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2I.   INTRODUCTION
“The personal  is  political,” feminists  have  declared  as  their  motto.  If  the  personal  is
political, and the political therefore personal, then this paper wishes to ask, what makes
militarisation personal, and how is it political? Militarisation is  defined  here  as  the  socio-
political process “in which individuals or political systems either become increasingly
dependent upon, controlled and affected by the military,” or “a process by which individuals
and political systems adopt militaristic values, beliefs, and presumptions about human history
that enhance military ones” (Enloe, 2004a: 219-220; Rycenga and Waller, 2001:121). By
examining dominant discourses of the War on Terrorism, how then is militarisation gendered
and gender militarised in the War on Terrorism? How are the consequences of US military
activity gendered? In what ways do discourses divide groups of individuals and encourage
aggression  by  the  sexual  subordination  and  Othering  of  enemies?  The  militarisation  process
for the War on Terrorism penetrates everyday social thinking and effects how individuals
perceive and interpret their state, society, and personal security. Wars have always been and
will continue to be reliant on hierarchical gender constructions. In contribution to other War
on Terrorism analyses, a feminist perspective highlights the significance of gender in this
particular field of US foreign policy, and demonstrates an innovative way to approach IR
dilemmas.
The ‘War on Terrorism’ remains an ambiguous policy by definition, but has
nonetheless produced two controversial wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, that have
demanded  constant  justification  and  explanation,  globally  as  well  as  domestically.  I  am
interested in how discourses on the War on Terrorism are constructed and reproduced in the
US for US citizens. These discourses are often contradictory and result in disturbing ironies,
like  the  description  of  the  death  and  destruction  in  New  York  City  as  a  ‘war  zone’  on  11
September 2001, in contrast to the referral to thousands of women and children killed by US
bombings in Iraq as ‘collateral damage.’ (Hensman in Joseph and Sharma, 2003: 25)
This  thesis  treats  such  larger  themes  of  the  War  on  Terrorism,  but  also  takes  a  keen
interest in individuals and the events in which they perform. Some individuals are anonymous
and invisible, while the bodies of others are given a physical presence in the publicity of their
person, or the larger group of bodies to which they belong. It is fascinating to observe, as
Judith Butler (2004b) does, how gender and sexuality determine which bodies are valuable
3and worth protecting, as opposed to those which are meaningless or even dangerous, thus
necessitating their destruction.
How gender is formative of US foreign policy is a very timely examination to
conduct. This thesis seeks to identify, examine and problematise hierarchical gender identities
that are constructed to legitimise the War on Terrorism. After a theoretical and
methodological discussion, the discourse analysis will proceed chronologically beginning
with those produced during and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It then
continues with the discourses of the US military response, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
which are at the core of this analysis. The discourse and representation analysis is conducted
on political themes, speeches, events, actions, spaces, places, images and individual stories
and experiences. They reflect how the War on Terrorism is justified, conducted and supported
by the feminisation of the Other, and the masculinisation of the self, where the
dehumanisation, demonisation homosexualisation, Orientalisation, and victimisation of
Others contrasts threateningly, to the bodily and sexually Puritanistic, heterosexual,
physically strong, civilised and righteous self.
This project was born out of a concern for the often-disturbing ways that gender is
manipulated to support and legitimise violence and militarism. It is something that continues
to both upset and fascinate me, for the capacity of the political world to regard violence as
‘normal,’ even ‘natural,’ is both interesting and distressing. These assumptions are entangled
with particular distributions of gender and sexuality that tragically constitute violence, and
encourage its perpetuation. These strong, haunting sentiments motivated and sustained my
interest and energy in researching and writing with enthusiasm, believing as Hannah Arendt
did that “the practice of violence, like all, action, changes the world, but the most probable
change is to a more violent world” (Arendt, 1970: 80).
II.   THEORISING GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Feminist IR theorists aim to demonstrate how gender is a central force in shaping IR
from  state  behaviour,  power  politics,  the  workings  of  the  global  economy,  and  all  other
aspects of world politics— “how we care about, perceive, understand, analyse, and critique the
world we live in is profoundly shaped by gender” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 10). As J. Ann
Tickner writes, despite these efforts this area of scholarship is still regarded as peripheral
amongst conventional IR theorists who fail to understand it and find it impossible to accept as
4a serious and useful approach. Agreeing with Tickner, that these misunderstandings occur
because “feminist IR scholars see different realities and draw on different epistemologies
from conventional IR theorists” (Tickner, 2001: 3; 2004: 50), it is important to first come to
terms with these differences and thus demonstrate why gender is important by showing how
these gendered realities reveal something meaningful about IR.
One central controversy, therefore that must be clarified early on is the concept of
gender. Even though it is generally understood as one’s socially constructed sexual identity, it
is nonetheless frequently equated with women and femininity. For gender to be able to tackle
IR proficiently, it is essential that ‘gender’ be understood as just as much about “men and
masculinity— something that is central to international politics since so much of the discipline
is about men and masculinity,”(Ticker, 2004: 51). Also, “it is not only females but males as
well who suffer form rigid gender roles” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 21). This, what I
consider to be a serious oversight— also by many feminist thinkers— is another obstacle for
traditional IR scholars to take feminist IR theory seriously, often because they feel
disconnected or threatened by women-centred conceptions of gender.
However, even this is not enough. If the concept of gender to be employed in a fuller
and more meaningful way, it is essential to theorise it further to the point where the idea of
sexuality itself becomes not only a theoretical cornerstone of the study, but also inseparable
from its methodological principles.  As V. Spike Peterson writes, “Feminism is not just ‘about
women,’ nor the addition of women to male-stream constructions; it is about transforming
ways of being and ways of knowing” (Peterson, 1992: 20). The following section begins by
describing the main established approaches to gender, following a deconstruction of the
concept in search of the appropriate definition.
Approaching Gender
There are three different recognised feminist approaches to gender in political theory.
Those referred to as liberal feminists recognise women’s exclusion from politics.  To correct
this perceived inequality among autonomous individuals, they pursue strategies for their
inclusion. (Squires, 2004: 3) Radical feminists seek to interpret and reconfigure the political
to make it open to their gendered specificity, and “attribute all of women’s oppression to an
undifferentiated concept of patriarchy” (Tickner, 2004: 15). The approach, however, is
criticised for being based on the knowledge and experience of Western, white, middle class
5women, and therefore does not “recognise differences amongst women based on race,  class,
sexual preference, and geographical location.” (Tickner, 2001:18)
Both reacting against and emerging from within this is standpoint feminism.
Standpoint feminists suppose that women’s experiences of the world are fundamentally
different from men’s and therefore they are in a special position to examine this system.
(Tickner, 2004: 17) Much of the criticism towards radical and standpoint feminism comes
from postcolonial or third world feminists, who are often more comfortable in the
postmodern/poststructuralist approach. Postmodern feminists normally use a genealogical
methodology, advocate diversity politics (instead of equality or difference), and speak of
gendering rather than gender. They aim to deconstruct, destabilise and displace the
oppositional discourses of political study. (Squires, 2004: 3). The strategy of displacement
differs from the strategies of de-patriarchalisation and ontologisation of the latter two feminist
approaches. Instead of replacing the political by the social by extending the principles of the
public sphere or celebrating their exclusion, deconstructivists argue, “it is more productive to
expose the internal tensions and contradictions that lie within any such distinction” (Squires,
2004: 52). In doing so, by politicising something that has been viewed as apolitical, what is
perceived as ‘natural’ is actually socially constructed and therefore subject to change.
There are therefore interesting differences in feminist epistemologies. The objective
frame adopted by liberal feminists, aims to determine ‘truth’ by providing universal values for
political reasoning. The interpretive frame  of  radical  feminists  aims  to  expose  and  interpret
already existing values within defined communities Finally, the task of the genealogical
frame  of  the  strategy  of  displacement  of  postmodern  feminists  is  to  question  the  ‘truth’,  to
“unsettle existing values by questioning their claims to self-evident status… to deconstruct
meaning claims in order to look for the modes of power they carry and to force open a space
for the emergence of counter-meanings.” (Squires, 2004: 80-81)
While the genealogical frame of postmodernism will serve as the primary frame of
analysis in this thesis, the interpretive frame used in standpoint epistemology will also be
required. Feminists with the interpretive frame as the default are often less comfortable with
the tension between the two frames when combining them in such a way, and seek to resolve
this. However, genealogical gender theorists often welcome this contradiction. Christine
Sylvester  celebrates  the  blend,  recommending  a  “playful  acceptance  of  all  existing
epistemologies” (Sylvester, 1994: 108-109). Judith Squires reminds us that the “virtue of
empiricist  epistemology  is  that  it  acts  as  a  reminder  that  we  need  the  workday  efforts  as
feminist scientists to uncover all the stories about men and women” (Squires, 2004: 108).
6Indeed, it would be impossible to conduct this thesis without the capacity to make the
experiences of men and women visible. In addition, Squires points out that standpoint
epistemology is constantly developing and becoming increasingly sophisticated; its ability to
identify multiple realities is beginning to blur the division between standpoint and
postmodernist thinking. My thesis therefore will use standpoint feminism to the extent that it
will make visible the gendered experiences of individuals, but remain within the postmodern
frame in order to deconstruct them critically— which is the central aim of this thesis.
Defining Gender
Subjectivity
Squires distinguishes between three significant approaches to subjectivity. First, the
determinist approach assumes biological determinism, in other words, that “one’s biological
sex determines one’s social and cultural characteristics and roles” (Squires, 2004: 55). Liberal
feminists used this to argue that despite their biology, they were equally capable of
rationalistic behaviour and thought (in other words, characteristics deemed masculine). The
second approach is constructionist, which emerged in the 1960s to counter biological
determinism. Simone de Beauvoir’s influential work The Second Sex was the first to develop
the theoretical sex/gender distinction, where sex is one’s biology (male/female), and gender is
one’s socially constructed identity (masculine/feminine). This approach has been highly
influential and has since become widely accepted.
However, the constructionist approach is under fire from the deconstructionist
direction  for  not  challenging  the  idea  of  presocial  biological  sex  difference.  Postmodern
feminist thinkers like Judith Butler (1999) argue that one’s physical sexuality is also a
consequence of one’s personal history and experience, that biology itself is a result of systems
of social organisation. Postmodern feminists often use Lacanian psychoanalytic theory or
Foucauldian theory and methodology, where both the physical and ideological affect gender.
The deconstructionist approach to subjectivity is strongly based on Michel Foucault’s
notation of subjectivity as the result of the operations of power upon the body (Foucault,
1988: 50). Let us now examine Foucault’s conception of power in order to better understand
why the sex/gender distinction requires re-examination and reconfiguration.
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Instead of the conventional and simplistic understand of power as ‘power-over,’
Foucault’s  conception  of  power  differs  in  three  fundamental  ways.  First  of  all,  power  is
exercised,  rather  than  possessed.  It  is  not  fundamentally  repressive,  but  also productive and
generates effects including resistance; and power comes from below, so it must be analysed
from the bottom-up, not top-down. (Foucault, 1978: 92-95; 1980b: 98; Shanely and Pateman,
1994: 220) Power must be understood as penetrating all levels of social existence; “Power is
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere”
(Foucault, 1978: 93). It is therefore not uni-directional, but multi-directional1 (Squires, 2004:
36), and network-like. Wherever there is a relationship, there is power, and thus,
subordination. Hence, social structures are hierarchical, as are gendered structures. But, the
domination that is exercised in society is not the kind of one-over-another, but rather,
complex and manifold, where “the multiple forms of subjugation... have a place and function
within the social organism” (Foucault, 1980b: 96). Because power is not a thing that can be
identified in a specific location or in someone’s hands like a commodity, it “must be analysed
as something which circulates, or... only functions in the form of a chain” (1980: 98).
Foucault of course is not without critics. (Callinicos, 1990; Eagleton, 1991; Taylor,
1986; Walzer, 1986) Some argue that he places too much emphasis on power as repressive,
whereas others in contrast argue that he underestimates the structures of domination. A
common criticism is also directed towards the tension in the definition of power as both
suppressive and capacitating (therefore as both objectivising and subjectivising). Others, like
Gillian Rose (1984), simply dismiss him as a pessimistic nihilist of “simply that old familiar
despair” (Rose, 1984: 11).
Postmodern feminists in turn have been criticised for this approach, often by other
feminists. They have been attacked for undermining the goal of female emancipation by
changing the emphasis from female oppression to gender constructions by rejecting the
universal category of ‘woman.’ Others see postmodernism as a “receipt for stasis, if not
indeed paralysis” (Evans, 1995: 149) because they believe it removes women’s agency— if
power is inescapable, then how should it be countered, even if produces the means for its own
subversion? The approach is dismissed as too complicated, impractical, and not applicable.
1 Hannah Arendt defines power similarly as consensual, as opposed to instrumental; “Power is never the property
of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together… The
moment the group, from which the power of the group originated to begin with, [the power of someone ‘in
power’] also vanishes” (Arendt, 1970: 44).
8In spite of these varying criticisms, many, especially postmodern feminists, have find
Foucault’s theories immensely useful. (Squires, 2004: 37-38) His broad definition of power
allows feminists to critically examine the production of gender from the bottom-up, starting
from gender experiences and identities, instead of top-down, when particular assumptions
reign  as  the  ‘truth’ about  sex  and  gender.  It  also  transcends  the  problematic  dichotomies  of
previous feminisms and offers new methods not only of analysing gender, but also new ways
of enabling individuals to destabilise and transform the self, to redefine and create new
identities that open new possibilities. (Roseneil, 1999: 177) Foucault’s approach, in fact, does
not overemphasise the repressive capabilities of power. Critics overlook that one of the prime
features of Foucault’s conception of power is that it is also productive. According to Foucault;
If power were never anything but repressive... do you really think one would be brought to
obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces
discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole
social body, much more than has a negative instance whose function is repression.
(Foucault, 1980b: 109)
While this too can be argued to be ultimately repressive if power were argued to bend
subjects to its will by the coercive employment of incentives to obey it. However, considering
the repression of individuals, power is the source of the individual itself. One of the primary
effects of power is to render “certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain
desires [to] be identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault, 1980b: 98). Relations of
power that produce truths are constantly and infinitely established and re-established by
discourse. Freedom from repression is also found within its creator, whereby freedom and
power are inseparable from one another; “At the very heart of the power relationship, and
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom”
(Foucault in Campbell, 1998: 204). Power therefore may be repressive, but it also provides
subjects with their agency. Hence, neither women’s agency nor the agency of any gender or
sexuality is eliminated in postmodern philosophy.
Power does not exist where there is no capacity for resistance, and discourse, in which
power and knowledge are joined together, “transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but
also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it”
(Foucault, 1978: 101). This understanding of power, and its presence and function in
discourse are inseparable from the aims of this thesis. It is tied to the understanding of gender
9and how power relations construct gender identity. It enables the researcher to identify a
broader scope of relations, sources, directions and effects of power, resulting in an analysis
seeking a more profound understanding of where power lies in the perpetuation of gender, and
with what effects and meaning.
Gender
Next is the question of gender itself. One of the most influential gender theorists
following Foucauldian notion of subjectivity is Judith Butler, whose understanding of gender
is crucial in this thesis. The most essential characteristic of Bulterian gender theory is that
gender is approached as performative; “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of
gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be
its results” (Butler, 1999: 33). Like power is not produced alone, neither is gender; “One is
always ‘doing’ it with or for another, even if the other is only imaginary” (Butler, 2004b: 1).
Gender is therefore an act that requires repetitive performance “of a set of meanings already
socially established; it is the mundane and ritualised form of their legitimation” (Butler, 1999:
178). It is a process without beginning or end, “an ongoing discursive practice… open to
intervention and resignification” (Butler, 1999: 43).
Because gender is never ‘fixed’ as it is imagined to be, there cannot be merely the two
genders (masculine/feminine)— there are many.2 Gender categories become complicated and
multidimensional to the point where their borders become blurred, or are discarded altogether
because of their inability to describe the nature and production (and reproduction) of genders.
As Butler writes, “Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency
from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time,
instituted in an exterior space through a stylised repetition of acts” (Butler, 1999: 179, italics
original). Thus gender is not understood as a noun, but an act and norm. Yet, social
constructions divide into male and female sexes. Recalling Monica Wittig, Butler argues,
“such a division suits the economic needs of heterosexuality, and lends a naturalistic gloss to
the institution of heterosexuality” (Butler, 1999: 143). Thus, not only do social gender norms
only legitimise a narrow understanding of two genders, but also this understanding is further
discriminatory by adhering to strict heterosexism. Those who do not conform to these norms
are punished accordingly.
2 This forms the basis of queer theory, of which Butler is considered to be one of the main developers. Queer
theory is useful in this thesis particularly when examining for example homophobia and heterosexism in
masculinities.
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The body,  as  the  subject  of  this  control,  is  as  central  to  the  process  of  gender  as  the
mind because it too is a site of gender ‘doing’ or ‘being done to.’ The body itself is
“constructed by discourses and practices that take the body both as their target and as their
vehicle of expression” (Gatens, 1992: 132). Bodies are public— and political. Butler writes
that “although we struggle for the rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for which we
struggle are not quite ever our own… my body is and is not mine” (Butler, 2004a: 21). In
addition Butler distinguishes between the discursive presence of visible and invisible bodies.
For example, that violence against bodies with a silent discourse— where lives and therefore
losses do not exist— “leaves a mark that is no mark” (2004b: 25)3.
Foucauldian notions of discipline and production are both present. In Discipline and
Punish (1975), Foucault argues that power relations work on the body, and discipline it.
Importantly, the concept of ‘discipline’ for Foucault;
may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a
modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures,
levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.
(Foucault, 1987: 215)
 In The History of Sexuality: Volume One (1978), Foucault introduces the term bio-
power to refer to the process by which techniques and institutions of power discipline the
body and control and regulate populations. He argues that power is no longer exercised over
legal subjects by the domination of death, but over the biology of human bodies and thus the
level of life itself. (Foucault, 1978: 139-145) Foucault’s genealogical study suggests that the
notion of sexuality did not exist until it was forced into the open by the repressive compulsion
of ritual confessions of sex that emerged in the nineteenth century with the institutionalisation
and psychiatrisation of society. Regulated confession and psychoanalysis formed discourses
of ‘true’ sexualities, and condemned others as false and perverse. Thus, it is the power regime
of sexuality that creates, categorises and legitimises the idea of sexuality. Sexual identity is
“always constructed within the terms of discourse and power, where power is partially
understood in terms of heterosexual and phallic cultural conventions” (Butler, 1999: 40).
3 As an immediate example she cites, for example, African AIDS victims. This argument is made in Undoing
Gender (2004b) in the context of how gender and sexuality are related to the recognition of personhood, and
likewise, dehumanisation. In Precarious Life (2004a), she forms a similar discussion of September 11 and post-
9/11 politics. These ideas are important to this thesis, and will be discussed in further detail in the context of
gendering IR.
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This thesis is interested in masculinities and femininities (in their plurals) as they are
produced and performed in the War on Terrorism. There is no single masculinity, and no
single femininity, but rather many interpretations of each that are located in fluctuating
hierarchies according to crosscutting factors like nationality, race or religion. The interest is
not simply in the gender hierarchies between but  also within these identities, as hierarchies
and  power  relations  exist  between  different  masculinities,  and  different  femininities,  not
simply between masculinities and femininities. And, in Bulter’s prescription, the
deconstruction of the political genealogy of gender ontologies should provide insight into the
constitutive acts of gender. These acts are then located and accounted for as prescribed by the
forces that discipline the social appearance of gender (Butler, 1999:44).
Race, Religion, and the Orient
 But there is still another dimension of gender that remains untouched, and those are
the effects of other social dividers like race, class and religion. Such factors have often been
discussed  in  relation  to  the  War  on  Terrorism,  but  less  often  in  relation  to  gender.  Yet,  this
thesis holds that they are inseparable from gender identities— and central to the nature of the
discourses of the War on Terrorism. The supposition that the categories of ‘men’ and
‘women’ “simply need to be filled with the various components of race, class, age, ethnicity,
and sexuality in order to be complete” (Butler, 1999: 21) assumes that these variables are
incomplete, therefore are permanently under (re)definition. Cultural identity, therefore, is
gendered because gender cuts across its constitutive categories.
Culture has a close association with race and culture when a people’s common
characteristics are discussed. Edward Said (1993) discusses the process of classification of
nature and humans into types. Reviewing Kant, Diderot, or Johnson, Said recognises a
“penchant for dramatising general features, for reducing vast numbers of objects to a smaller
number of orderable and describable types” (Said, 1993: 199; italics original) in the
eighteenth century. These designated generalisations gathered power in the nineteenth century
when they were allied with genetics. Difference began to be discussed in terms of genetic
universals, the Other’s primary characteristics, and his/her “primitive” state (Said, 1993: 199-
200). Therefore, while race can be defined in terms of genetic or physical difference, its
meaning lies in the concept of racial difference. While there have been attempts to identify
different levels of racism e.g. Wieviorka, 1994), such attempts should be understood as a part
of  a  continuum.  Even  so,  as  Said  argues,  racial  difference  created  by  European  colonialism
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enabled  the  creation  of  the  idea  of  the  White  Man.  It  was  an  idea,  and  a  reality  involving  a
particularly “reasoned position towards both the white and the non-white worlds” (Said, 1993:
227-288). It defined what it meant to be a White Man in the world (in other words, the leader
of human civilisation and the messiah of the savagery of the non-White world).
Gender hierarchies are created when differences in social categories precisely like race
are introduced. Commonly, they characterise the Other by constructing their sexual identity as
inferior,  often  by  feminisation.  For  example,  categories  of  race  generally  involve  the
discursive construction of particular masculinities and femininities. (Lewis and Mills, 2003;
Puar and Rai, 2002) Nira Yuval-Davis for instance observes that, “blackness has been
associated with evil, monsters and base sexuality” (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 50). She also argues
that “the embodiment dimension of the racialised Other puts sexuality at the heart of the
racialised imagery which projects dreams of forbidden pleasures and fears of impotency onto
the Other” (2003: 51). Racial and minority stereotyping endows specific characterisations that
can often stand in contrast to one another, for example the ‘violent’ Afro-Caribbean and the
‘wimpy’ Asian men. Members of the hegemonic community regard the Other as inferior and
uncivilised, and possessive of a base, lustful sexuality. Indeed, black men have often been
lynched for “mythical sexual intercourse with white women which could only be constructed
as rape within this discourse” (ibid.). The myth of the strange and unknown Other as a rapist
is frequent within racialised discourses. Cynthia Enloe additionally points out that the
relationships with racialised others involve other forms of sexual domination. The Asian sex
tourism industry is an example of the dependence of postcolonial individuals on male
Orientalist fantasies. These postcolonial subjects are economically dependent on these sexual
dreams and desires of Western men for survival. (Enloe, 2000a: 35-40, Yuval-Davis, 2003:
52)
The fascination with the so-called Orient goes back far in time to early European
colonialism.  Edward  W.  Said  is  well  known  for  his  criticism  of Orientalism, which he
describes as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special
place in European Western experience” (Said, 1993: 1). The Orient was a source of great
material and cultural richness and inspiration to Europe, and the relationship between the two
is a relationship of power, domination, and complex hegemony. It cannot be described as
simply a product of the European imagination. The Orient was not Oriental simply because it
was discovered to be so, but because it “could be - that is, submitted to being - made Oriental”
(Said,  1993:  6).  As  a  result  the  Orient  was  instrumental  in  defining  Western  self  as  its
contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience. Europe acquired strength and identity by
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portraying the Orient as its inferior self. (Said, 1993: 2, 3) The heritage of colonialist thought
therefore continues to define the unequal relationship between West and East.
While Said’s perceptions of Orientalism lack a gender perspective, his observations
have been helpful to postcolonial feminist theories that have in that context made the
gendered perceptions of the self and Other, as described above. They recognise that the
“discourses of cultural and sexual difference are powerfully mapped onto each other”
(Ye?eno?lu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 549). The highly publicised and controversial debate
surrounding the Muslim veil demonstrates this ongoing discourse. Opinions are highly
fractioned not only between East and West, but groups of people in them, including Muslims
themselves, as well as feminists. Postcolonial feminists often accuse Western feminists of
essentialising and victimising non-Western women as being in need of the emancipatory
assistance of their ‘liberated’ Western sisters, and this allegation is constantly repeated in the
case of the veil.4 As  Meyda  Ye?eno?lu  describes,  the  veil  captures  Western  fantasies  where
the exotic female figure represents the mysteries and secrets of the Orient. The concealment is
seductive, but simultaneously threatening, explaining Western desires to liberate the
backward and uncivilised Orient by lifting the veil, demystifying the Other. The colonizer’s
desire to control and dominate the (feminised) foreign land and bodies is articulated in the
surveillance of what may lurk behind the veil. (Ye?eno?lu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 547-
557)
The religious dimension of interpretations of the Orient cannot be ignored either. The
terrorists of 11 September 2001 were Muslim, and so the US voices of the War on Terrorism
have been particularly targeted at Islamic fundamentalism with immense suspicion and
hostility. In stark contrast to this is an American Christian fundamentalism that is apparent in
US foreign policy discourses. Considering that religions supply individuals with answers to
existentialist predicaments, definitions of good and evil, and meaning to life itself, it is a
considerably powerful domain of everyday ontology and epistemology. Both Christianity and
Islam seek to answer on behalf of all of humanity, not just a particular collectivity, and
thereby engage its members in religious and cultural imaginations and their hierarchies of
desirability - determining global inclusions and exclusions (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 42-43).
Religious principles are also determinants of the limits of sexual propriety. Different
standards and practices often provoke scorn or disgust from other religious cultures - as we
4 Western feminists are increasingly aware, however, that the veil may no longer be a tool and symbol of
traditional female oppression. Instead, many consider that it has become an asset to their struggle, the
“embodiment of their will to act, their agency” (Ye?eno?lu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 558)
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have  seen  in  the  case  of  the  veil.  For  example,  David  Campbell  in Writing Security (1998)
discusses the Puritan American self constantly defining and redefining itself in contrast to
spiritually inferior Others, due to their paganism, race, communist beliefs, or other
rationalisations.  Indeed, religious Others are often approached by the West in much the same
way as racial or Oriental others, whereby non-Christians are seen as morally inferior, if not
pagan-like, and thus also sexually perverted and depraved. However, again we must be
cautious, for there are variations and exceptions in these constantly transforming discourses.
As mentioned, Islamic women are more likely to be regarded as victims of Muslim men, both
sexually as well as politically. The relationship between East and West, however, remains
hierarchal with the West asserting a relative moral superiority and desire to control.
These processes discussed here are dehumanising and demonising for the Other in
question. Gender and sexuality are indeed part of the cultural discourses of identity that result
in the production and legitimisation of imagined hierarchical borders between communities by
differentiating between us/them and inside/outside. As we find ourselves already discussing
it, the following section proceeds directly to theorise gender in International Relations.
Gendering International Relations
Feminist theory identifies international politics from its realist roots essentially as a
masculine-constructed arena therefore its rules, values and expectations are gendered in
favour of men by a process of socialisation— “how individuals are taught culturally
appropriate attitudes and behaviours” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 19)— forming gender
identities. 5  Peterson and Runyan call “gender ideology” the belief system of gender
stereotypes legitimised in this process (1993: 26). Butler concurs, saying that “genders can be
neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent” but still punishments are distributed to those
who do not abide by them (Butler, 1990: 141-140).
As a consequence, men’s experiences and knowledge in IR are accepted as universal
and even superior (Hoffman-Hizi, 2002: 7). The continuing public-private dichotomy
structurally sustains this perception, where masculinities are political and active, and
femininities are personal and passive. For example, central concepts such as ‘power’ and
‘security’ that have origins in realist thought have distinctive gender constructions that
5 For a clear sociological discussion about how discourse analysis reveals how patriarchal discourses are created
and maintained and how individuals become socialised see Walby, 1990:97-103. World religions and ideological
systems are core examples of how patriarchy is mediated through language and belief.
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legitimise an aggressive masculine identity. Taking the concept of ‘power’ as an example,
Spike V. Peterson and Anne Runyan point out that it,
Is usually defined as ‘power-over,’ specifically, the ability to get someone to do what you
want. It is usually measured by control of resources, especially those supporting physical
coercion...  and obscures the fact that power reckoning is embedded in sociocultural
dynamics and value systems.
(Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 33)
It is not that this type of power is not a so-called reality, but that it is a socio-culturally
determined interpretation, which is essentially biased towards perpetuating self-sustaining
cycles of violence;
The point is not that power-over, aggressive behaviour, and life-threatening conflicts are
not  ‘real’  but  that  they  are  only  a  part  of  a  more  complicated  story.  Focusing  on  them
misrepresents our reality even as it (to some extent unnecessarily) reproduces power-over,
aggressive behaviour and life threatening conflicts.
(Peterson and Runyan 1993: 35)
The  concept  of  ‘security’  is  similarly  gendered.  It  “is  understood  not  in  terms  of
celebrating and sustaining life but as the capacity to be indifferent to ‘others’ and, if
necessary, to harm them” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 34).
Peterson and Runyan refer to ‘Gender ideology’ as the belief system of gender
stereotypes that are legitimised in the process of socialising individuals to particular gender
roles. In gendering IR, feminist theorists pay close attention to the oppositional dichotomous
structures in IR. They structurally sustain the perception of masculinity/men as political,
active, and rational, and femininity/women as personal, passive and irrational, respectively.
For example, self/other, autonomy/dependence, agency/passivity, rational/emotional,
fact/value, hard/soft, mind/body, civilised/primitive, public/private are all androcentric 6
dichotomies. (Peterson and Runyan 1993: 25) Dichotomies hold a set of assumptions that
allocate dominance to term A at the expense of not-A. (Gatens, 1991: 93) Feminists are
particularly interested in deconstructing them because of their dominance over social thinking
6 Androcentric— prioritising men as the most important actors and men’s experiences and perceptions as the
most worthwhile and legitimate. They are considered to be natural and are thus left unchallenged. (Peterson and
Runyan, 1993: 25).
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and  practices,  and  thus  over  constructions  of  gender,  man  and  woman,  where  men’s
experiences and knowledge are accepted as universal and even superior, even in IR
(Hoffman-Hizi, 2002: 7). Their deconstruction provides opportunities to break down existing
divisions and imagine how they might be reconstructed differently.
The feminist ‘bottom-up’ approach seeks to challenge this thinking ontologically and
epistemologically. It pushes it beyond its typical dichotomous and state-centric locking, and
seeks to recognize how uneven social structures, especially gender hierarchies, have a
detrimental effect on the general populace, its groups, and individuals. (Tickner, 2001: 48) Or,
as Peterson and Runyan put it:
These values not only fail to benefit everybody; they no longer (if ever) unproblematically
benefit elite men. And they have never afforded accurate understandings of the world. These
orientations are not all bad, but their pursuit at the expense of other values has always been
costly.
(Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 43)
Feminist IR theorists thus argue that the state too is gendered due to the male
domination of political elites and the ‘cult of masculinity’ among its members. As such, state
policies are also gendered. This does not mean that women are invariably oppressed by the
state, but women are nonetheless frequently marginalised or ignored in state affairs,
delegitimising and de-politicising their experiences, sufferings, and security concerns by
binding them to the ‘private’ sphere. Feminists especially point to structural violence, such as
poor  health  care,  sexual  harassment,  wage  gaps,  rights  and  resources  that  sustain  structural
inequality and power relations. (Peterson, 1992: 45-46)
Physical violence, too, is gendered. The state concerns itself with ‘hard’ security
issues,  in  other  words,  violence  that  engages  the  power  of  the  state  for  the  protection  of  its
own power and existence, often against another state. However, the state does not act as the
securer of the protection of women’s bodies. (Peterson, 1992: 46) Sexual violence and
violence against women (including domestic violence) interpreted as ‘private’ and thus not of
public or political interest is especially disturbing. The shocking scale violence that is targeted
against women and their children behind the closed doors of the home is not considered to be
a matter of state concern. This apathetic posture helps legitimise the idea of violence against
women as an unstoppable natural reality of everyday life and heterosexual relationships. The
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state  can  thus  prove  to  be  lethal  to  its  female,  second-class  citizens7. The main point here,
however, is that the state is not only the legitimate actor of violence, but also the determinant
of what violence warrants state intervention by dividing of violence into categories public and
private. This division prioritises the interests of masculinist elites, marginalises women’s
sufferings and keeps them in a subordinate social position. This division also becomes
problematic when examining the issue of terrorism, as will be discussed later.
It is also necessary to mention that these structures are also legitimised by gendered
national identities, on which a state’s continued existence and success is dependent. Because
nationalist identities invoke ideas of community, which consists of familial relations, gender
roles are more difficult to distinguish. However, the family implies matrimonial relations that
create metaphors of motherlands, fatherlands and homelands that appeal to a shared sense of
transcendental  purpose  and  community  for  states  and  their  citizens  alike.  In  addition,  these
national identities are frequently used by political elites to promote state interests throughout
the society in question, while concealing racial and social class divisions. (Tickner, 2001: 54-
56) In wartime, women’s bodies become sites of national security. Their identities as mothers
to children are enlarged to encompass motherhood to the nation-state. (Nikolic-Ristanovic,
1996: 359-360) Women are both the mothers of the nation and the nation itself. The state is
thus personified as a female embodiment of the nation to be protected by the (usually
masculine) citizens of the state. Lady Liberty of the United States, Britannia of Britain and the
French Marianne are fascinating examples of this feminine national personification that is not
only the embodiment of national values, but also its honour, purity and righteousness.
Although often adorning battle gear, these characters are divine cheerleaders of the national
cause, and stand in the sidelines of battle as reminders of national cause and virtue.
There have been attempts to alter or even abandon traditional realist thinking about
security, but it continues to dominate our understanding of politics in its conventional sense
despite its the increasing realisation of its inabilities and inadequacies as a political category
especially in a post-Cold War era. In the post-September 11 period, realism has continued to
relinquish its inter-state assumptions of IR, but retains such fundamental assumptions as
rational  actor  behaviour  or  game theory.  Articles  on  the  War  on  Terrorism published  in  the
widely read and respected realist journal World Politics provide  a  general  sketch  of  the
direction of post- September 11 realism. Daniel Philpott (2002) for example, addresses the
7 The term ‘citizen’ has been historically problematic for women. When men were endowed with the rights of
citizenship, women continued and continue still to be excluded from positions of economic and political power,
including military combat, thus enabling them to be referred to as so-called second-class citizens (Tickner, 1997:
627).
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problem  of  non-state  actors  in  IR,  but  replaces  the  inter-state  dilemma  with  a  Samuel
Huntington (2002) type of ‘clash of civilisations’ scenario where radical Islam is pitted neck-
to-neck against Western Westphalian international society. Likewise, Lisa Anderson (2004)
approaches the War on Terrorism by attempting to assess “What are the rules of this game?”
(Anderson, 2004: 307) and Daniel L. Byman (2003) strives to ‘know’ the enemy Al-Qaeda,
and thereby educate citizens and government officials to enable them to devise effective
strategies for their annihilation. Mainstream realism, therefore, continues to focus on strategic
calculations and the discovery of objective truths about IR, even in the War on Terrorism.
The feminist approach emphasises how dramatically gender identities are involved in
creating, sustaining and legitimising the realist security system. It is important to bear in mind
that so far at present the feminist IR approach is heavily Western, and that analyses conducted
with  it  are  mainly  critiques  of  Western  states.  This  thesis  focuses  on  the  United  States,  but
also deals heavily the non-Western countries of Afghanistan and Iraq. This approach is
nonetheless appropriate because of the main interest being in US foreign policy, and the
inclusion of Third World/Orientalist feminist theory helps to alleviate the heavy Western
imprint. The next section discusses war and militarisation from this approach.
War and Militarisation
War and violence are accepted as natural and inevitable consequences of an anarchic
world order. The tautological belief in fighting for peace and then sustaining it by preparing
for war creates a self-perpetuating cycle of militarisation and violence. As a result, arms races
emerge that “involve sacrificing social welfare objectives in favour of defence spending and
training of young people to risk lives and practice violence in the name of putatively higher
objectives” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 36). In the process, structural androcentric
dichotomies  are  assumed  and  defined  that  legitimate  opposition  and  conflict,  for  example
self/other, us/them, friend/enemy, aggressive/passive, soldier/victim, and protector/protected.
Again, these definitions are considered to be natural and are thus left unchallenged. As a
consequence, the former experience of the world is celebrated and the latter marginalised,
forbidding the possibility of alternative experiences.
This androcentrism becomes tremendously obvious when observing war. Women’s
roles and experiences in war have largely been invisible, implying that they are not considered
to be important in the war system. History books consistently exclude any mention of women
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and instead focus on— and often celebrate— great strategies, battles and military leaders. 8 In
actual fact, women are just as centrally instrumental in enabling war as men. The practice of
war militarises the bodies and sexualities of both men and women, albeit in different ways,
with different consequences and forms of suffering. To this I now turn my attention.
Masculinity and the Military
The war system is dependent on the maintenance of producing and reproducing gender
roles that maintain its effectiveness and legitimacy. This entails sustaining a type of
masculinity  that  encourages  men  to  sacrifice  their  lives  and  kill  others,  and  subordinate
femininities that help men fulfil these roles.
Referring back to the process of socialization, Joshua S. Goldstein argues, “Men are
made, not born. Unlike women, men must take actions, undergo ordeals, or pass tests in order
to become men. They are told to ‘be a man’”(Goldstein, 2001: 264). Peterson and Runyan
concur that military machismo is highly gendered because “militaries need men to act as
‘men,’ that is, to be willing to kill and die on the behalf of the state to prove their ‘manhood,’”
(Peterson and Runyan, 2003: 83). J. Ann Tickner writes that, although war is generally
considered to be manly, military training is focused on turning men into soldiers “using
misogynist training 9  that is thought necessary to teach men to fight [and] such training
depends on the denigration of anything that could be considered feminine” (Tickner, 2001:
57). This hegemonic masculinity is dependent on the degradation of a feminised
understanding of peaceful conflict-resolution that is perceived as idealistic and unrealisable
(2001: 49). There is therefore a close relationship between gender roles and how they are
understood— one is defined in relation to the other, and they interact hierarchically.
A study of hegemonic masculinities in politics is found in Charlotte Hooper’s Manly
States (2001), which amongst several other works interested in masculinities draws its theory
first and foremost from R.W. Connell’s Masculinities (1995). Adapting Antonio Gramsci's
concept of hegemony, Connell describes hegemonic masculinity as located at the top of the
relations of dominance and subordination among groups of men. Hegemonic masculinity is
not a fixed gender type, but varies in time and place. It must instead be defined as “the
masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations, as
8 Goldstein, for example, remarks that in his writing on the Second World War historian Stephen Ambrose only
passingly mentions women in reference to wartime prostitution— therefore as commodities, but otherwise
“Ambrose bypasses sex, presumably because it does not matter at the front” (Goldstein, 2001: 338)
9 See for example (Bourke, 1999: 132) and (Goldstein, 1999:  264-269)
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position always contestable” (Connell, 1995: 76). There can be no equivalent hegemonic
femininity because although there are hierarchies among femininities, all femininities are
subordinate to the hegemonic masculinity regardless. This masculinity relies heavily on a self-
identification with heterosexuality and defines itself in opposition to homosexuality, which is
at the bottom of the gender hierarchy among men. But, heterosexual masculinities can also be
subordinate. Hooper also remarks that hegemonic masculinity is often racist and
oppositionally defines itself against other ‘subordinate’ non-white masculinities. (Hooper,
2001: 55) This will be important when looking at the dehumanisation and demonisation of
terrorists/Afghani and Iraqi men. (Connell, 1995: 76-78; Hooper, 2001: 54-55)
Here we again find violence as a disturbing instrument in gender and sexual relations.
Most  instances  of  major  violence  are  performed  by  men  and  generally  function  to  draw
boundaries and exclusions, symbolic and physical, not just against women, but amongst each
other or against homosexual men. Violence can be a method of asserting masculinity, and it is
the ideology of masculinity that legitimises its use. (Connell, 1995: 83)
Hegemonic masculinities are particularly significant and visible in the military, where
the hegemonic masculinity is the combative ideal, also accounting for the relentless
misogynistic and homophonic character of militaristic identities. (Tickner, 2001: 57) Because
the ‘feminine’ is equated with an inferior and undesirable, anything interpreted as feminine is
regarded as threatening to the realisation of hegemonic masculinity. Arguably, this ‘proving
one’s manhood’ is an inescapable and essential characteristic of an institution whose purpose
is to persuade men to act kill and/or die for their state. It is effective too, for those who fail to
display the appropriate behaviour are publicly disgraced become group-outsiders as ‘failed
men.’ (Goldstein, 2001: 269) Arto Jokinen argues that men are easily persuaded, tempted or
even forced to accept hegemony because is assures, if not at least promises them a degree of
gender-based power for all men (Jokinen, 2000: 215).
Goldstein elaborates widely on misogyny— the “‘mother’s milk of militarism’”
(Goldstein, 2001: 371)— in militaries as a way of promoting a hegemonic masculinity. He
argues that central to putting pressuring men to conform to the desired masculinity is the fear
of shame. Becoming a group-outsider as a ‘failed man’ is an unbearable fate, considering that
one’s position in one’s social group is one of the most essential driving forces of human
behaviour (Goldstein, 2001: 269). Men therefore must either “pay the price of a warrior
mentality— anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), emotional difficulties in
relationships— or pay the price of humiliation and shame that faces the sissy as a failed man”
(ibid.).
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This helps explain the aggressive homophobia 10  prevalent in militaries, which are
often endorsed by state in its laws— for example in the US, in the ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’
policy11. Goldstein provides an interesting analysis, explaining that because homosexuality is
equated with femininity, it is incompatible with and destructive for the hierarchal hegemonic
masculinity structure of the military;
[The presence of gay soldiers] makes ambiguous the construction of male soldiers as
dominant sexual actors whose submissive-receptive partners are women external to the
military force… Because homosexuality is read as effeminate, the presence of openly
homosexual men shatters the homosocial unity needed to successfully carry out aggression
against fraternising across ranks.
(Goldstein, 2001: 374)
He  links  this  homophobia  with  the  need  to  feminise  one’s  enemies  as  a  form  of
“symbolic domination” (2001: 356). Because masculinity is the dominant identity, enemies
are psychologically subordinated by sexualising them with the subservient gender—
femininity. During the Gulf War, for example, Saddam Hussein was frequently feminised or
rhetorically sodomized by American troops. The systematic repetition sexist expressions in
war function to legitimise and re-emphasise such hierarchies. For example, “a US pilot, after
shooting down a male Iraqi pilot, reportedly said he ‘cold smoked the bitch’ (not the
‘bastard’)” (ibid.).
It may well be that nationalism is heterosexist as Peterson argues. Not only does
nationalism denigrate the ‘other’ out-group as feminine in its inferiority that establishes the
in-group as the dominant masculine. This order can be reversed by feminising the self in order
to rally the protectionism of citizens against a masculine, aggressive enemy. Regardless, the
relationship remains heterosexual. Social relations are organised within heterosexist groups by
“polarised gender identities, heterosexist families, masculinist ideology, patriarchal power and
10 Goldstein is quick to remind that this is by no means universal; “The US military's homophobia reflects a
culturally embedded view that homosexuality represents a feminisation of men. By contrast, other cultures
elsewhere have constructed homosexuality as having a masculinising effect in males and this is an asset in
military mobilisation. In the Theban Sacred Band of ancient Greece— a very capable military force— gay
relationships among soldiers were openly encouraged. Men were placed in the ranks alongside their lovers on the
theory that they would not disgrace themselves by showing cowardice while their beloved was watching. The
sexual bonds between male soldiers enhanced cohesion and boosted motivation.” (Goldstein, 2001: 374-5)
11 While the policy does not forbid homosexuals to join, they must remain ‘in the closet,’ in return for not being
asked about their sexual orientation, otherwise risking expulsion. See (Bell and Binnie, 2000: 64-65). The ban on
homosexuals in the British military was only lifted in 2000.
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authority… [to] achieve group coherence and continuity through hierarchical (sex/gender)
relations” (Peterson, 1999: 55).
The systematic rape of an enemy’s female population is the most disturbing form of
symbolic humiliation in war. Women as child bearers embody the nation— and men the
state— and hence are seen as national property to be ‘protected.’12 Gender therefore has a role
in ethnonationalism where “women’s bodies as symbols of the nation, markers of the in-
group, and national ‘property’ to be defended and protected by men” (Goldstein, 2001: 371)
from the out-group. To dominate and damage them by rape is a declaration of victory over an
enemy too weak to protect its most valuable goods— again feminising the enemy, who is
metaphorically endangering the nation. In sum, “if symbolic and actual rape encode
domination, then misogyny serves as an important motor of male aggression in war” (ibid.).
Because defeat is the ultimate humiliation, hegemonic masculinity is valorised in its
role as the ‘protector.’ It links military masculinity with particular values like honour, loyalty,
and righteousness and it  is  this type of masculinity that belongs to heroes and myth making.
(Tickner, 2001: 57) Tickner recalls that the “defining moments in collective historical
memories are frequently wars of national liberation, great victories in battles against external
enemies, or the glories of former imperialist expansion” (2001: 56). Such war tales are often
depicted in story telling to mobilise public support for war and rely largely on a celebration
this mythic and heroic masculinity. The myth of a just warrior fighting to ‘protect’ vulnerable
women and children continues to prevail despite that everyone loses  in  war,  albeit  in
somewhat different ways
The ‘protector-protected’ roles are therefore socio-cultural constructions, and essential
for the legitimation of war despite its falsehood. 13  It also disables any possibility of
questioning the purpose and negative effects of war by both men and women. Also, women’s
role as life-givers, as opposed to life-takers (the role given to soldiers) expects them to mourn
and rebuild  after  the  war.  Therefore  anyone  who questions  it  by  asking  ‘for  whom?’ or  ‘for
what?’ [is the war fought] is usually considered “ungrateful for the protection courageously
delivered by men and states through their military might and actions” (Peterson and Runyan,
1993: 123).
Going further back one could suggest that there is a pattern of rugged militaristic
hegemonic masculinity in the US at times of dwindling self-confidence. The trauma of the
12 Enloe says that because of this division that makes rape more about power and sex, “not only the rapist, but
the state is culpable” (Enloe, 2000a: 195).
13 This dichotomy is also embedded in the basis for just war theory, and “has to a great extent been codified in
international law” (Höglund, 2003: 244).
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Vietnam War and the consequent ‘Vietnam-syndrome’ had detrimental consequences on the
muscular US masculinity that was prided since the Second World War. After suffering this
humiliation in the 1970s, the 1980s saw a remasculinisation of the US. Films like Rambo, The
Terminator, and Top Gun venerated the burly independent hero and feminised the ‘feeble’
political administration that had prevented the US military from winning the war. Vietnam
veterans became “emblems of masculinity unjustly victimised -- by their government, the
war, the Vietnamese, American protesters, and the women’s movement” (Goldstein, 2001:
279). The rebirth of a purified masculinity and the rejection of femininity was central in the
neoconservative politics of the 1980s. (Campbell, 2005: 957-962)
The final reclamation can be argued to have been achieved with the success Gulf War.
However, it did not result in a complete restoration of the previous post-Second World War
hegemonic masculinity. As discussed, hegemonic masculinities fluctuate in time, space and
place, and so are never completely identical. The militaristic masculinity that prevailed was
one bodily involved. It acquired a technologically polished muscle speedy results and quick
victories of smart weapons capable of ‘precision’ bombing. The fantasies of Robocop and The
Terminator were being brought to reality. The soldier was now not only stronger and better
equipped, but smarter and faster, heightening his capacity to kill in speed and quantity.
Likewise the realities of the war were popularly televised and integrated into the fantasies of
the viewers. Judith Butler depicts the home viewing of recent wars as “a form of violent and
voyeuristic pornography” (Goldstein, 2001: 355). The euphoric televised consumption of the
Gulf War championed the remasculinised US military with the help of advanced
technological innovations and feminised its weak and passive Iraqi objects. A small measure
of femininity became acceptable too. For example, Goldstein notes how a touch of tender
‘femininity’ was legitimised by the behaviour of US war leaders when they;
openly articulated a sense of manly vulnerability and human compassion, rather than bravado
or stern invincibility, for example, by lavishing attention on their families (Bush and
Schwarzkopf) and even weeping in public (Powell)… The new visibility of women in the US
military rounded out the construction of the new, more family-oriented masculinity.
(Goldstein, 2001: 279, parentheses original)
Indeed, as Goldstein continues, the power of masculinity was actually expanded by
this seeming relaxation by permitting it a broader field of direct involvement, such as the
family. Although I will refrain from exploring the masculinities of the 1990s, the new ideal-
type hegemonic masculinity that emerged after the crisis of masculinity can be termed, as
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discussed by Hooper, the bourgeois-rationalist model 14  that “idealised competitive
individualism, reason, and self-control or self-denial, combining respectability as breadwinner
and head of household with calculative rationality in public life” (Hooper 2001: 65-66).
In this thesis I examine the masculinities that emerge from the discourses of the War
on Terrorism. This entails, for example, the celebration of killing and destruction caused by
fallen soldiers,  crowned as ‘war heroes’. It  justifies the brutality of war and is dependent on
the veneration of a militarised hegemonic masculinity. I will focus on how such identities are
produced and sustained, how they are interlinked to notions of honour and righteousness, and
intersected with sensitive religious ontologies. The position of George W. Bush and the way
he has managed to construct himself not only as a hegemonic leader in wartime, but also as
the leader of a mission for a ‘greater’ cause is also interesting. In contrast to these American
masculinities are the masculinities of the terrorists, and Afghani and Iraqi men. As male
‘Others,’ I am interested in how their subordination is established through gendering and also
why and how this is important for the self-assurance of American masculinities.
Women and War
Femininities are as important as masculinities to understanding the war system. While
masculinities are visible, femininities are often less so, and given less attention because they
are not perceived as ‘important.’ However, understanding how femininities are activated and
constructed in militaristic contexts often brings new dimensions of militarism into focus.
While men are either identified as heroes or cowards, women’s roles and functions are often
much more fluid and complex, enabling femininities to mould easily into different situations
and contexts to support the visible military framework as deemed necessary at a particular
time and place. Femininities are indeed militarised both within and outside military
institutions to support them. Once again, it crucial to understand that masculinities and
femininities are always relational, and as such, always defined in relation to one another.
To begin with, women are visible in their invisibility in war. Warfare has been a
historically male-dominated business, and apart from a few exceptional cases, women have
been largely excluded from fighting. The fraction of women that now participate in the
military— politically recruited perhaps for ‘manpower’ shortages (Enloe, 2000b: 237-238)—
must adopt ‘masculine’ speech and behaviour in order to be ‘professionals.’ Even so they are
14 The other ideal types have consisted of the Greek citizen-warrior model, the patriarchal Judeo-Christian
model, the honour/patronage model, and a Protestant, bourgeois-rationalist model. See Hooper, 2001: 64-70 for
their genealogy.
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not respected as such— being subjected to subordination and sexual harassment— and possibly
reinforce the patriarchal structure of the military as a result. This counterproductivity has also
been argued to be a feature of women’s peace activism. The mobilisation of women in the
armed forces will be returned to after reviewing the nature of their exclusion.
According to Goldstein, their absence is due first of all to the confusing effect female
warriors  might  have  on  male  soldiers  not  only  during  training,  but  also  during  combat.  For
example, in 1948 when Israeli women participated in fighting, it has been argued that men
found the injury of a female comrade during battle too upsetting to ignore and the mission
was forgotten as they hurried to her aid. (Goldstein, 2001: 306) Tickner recalls how the image
of women fighting in the Gulf War disturbed the home public. (Tickner, 2001: 58) The
sensation  caused  by  the  rescue  of  Private  Jessica  Lynch  in  Iraq  in  2003,  which  will  be
explored later in this study, shows that this is still relevant now during the War on Terrorism.
The construction of the feminine territory is mapped outside the military at the home front.
They fulfil roles, “incompatible with men’s participation in the ranks, to make the trauma of
combat tolerable” while “reinforcing soldier’s masculinity” (Goldstein, 2001: 301). The
feminisation of enemies might also cause confusion for soldiers with female co-combatants
because of the coding of femininity as subordinate. (Goldstein, 2001: 356)
Joanna Bourke suggests another reason for women’s exclusion from the ranks. She
argues that their presence is “demoralising for men: it would disrupt processes of bonding and
destroy  a  self-consciously  ‘masculine’  war  ethic”  and  would  result  in  their  symbolic
castration. (Bourke, 1999: 326) Thus, to maintain the masculinity of the military, a variety of
different roles are recognisable amongst women during war. The most obvious of these roles
is encouraging their men to go fight. Bourke argues that women who encourage men to fight
are gratifying their own aggressiveness by pressuring them to act on their behalf. As a result
they eagerly send their husbands, sons and male lovers to risk their lives. (Bourke, 1999: 149,
332-333) Whether or not this argument is valid, it is evident that “women are often active
participants in shaming men to try to goad them into fighting wars” (Goldstein, 2001: 272).
Women’s roles as nurturing wives, mothers, sisters, lovers, girlfriends and nurses are
thus essential to the survival of militaries. Men’s morale and sanity in wartime is often reliant
on an often idealised female relationship ‘back home.’ Not only does it sustain a soldier’s
ability to endure his service, but also can serve as a kind of “metaphysical sanctuary for
traumatised soldiers, a counterweight to hellish war” (Goldstein, 2001: 304). It also provides
some soldiers with a motive to fight— to protect their women and children— physically or
metaphorically. (2001: 305) Jean Bethke Elshtain calls these women ‘Beautiful Souls’ who
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are non-violent beings representative of an ideal way of life that are mobilised in wartime in
times of war on behalf of the ‘Just Warriors’. The famous First World War recruitment poster
Women of Britain Say--GO! is a example of this. (Elshtain, 1995: 140)
Cynthia Enloe argues that women provide militaries with tangible security around
their bases through such roles. Those in roles on military bases as prostitutes, girlfriends,
wives, activists and female soldiers see their roles as mutually exclusive, and often regard one
another with hostility as sexual and ideological adversaries. The preservation of these
imagined distinctions amongst women keeps them in these roles— without which a base could
shut down— and thus provides a base with an entire network of female security. (Enloe, 2000:
65-92)
In wartime women’s labour too is mobilised even more intensely because of the need
to fill the jobs vacated by men and those created to feed the war machine. Another reason why
women cannot become soldiers is precisely because the work they are assigned is central to
running the war machine. “In every society at war” Goldstein writes, “women workers help
sustain both the war effort and the economy behind it. Most of this work is unpaid, and
largely unmeasured” (Goldstein, 2001: 380).
These jobs or roles that women are assigned during war differ from those during
peace. Even though if the job might be the same empirically, their meanings and functions are
refreshed and redefined according to the circumstances. As mentioned, gender roles are not
fixed, but flexible and fluctuating. There are two ‘jobs’ whose chameleonic gendering is of
particular interest here: the female soldier and the militarised mother— both of which are
introduced well by Cynthia Enloe.
Militarised Motherhood
Starting with militarised motherhood, Enloe argues that it “often starts with the
conceptualising the womb as a recruiting station… a woman who has more children— sons,
preferably— is a woman who is contributing to ‘national security.’” (Enloe, 2000b: 248) She
profiles the ideal militarised mother in the following way:
1. A woman who finds it reasonable that her government urges female citizens to have
more children to ensure future national security.
2. She believes sons and daughters should be brought up and nurtured differently.
3. Being ‘good mother’ is a confirmation of her national membership, i.e. citizenship.
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4. She unchallengingly conforms to the idea of a ‘patriotic15 mother’.
(2000b: 253)
Mothers hardly ever conform to all of these qualities, just as most men do not embody
the hegemonic masculinity. The ideal is not required, and often the “internalisation of a few
simple militarised maternal beliefs often may be sufficient to provide the military with the
manpower it thinks it needs” (ibid.). As a result, the militarised mother is also likely to
supportive of his manhood, take pride— often publicly— of her son’s military position and
achievements, provide letters, phone calls, and packages for morale, and look after him if he
is sent home wounded. Importantly, she trusts the military— “when the military informs her of
her son’s death, she will find its explanation credible” (Enloe, 2000b: 253-254). Her duty is to
mourn the fallen and then substitute them by reproducing. These gender constructions—
where  men must  act  as  ‘men’ and women must  act  as  ‘women’— thereby  sustain  women as
‘life-givers’ to compensate for men’s actions as ‘life-takers.’ (Enloe, 1993: 82) Women
supply the nation with citizens and male soldier-citizens, who to go fight and take life (or lose
their  own)  in  war.  Indeed,  it  is  an  expectation  shared  in  quite  openly,  that  “the  soldier  is
expected to sacrifice for his country a mothers are expected to sacrifice for their children”
(Elshtain, 1995: 222). Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic describes this “glorification of women as
biological regenerators of the nations with a disregard for women as a people as a massive
abuse of women’s reproductive rights and maternal emotions” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996:
360). The irony is that it is usually the women who lose their sons who realise that it is the
role of the mother that they suffer the most.
Like  their  soldier  sons,  mothers  can  also  be  powerfully  endowed  with  myths.
Militarised states publicly celebrate mothers as patriots and home front heroes, especially
those whose sons were killed in action, for sacrificing their offspring for a ‘higher cause’— the
security of the state. Those on the opposite end are the ones who question the war and its
purposes. Such behaviour is considered ‘shameful’ and is punished by condemnation and
humiliation for their ‘ingratitude’ for the valiant protection provided by their sons and the
state. (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 124)
These empirical observations, however, do not suffice to thoroughly explain why
motherhood is so important to a state’s conduct of war. The support they provide for their
15 “The conventional prescriptions for being recognised as a woman-as-patriot are grounded in notions of
feminine ‘respectability’… Most militarising states need women… to be patriots, yet need them to do so without
stepping over the bounds of ‘proper’ femininity, since that would then dispirit a lot of men, who would feel that
their own masculine turf was being challenged. In a patriarchal state a woman can aspire to be a ‘patriotic
mother’ but not a ‘patriotic citizen.’” (Enloe, 2004a: 172)
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sons is crucial, but the analysis is incomplete without taking into account the ideological
gender constructions behind motherhood, state, and nation. As mentioned, it is wartime when
the  nation  is  particularly  strongly  personified  as  a  woman,  as  mothers  constitutive  of  the
‘motherland’ itself. As such, woman as a mother and the nation become one and the same.
The nation becomes a pure and glorified fertile female representing the values and virtues of
the nation. When threatened, she is regarded helpless to protect herself, and therefore requires
the valour of her male children (citizens) to sacrifice their bodies for her survival. Such
descriptions capture powerful protective emotions of national empathy in both male and
female citizens, for it is regarded as just and honourable for the strong (hard, muscular male
bodies) to sacrifice for the weak (soft, round, life-creating female bodies).
Some of the most tragic and unfortunately common consequences of such depictions
are found in wartime rape. As already explained, wartime rape is not only a form of physical
but also symbolic violence against women that functions as an act of domination and
humiliation  of  the  nation.  With  regards  to  motherhood,  the  acts  of  wartime  rapists  seek  to
signal that the women they rape “are worthless since they gave birth to the enemy's rather
than their own children” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 360). The penetration of the pure female
body/nation by that of the enemy male gives birth to a national contamination. The nation
becomes biologically polluted. Its blood16,  its  essence,  its  purpose,  is  no  longer  pure,  even
when the ejaculation of the enemy semen does not result in offspring. An aggressive intrusion
and domination of the national body has still taken place in attempt to pervert its reproductive
functions, its source of existence.
There are two different discourses on US military mothers in the War on Terrorism.
First is the honourable patriotic military mother who is celebrated for supporting the national
cause by encouraging and supporting her child/children to join the military and fight to
protect her and their homeland. She encourages them to risk their lives and kill others, and if
killed, she believes her offspring to have died honourably in performing this defence. The
second is the military mother whose child/children died in the service, whose death changed
her stance to the war from supportive to oppositional. Cindy Sheehan, the mother who
became famous by holding a demonstration outside the ranch of George W. Bush, is an
example of this motherhood.
16 Blood has historically been a sensitive marker of purity and status. Royalty is supposed to possess ‘blue
blood’, whereas interracial marriages have been a cause for fear of ‘dirty blood’.
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Female soldiers
When women are allowed ‘life-taker’ roles, feminists are often in disagreement over
the  reasons  why.  Some  radical  feminists  argue  that  the  state  military  is  an  empowering
experience for women as a method of defence or liberation from patriarchy while others argue
that it is a tool of patriarchal legitimacy. Liberal feminists, on the other hand, optimistically
argue that it is an attempt to promote equality in the armed forces. A third feminist voice
opposes both and points to another explanation: one to meet the shortages of manpower. This
thesis takes the latter approach. Women in the armed forces are integrated in an all-but-equal
manner, in a way that does not challenge the masculinity of the military or threaten the
militarised masculine identity of male soldiers. Instead, female soldiers reinforce them while
realising a pragmatic strategy of performing basic non-combative yet supportive military jobs.
This has meant “using women in ways that have perpetuated a respectable brand of
femininity.” (D’Amico, 1996: 380; Enloe, 2000b: 263)
Specifying on this argument, Francine D’Amico (1996) found that women in state
militaries have the same grievances that they experience as civilians. Sexual harassment is
extremely common, and wife beating tends to be notably high amongst military men. As in
the labour market, it is uncommon for women to occupy powerful positions, instead usually
performing ‘supportive’ roles for example, as clerical, administrative and medical staff.
(Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 84-6) Cynthia Enloe also argues that states allocate such jobs to
women so men can fill ‘real’ military posts. Importantly, the recruitment of women may
simply be an attempt to give a state ‘modern-and-democratic’ international publicity. (Enloe,
2000a: 280)
Similarly, the training they receive is different from men’s and usually emphasise self-
defence methods in case the unimaginable happens: should their male colleagues fail to
protect them. (D’Amico, 1996: 382) This is also a reflection of the (US) law’s refusal to
recognise female soldiers as legitimate actors of violence, only as victims of it in need of
protection— which is also one of the main arguments used against allowing women in combat.
(Rycenga and Waller, 2001: 60-61)
D’Amico also argues that the militaries have total control the behaviour of their
female  recruits,  and  exploit  their  skills  according  to  their  needs.   For  example,  women who
subversively promote women’s issues, report sexual harassment, or are lesbians are seen as
troublemakers and are targeted in ‘witch-hunts’ on the grounds that they have a harmful effect
on morale and amount to a national security risk. Such justifications hide the homophobic
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character of IR and control which women are best suited to participate in the ranks.
(D’Amico, 1996: 382-4) According to Cynthia Enloe, many women accept it and view their
participation in the military as a feminist mission because they see it as a challenge to endure
misogynist subordination to prove that ‘we can do it, too.’ (Enloe, 2000b: 186) In addition as
female soldier in Iraq Kayla Williams writes in her memoir;
Even girls don’t like girls who file EO [Equal Opportunity] complaints - they don’t want to
rock the  boat.  Girls  don’t  want  to  be  perceived as  filing  a  frivolous  complaint.  There’s still
the assumption that girls lie about harassment to get what they want - to advance their careers
or to punish somebody they dislike.
(Williams, 2006: 209, italics original)
Closing the question of equality in the forces, there is little evidence that the military
has advanced women’s position in society or their  ability to acquire power.  Instead, women
are institutionalised and socialised into military practices and like men, support a destructive
war system and foreign policy. States nonetheless have a tendency to frame their admission of
women into the ranks as a democratic endeavour for gender equality.
In the War on Terrorism, three discourses of woman soldiers that represent three
different perceptions of women in the US military can be identified. The stories and
phenomena of soldiers Jessica Lynch, Lynndie England and Kayla Williams will be examined
in this context. These two aspects that I have mentioned as examples— military mothers and
woman soldiers— are not the only discourses that this thesis will examine. In addition to this,
I will also look at the femininities of Laura Bush and Condoleezza Rice as the only prominent
and highly publicised female members of the otherwise masculine-dominated Bush
Administration. Interesting is not only the roles that they adopt in policy implementation, but
in  particular  how  they  describe  first  of  all  their  own  sexuality,  and  subsequently  the
sexualities of other men and women both in the US and in faraway places. Indeed, this same
approach is employed to all the discussed American militarised sexualities, both masculine
and feminine, and how they produce militarised gender identities for Afghani and Iraqi men
and women, and how these discourses are instrumental to the justification and continuing
performance of the War on Terrorism.
Gendering Terrorism
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The term War on Terrorism is a curious one. In IR, ‘war’ is traditionally the term for
violent  conflict  between  two  states,  each  defined  as  such  by  their  territorial  sovereignty,
which is commonly described as a codification of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
‘Terrorism’ by contrast, has no single definition, nor any agreed set of minimal principle
features, except that it is an act of aggression. As explained, ‘war’ is already a concept that
feminists are eager to problematise. ‘Terrorism’ must therefore also have interesting
implications for feminist scholars. I will first explain how feminists have problematised the
concept of ‘terrorism’ and then present what kind of arguments have been raised specifically
concerning gender and the War on Terrorism. In general, the existing gender-oriented
literature on terrorism is interesting, but topically and theoretically limited. There are virtually
no thorough feminist theorists on terrorism prior to September 11 apart from Robin Morgan,
whose is only marginally useful, as will be explained. The most useful material is written
post-9/11 and focuses on the victimisation of women— in Afghanistan in particular— and the
demonisation of Islamic men in War on Terrorism narratives. From these articles I extract
feminist critique on the concept of terrorism. The narratives their produce will be discussed
later.
To being with, one work frequently referred to by feminist scholars discussing
sexuality and terrorism is Robin Morgan’s 1989 The Demon Lover,  since  it  is  the  only
extended written work that addresses this relationship. She strives to prove how terrorism is
patriarchally constructed, and in doing so produces a series of interesting points, as well as
inadequate ones. The first of her useful points is the distinction of state violence against
civilian populations as legitimate, but the violence of other political groups as illegitimate; in
other words, terrorism;
The scars of officially sanctioned terror deform all periods of history: denial of human rights
and civil liberties, preventive detention, raids, torture, corporal and capital punishment,
genocide, colonialism, slavery through serfdom through class exploitation, plus, in our town
time, concentration camps, the Gulag, apartheid, ‘disappearances’, the arms race, chemical
and germ and atomic warfare, nuclear experimentation? If we exclude the activities of
established nation-states from our definition of terrorism (as most experts do), then aren’t we
settling uncomfortably unto automatic respect for those who already hold power… ?
(Morgan, 1989: 35, parentheses original)
Also,  Morgan  criticises  the  US  State  Department’s  definition  of  terrorism  where
“‘Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-
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combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents.’” Morgan lists rape,
battery, homophobia, and educational discrimination among examples that could for some fit
this definition yet are not considered as ‘terrorism.’ (Morgan, 1989: 36)
While  such  observations  are  useful,  the  major  problem  with  Morgan’s  text  is  that  it
first of all empirically recognises terrorism as primarily a patriarchal activity, by men,
targeted at men, for men’s causes. While this appears to be true, and indeed women are only
portrayed as victims, wives, sisters, lovers, and so forth (Finn, 1989: 392-393), she does not
recognise the active and independent role of women in terrorism. As a result, she does not
recognise female terrorists as having any motivations other than being the gratifying lovers of
male terrorists— they are the victims of the ‘demon lovers’. Morgan’s thesis therefore cannot
explain the violence of female leaders like Golda Meir or Margaret Thatcher, account for the
increasing number of female terrorists, or acknowledge how men suffer from aggressive
constructions  of  masculinity.  The  text  is  dated  and  very  radical  in  its  feminism,  and
romantically depicts IR as a men’s game that consciously oppresses women— thereby leaving
dichotomies like aggressive/passive and protector/protected completely unchallenged. Karen
Beckman similarly criticises Morgan saying that “any attempt to rigidly separate violence and
non-violence through the idea of gender… would be to fall into the same rhetoric of ‘us’ and
‘them’ that Bush Jr. introduced in his address before Congress” (Beckman, 2002: 29).
More optimistically, later feminists especially post-September 11, have paid more
attention to the problematisation of the definition of ‘terrorism.’ While IR scholars still debate
over its definition, the word is nonetheless used loosely to refer to specific types of anti-state
violence of organised groups, as Morgan notes. Feminist political scientists draw attention to
the  selectivity  of  such  definitions.  Geraldine  Finn,  for  example  argues  that  the  term  has  a
biased classification of terrorism, recognising gruesome public spectacles of ‘illegitimate’
political violence as terrorism while ignoring other unacknowledged forms of terrorism such
as violence against women that is targeted daily at women and children behind the closed
doors of the home, unlike suicide bombings witnessed universally via mass media. (Finn,
1990: 376, 390)
Criticism is voiced concerning this division also because it assumes that no connection
exists between domestic violence and ‘terrorist’ violence. Vesna Kesic argues that domestic
violence provides male children with role models of violent men that encourage men to
“express their masculinity in violent ways, and feel entitled to solve all kinds of problems by
‘quick and efficient’ violent means” (Rycenga and Waller, 2001: 43). Females are provided
with submissive female role models that passively accept their roles as targets or victims of
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this behaviour. Kesic argues that domestic violence spreads past private borders to public
spaces and as this cycle of violence continues and remains unchallenged, “society, as a whole,
becomes more and more accustomed to violence and brutalised by its ubiquitous presence”
(ibid).
Höglund echoes this view in saying that international terrorism “is rooted in a deeply
unjust global situation and will not be overcome through armament and increased defence”
(Höglund, 2003: 244). Feminist IR therefore also participates in providing a gender argument
against  the  use  of  militaristic  action  to  counter  terrorism.  As  Robin  May  Schott  writes,
“domestic abuse is also a form of terrorism, though ‘war’ is not the appropriate strategy for
fighting either domestic or foreign terrorism” (Schott, 2003: 6).
This section has been an explanation of the gender theory employed in this thesis and
how  it  is  capable  of  tackling  and  challenging  central  pillars  of  IR  theory.  As  war  and
militarisation are the central theatres of the US War on Terrorism, it is in this context where
the heart of the analysis will be carried out.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Adopting the theoretical perspective of gender and war outlined above enables an
informed approach to the analysis of gender in the War on Terrorism. Here the intention is to
explain the set of research questions that this thesis wishes to address. They have been divided
into thematic questions that are borne in mind throughout the thesis, and more specific
research questions on the cases that are examined.
First of all, generally, the thesis aspires to understand how gender identities are
politically activated in the War on Terrorism. How does gender marginalise some groups of
people, and privilege others? How do the gender prescriptions of military culture engage in
and amplify this determination? How is gender identity nationalised? How are the identities of
the ‘US self’ and ‘terrorist Other’ discursively gendered and what kind of hierarchies do they
encourage, and with what kinds of psychological and material effects?
The analysis proceeds chronologically starting from the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, to the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. How were the people, both US
and terrorist, and events of 11 September gendered? What kind of masculinity and what kind
of femininity attained a hegemonic position in the post-11 September environment? How
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have US political leaders contributed to the promotion and legitimation of particular gender
identities?
What were the gendered consequences of 11 September and the subsequent invasion
of Afghanistan? How were the justifications of the invasion of Afghanistan gendered, and
with  what  implications  on  US-led  democratisation?  How  were  Afghan  men  and  women
gendered in US discourses? The section Claiming Bodies aims to discuss how gender is
inextricably involved in colonialist and Orientalist discourses. How does the colonising gaze
gender and sexualise Others subjected to its gaze? How is this enacted in US discourses of
women’s rights and democratisation in Afghanistan? On the other hand, how is the
disciplining of Muslim male bodies gendered? What are the competing masculinities and by
what methods are disciplined bodies demeaned for control? How does this define the
sexuality of the US self?
Next, turning to Iraq, the thesis asks; How were the identities of Iraqi men and women
gendered to support the US invasion of Iraq? How were the femininities of Iraqi women
defined by US perceptions of women and child victims, and female terrorists? What were the
sexual politics of Abu Ghraib, and how did discourses in its press coverage contribute to
defining the gender identity of the US self? How did US soldiers and their stories contribute
to the reproduction of a particular gendered militarised identity of the self, and a likewise a
gendered perception of the Iraqi Other?
Finally, the examination returns to the US homefront, and examines militarised
motherhood in the War on Terrorism. What kind of gender identities does the military mother
anti-war movement celebrate? How does Cindy Sheehan gender nationalism and pacificism?
Ultimately,  what  kind  of  attitude  does  she  have  towards  the  institution  of  the  military,  and
how is it reflected in discursive opinion on gender roles in war?
Overall, in the concluding section, I wish to cross-examine and compare the identified
discourses and representations. I also wish to ask, how harmful are these constructions of
gender in militarisation? What might be the counter-productive consequences of such
genderings for the goals of the US War on Terrorism? What possibilities are there for change?
The above questions are formulated in accordance with the theory presented in the
previous section about gender and war. This thesis wishes to stress the importance of these
questions; the War on Terrorism is an endlessly discussed topic, but gender analyses of it are
considerably lacking, especially in the case of Iraq. By providing an overview of gendered
discourses and representations, this thesis provides insights into understanding how gender is
both constitutive of foreign policy in the War on Terrorism, the consequences of which often
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sadly injurious. To feminist IR this analysis contributes not only a new inquiry, but also an
innovative way of examining the War on Terrorism that combines discourse analysis with
representation, and employs on a wide variety of sources, from media coverage, to
photography, and autobiography, for example. The topic of sexuality and IR also is hardly
touched in feminist analyses of the War on Terrorism, and this work also aims to contribute to
making of this deficit.
To  answer  this  body  research  questions,  I  will  use  discourse  analysis,  as  well  as
theories of representation. The following section explains the theories and methods by which
this will be done.
IV.   METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
As stipulated, this thesis is methodologically reliant on poststructuralist discourse
analysis of the Foucauldian tradition. This has been the dominant choice of discourse analysis
for political scientists, but still continues to be a target of criticism by supporters of more
traditional research methods. Critics “accuse it of being trendy jargon that fails to deliver new
plausible insights and undermines scientific beliefs in truth and reality” (Torfing, 2005: 3).
Lighter criticism is directed at “a number of gaps, theoretically and empirically, areas of
benign neglect” (ibid.) that may easily hold some truth. One must bear in mind that
poststructuralist discourse analysis is a relatively new and theoretically unfinished project
lacking concrete theoretical concepts, research strategies, and methods. However, discourse
analysis has certainly made a considerable impact on social science research by
reconceptualising and transcending the concepts and biases of rationalism by radical
hermeneutic alternatives and alerted the mainstream to a number of neglected issues like
values and symbols. Therefore, despite some legitimate criticism concerning its paradigmatic
incompletion, poststructuralist discourse analysis has undoubtedly demonstrated its
competence, merit, and innovativeness as a serious and rewarding form of political analysis.
(Torfing, 2005: 3-5) The following section provides an overview of the discourse theory, after
which the discussion will proceed to a more specified explanation of the Foucauldian tradition
that is at the heart of this thesis.
Discourse Theory
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There are many ways to interpret ‘discourse.’ It can refer to ways in which things are
spoken or thought of, discussed or represented. There is no one overarching theory or
methodology  of  discourse  analysis,  and  therefore  there  is  no  one  ‘correct’  way  to  do  it.
Different approaches agree on one feature, however, which is that language and reality
interact as one, and that meaning is not in the linguistic repetition of reality, but a product of
discourse. They are usually repeated and learned so well that they are not recognised as
learned. (Jokinen, 2000: 108; Jokinen in Liljeström 2004: 191) The aim of discourse analysis
is  therefore  not  to  ‘discover’  universal  truths  or  facts.  On  the  contrary,  it  seeks  to  question
those truths, because those conducting discourse analysis consider ‘facts’ to be socially
constructed. ‘Facts,’ in other words, do not simply exist ‘out there,’ but are constructed in
discourses. (Juhila and Suoninen in Jokinen et al., 1999, 234) Discourse theory is therefore
“concerned with the role of meaningful social practices and ideas... [and] analyses the way
systems of meaning or discourses shape the way people understand their roles in society”
(Howarth in Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 115).
While discourses are not tangible material, they have real and material consequences.
Discourses always have an object, because they are speaking about ‘something.’ ‘Something’
is always being expressed by ‘someone’ in a certain situation or position. It is how it is being
expressed that is of interest. ‘How’ is the key word here, by which we ask how (and therefore
also what) do people construct meaning in their spoken, thought and written expressions.
They are open and give shape to experiences, phenomena, events, and relationships.
Discourses therefore effect the material and practical, give them form and open/shut them to
possibilities. (Helén, 1997: 358)
These general assumptions are present in discourse theory. However, discourse theory
is not only poststructuralist, or Foucauldian, as in this thesis. It is important to bear in mind
that the other possibilities available, constitutive of the progression of discursive thought.
Jacob Torfing reviews the literature on discourse theory by dividing it into three general
generational categories. For the first generation of discourse theory, discourse is defined in a
linguistic sense, as spoken or written text. To this category belong socio-linguistics (Downes,
1984), content analysis (Holsti, 1969), conversation analysis (Schegloff and Sacks, 1993), as
well as discourse psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). These methods, however, are not
very useful to political scientists because of the unflinching focus on semantic features of
discourse, disregarding fundamental areas of political analysis like power or ideology.
(Torfing, 2005: 6)
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The second generation widens the definition of discourse to include a wider range of
social practices. It is defined as “an empirical collection of practices that qualify as discursive
in so far as they contain a semiotic element... [such as] speech, writing, images and gestures
that social actors draw upon in their production and interpretation of meaning” (Torfing,
2005: 7). Norman Fairclough is a leading developer of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).
Despite drawing from Foucault the analysis of formative discursive practices, he rejects
Foucault’s quasi-transcendental approach (Fairclough, 1992: 38-39). Still, CDA engages with
the power effects of discourses by identifying discursive practices as ideological. Its
explanatory potential is reduced however by limiting discourse to linguistic processes
independent from social structures. (Torfing, 2005: 7)
The third generation identified by Torfing thus expands the understanding of discourse
to include all social phenomena, where everything becomes discourse, as theorised by Jacques
Derrida (1978), for example. “Social meaning becomes partially fixed in and through
discourse” (Torfing, 2005: 8) in a decentred system escaping the idea of fixed realities. There
are three shared postmodern themes worth highlighting. They are the critique of meta-
narratives, anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism. (Howarth, 1995: 117) The
deconstruction of hegemonic discourses is the primary method of such
poststructuralist/postmodern theorists, a group whose prominent developers include Roland
Barthes, Julia Kristeva and Jacques Lacan. (Ibid.) While Foucault forms the centre of this
thesis, these theorists have been mutually influential.
Despite the increasing popularity of discourse theory, it has also been subject to
criticism. Realist critics argue that discourse theory reduces everything to thought or
language, and ignores the repercussions of the material world. Supporters retort that it does
not deny “the realist assertion that matter exists independently of our consciousness, thought
and language... [but contends] merely that nothing follows from the bare existence of matter”
(Torfing, 2005: 18). Because the so-called material world is not understandable or meaningful
outside of realm of consciousness, postmodern discourse theory argues that there is no such
distinction as material and non-material worlds, or thus, the discursive and non-discursive.
(Howarth, 1995: 119, 127) The anti-foundationalist denial of objective truth is also a target of
criticism that often results in accusations of nihilism. Just because concepts and identities are
dependent on discourses does not mean that they do not hold any meaning within particular
discourses. Judgements about empirical and moral claims can made, but they cannot exist
outside the discursive. (Howarth, 1995: 128)
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I shall not elaborate any further on the general field of postmodern discourse theory,
but proceed with clarifying Foucauldian discourse analysis, and subsequently other directly
influential contributions useful for the analysis in this thesis.
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis is in increasing use amongst IR scholars. David
Campbell (1998), Michael Shapiro (2000), and James Der Derian (1989) are among some of
the most well known political scientists to apply and develop the postmodern approach in the
field. Foucault is not the only theoretical forefather of the approach, and should hardly be
taken as such. These scholars indeed draw not only on the founding writers, but also a great
deal on each other in cooperation. This thesis, while bearing inspiration from these thinkers,
slants the Foucauldian analysis towards a gendered research of IR, and so aforementioned
feminist IR theorists like Christine Sylvester (2002) are also key examples of the employment
of discourse analysis in IR. This section is an explanation of Foucauldian discourse analysis
in this thesis.
Poststructuralist discourse theory assumes, as David Campbell writes, that “the
existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside language and our traditions of
interpretation” (Campbell, 1998: 6) and therefore any perception of reality is a participation
and product of discourse. As mentioned, discourse is understood as extending beyond the
domain of the empirical. Because there are ontological realities outside expressed discourses,
what  is  expressed  in  given  discourses  is  equally  significant  as  what  is not expressed. Their
exclusion from overt expression does not render them any less real and are equally important
in any analysis. It is thus impossible to divorce the discursive from the non-discursive. This
impossibility becomes clearer when examining Foucauldian method, whereby it also becomes
impossible to distinguish theory from practice.
For Foucault, discursive analysis is a genealogical practice. He writes that “a
genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from
[scientific] subjection, to render them... capable of opposition and of struggle against the
coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse” (Foucault, 1980b: 85). In
other words, it is an epistemological and ontological exploration and critique that seeks to
transcend the absolute boundaries established by scientific inquiry. Genealogies, Foucault
writes, are indeed anti-sciences whose main struggle is waged “against the effects of power of
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a discourse” (1980: 84). As Gilles Deleuze remarks, genealogy is not only interpretive, but
also evaluative. (Deleuze, 1983: 2, 6) The Foucauldian tradition is interested in examining
and evaluating discourses located in histories, places and norms, where they are produced,
legitimised and normalised. (Jokinen in Liljeström, 2004: 192-193) It is the power produced
and exercised in these discourses that is of the highest concern.
Indeed, if Foucauldian discourse analysis is a struggle against the effects power of
discourses, then is central to the understanding of discourse. (Suoninen in Jokinen et al., 1999:
18; Jokinen, 2000: 110, 113-115) Adding to what has already been described of power, power
relations themselves are established and implemented by the production, accumulation,
circulation  and  functioning  of  a  discourse  as matrices of transformations (Foucault, 1980b:
93, 1978: 99). Power operates through particular truth-producing discourses that Foucault
calls discourses of truth. Social functioning is dependent on the submission these truths,
which are never fixed, but constantly being moulded and remoulded by power: “Power never
ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalises,
professionalises and rewards its pursuit” (ibid.). The recognition and understanding of the
power/knowledge relation is what enables one to problematise, dislocated and transcend
hegemonic discourses by giving priority to power and power struggles. While critics hold
deconstruction to mean negative criticism, interpreted as a single, destructive that eliminates
subjects and their agency. However, deconstruction must be seen as a promising process of a
“sustained critique of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility
of going beyond them”. (Campbell, 1998: 223) It is within this project where we can locate
the emancipatory goal of freedom from the repressive hold of power. It can never be escaped
or conclusively conquered, but because discourses are flexible and changeable, can be
positively transformed.
Additional developments in Butlerian gender theory advance the notion of
performativity, which makes for an interesting contribution to discourse analysis, and one
significant in this thesis. For Judith Butler (1999, 2004b), largely influenced by Foucault,
gender is a discursive practice, where the body is the central site on which power is exercised
by  performance  to  produce  gender  norms.  Thus,  bodily  practices  also  have  the  potential  to
challenge and transform norms. David Campbell in Writing Security (1998) uses Butler’s
notion of performativity to explain the performative constitution of state identity. Identity,
according to Campbell, is constituted by the process of a regulated repetition of boundary-
inscribing acts that differentiate the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’, and ‘self’ from the ‘other’.
(1998: 8-10)
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The next section will return to the dichotomous practice of othering, but here
Campbell  served  as  an  example  of  the  possibilities  of  Bulter’s  bodily  discourse  theory.  As
discourse is found on not only in speech and writing, but also acts, thoughts, bodies, and so
on, the flexibility of such an approach can also be regarded as more of an enriching asset than
a  complicating  impediment.  It  should  also  be  clear  that  in  this  case,  theory  and  practice  are
inseparable. Since the theory is itself transformative (Butler, 2004b: 204), theory can only be
considered as the  practice  that  it  espouses.  Also,  Butlerian  theory,  to  which  this  thesis
adheres, is highly compatible with Foucauldian discourse analysis, mainly due to being
largely influenced by Foucault in the first place. These theories, being interlinked, are here
regarded as part of the same larger theoretical framework and thereby mutually supportive
and enriching.
Before proceeding, it would be fitting and practical to overview three analytical
concepts here useful for approaching discourses as discussed by Jokinen and Juhila. These are
accounts, meaning systems, and identity and subject positions. Firstly, when people use
language, they not only produce description, but also they try to make sense of the object of
description in relation to their own activities. This understanding takes discourse analysis
beyond simplistic ‘description’ to people’s ‘accounts’ of their perceived world. Secondly,
meanings intersect with each other. Therefore one will encounter several meaning systems in
constant renewal and reproduction. By identity and subject positions, Jokinen and Juhila mean
that people construct themselves and others in their language. Identities are not fixed, but are
in constant transformation in many types and combinations. Identity therefore must be
understood not as a static, but active category that will change according to time, place and
that which it defined against. (Jokinen et al., 1999: 67-68)
To this trilogy I wish to add another concept presented that will be useful in my
analysis,  that  is  the  concept  of  narrative.  Jokinen  and  Juhila  explain  that  narratives  refer  to
stories that are shaped by the conferral meaning to their details, features, and events. Many
discourse sites in this analysis involve narrativity, such as the stories recounted in media
clippings, personal histories divulged in autobiography, or anecdotes in speeches. Stories and
storytelling are thus also producers of discourse. Although they usually will express previous
events or experiences, they always located within a context, a discourse that constructs its
reality in different ways. (1999: 68) Discourse analysis is not concerned with evaluating
whether a story or statement is true or not, but rather its implications, meanings and
consequences. The non-fiction/fiction divide derives from the scientific divide of true/false
and fact/tale, thereby confirming the existence of an objective reality - the approach directly
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challenged by postmodernism. It is possible to argue that all that is ever written about ‘reality’
is a kind of fiction. Foucault himself insisted that he has only ever written fictions. Truth is
not absent from fictions, for fiction functions in truth. Discourses of truth do not exist until
they are created, or, ‘fictioned.’ Fictioning is the construction of reality as ‘true.’ (Foucault,
1980b: 193)
Fictions are being researched and evaluated here too. This research is openly
acknowledged to be a political act, whereby the understanding of the presented material is to
some extent or another influenced by the disposition of the researcher. Research products are
also  the  production  and  reproduction  of  discourse.  The  researcher  is  therefore  a  part  of  the
discourses one engages with and produces, as there is no such thing as perception and
assessment ‘from a distance.’ However, this does not automatically leave one trapped within
one’s  own  reality,  because  one  should  be  aware  of  the  fluidity  of  reality,  that  it  can  be
constructed in an array of ways. And finally, one must not only analyse and criticise, but also
has the emancipatory potential to think how the realities he/she is deconstructing could be
reconstructed differently. (Liljeström, 2004: 193)
Representation
To  the  above  I  still  wish  to  add  a  discussion  of  representation  in  discourses.  Stuart
Hall defines representation as
the  production  of  the  meaning of  the  concepts  in  our  minds  through language.  It  is  the  link
between concepts and language, which enables us to refer to either the ‘real’ world of objects,
people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events.
(Hall, 1997: 17, italics original)
It is the relationship between and the process linking ‘things,’ concepts and signs
(words, sounds, or images that carry meaning) together that is at the core of the production of
meaning and what constitutes representation. (1997: 21) The War on Terror discourses are a
jungle of representations, in language, events, and images 17  to deconstruct. Foucauldian
theory makes use of representation. Foucault engages with, for example, it in examining
Diego Velasquez's 1656 oil painting Las Meninas (1980a: 3-16). As representation is in wide
17 Starting with the visual phenomenon of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, to images of American
soldiers battling in deserts or engaging in ‘urban warfare,’ and likewise the pictures of Afghan men and women,
one can already discern that the War on Terror has a jungle of symbolism and meanings to explore.
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and repeated use in this thesis, it is of practical and philosophical value to theorise it a little
further, especially regarding the representation of Others. There is no one approach to
representation, and is particularly underdeveloped in IR. As a relatively new and innovative
tool in IR, it is useful to continue from the observations of others and adapt it to our purposes.
Such has been the technique with other political analyses making use of representation, such
as in Arto Jokinen’s (2000) Panssaroitu Maskuliinisuus. We continue, therefore, with Stuart
Hall’s overview.
Hall presents three approaches to representation. First, the reflective approach assumes
that an object reflects its true meaning as it exists, fixed, ‘out there.’ The second approach is
intentional,  which  argues  that  it  is  the  author  that  forces  his/her  meaning  on  the  rest  of  the
world. Hall criticises this approach for assuming that language is a private act. Instead, he
argues that “language is communication… that depends on shared linguistic conventions and
shared  codes”  and  that  when  we  express,  we  must  “enter  into  the  rules,  codes,  and
conventions of language to be shared and understood” (Hall: 1997:25). The third,
constructionist approach that this analysis assumes, recognises this. Meanings do not exist in
things; they are constructed by the conceptual and representational system used to give
meaning to the material world. (ibid.)
Representation is always a question of what is and is not being shown and what is
expressed directly, and likewise indirectly. It is not merely showing something, but presenting
and representing something or someone in a particular way to someone else. Not only do
representations show what we think, but they also effect how we think. (Jokinen, 2000: 117,
124)  In  this  thesis,  gender  is  taken  as  a  central  component  of  these  representations.  What  is
presented is always producing a particular type of sexuality, responding to a particular
perspective, as well as affecting the perspectives of others. Because sexualities are
hierarchically constructed, the status of the ‘different’ person or group being constructed is
defined in relation to producer of the expression. It is therefore to the constructions of ‘others’
and ‘difference’ to which the discussion will now turn.
Representing ‘Others’
Representation often involves the presentation of ‘different’ people and places, of
showing how ‘otherness’ is constructed in different locations of place and time. In explaining
why ‘difference’ matters and why there is such a fascination with ‘otherness,’ Hall makes the
following observations. First of all, citing Jacques Derrida, meaning is dependent on the
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difference between binary opposites such as white/black, upper class/lower class,
masculine/feminine, and citizen/alien. These polar dichotomies always have a hierarchical
power relationship that subordinate one to the other. Despite it being a crude way of
producing meaning, these over-simplifications seem to be found everywhere. (Hall, 1997:
235) Indeed, as Moira Gatens observes, dichotomies “are not a neutral way of dividing up the
world into categories [and...] assign a prominence and a dominant value to the term in the
position of A at the expense of not-A” (Gatens, 1991: 93). As discussed previously, feminist
theory is particularly adept at pointing out dichotomies because of their detrimental effects as
dominant metaphors in the thought and construction of gender and sexuality. Raia
Prokhovnik, for example, provides an interesting discussion of such problems with
dichotomy. Dichotomies offer temptingly simple yet dangerously adversarial styles of
reasoning that when used unselfconsciously become seen as natural, although they are
harmful and usually self-defeating. (Prokhovnik 1999: 31-38)
The second observation of representation is derived from the theory of language of
Mikhail Bakhtin that argues that difference is necessary because meanings are constructed
through dialogues with the Other. Meanings are therefore fluid and always being negotiated
and renegotiated. No single group can ever be the authority of meaning or their own identity.
(Hall, 1997: 235-236). The third is anthropological, where difference is the foundation of the
symbolic order known as culture. Binary oppositions give order by classification that in turn
sustains the culture’s stability; “Symbolic boundaries keep the categories ‘pure,’ giving
cultures their unique meaning and identity” (Hall, 1997: 236)
The fourth and final explanation is psychoanalytic, begun by Sigmund Freud and
developed further by Jacques Lacan. Lacan also drew on Hegel’s notion of the dynamics of
negation  of  the  other  for  unity  and  coherence  for  the  self.  For  Hegel,  in  wartime  it  is  the
enemy Other that becomes an object of desire— not emotional, but as an object that reflects
back to the self.  Lacan agrees, adding that, “the Other is fundamental to the constitution of
the self, to us as subjects, and to sexual identity” (1997: 237). However, the psychoanalytic
angle rejects that there is such a thing as a given ‘self’ or identity. Identities are in constant
dialogue with the Other and thereby never complete. Because it is the constant production of
signifiers with coded structures, the pursuit of one’s identity is always incomplete and
unconsummated. (Hall, 1997: 237; Shapiro, 1997: 41-43).
In addition to this, the Other can be endowed with negative meaning whereby there is
a good/bad binary opposition, It is here that racist stereotyping and violence can be
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produced. 18  ‘Difference,’ therefore, is arguably positive or negative. (Hall, 1997, 238)
Applying Lacan to ontological questions in warfare is appropriate because of the applicability
of his theory of individual identity to the larger national collectivity. Individuals symbolically
identify  with  the  national  group  in  a  way  that  produces  a  collective  unity  that  denies  or
downplays the existence of other social fragmentations, for example, racial antagonisms.
Michael Shapiro adds that because the coherent identification of the national self requires
strong and explicit boundaries, this can create Others both within and outside the collectivity.
Others  within  the  national  boundaries  become  national  objects  of  desire.  They  “reflect  a
disorder too unacceptable to be recognised as a part of one’s own order” (Shapiro, 1997: 59).
As Shapiro discusses the othering of disorder, warfare relies “on a discourse of danger based
on a radical separation of a domestic order versus a disordered world.” (Shapiro, 1997: 57-60)
The above explanations should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Although they come
from different academic schools, they all address the same questions of ‘difference’ in
representation. A selective use of all ideas is therefore possible as these approaches
interweave easily, although I will lean more on the Lacanian interpretation. Although these
theories  do  not  discuss  gender  as  such  in  this  context,  there  is  a  sufficient  body of  feminist
literature addressing difference, as has already been listed. As mentioned, poststructuralist
feminist theory is also compatible with these theories, as it has been heavily influenced by the
theories of Foucault, Lacan and Derrida, for example, by gendering their formulations as
Bulter has done. Therefore because they employ the same epistemological and ontological
frameworks, there should be little or no problems in adapting them for my purposes.
Research Material
In a feminist enquiry, where gender and sexuality are the core concepts, cultural
representations  are  observed  to  continuously  produce  different  ways  of  what  is  and  what  it
means to be a man, a woman, transgender, heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, or anything
else (Rossi, 2003: 19). As discussed, these categories also interact with other factors such as
race, ethnicity, nationality, or social class. Finding research material to examine these
relationships is not difficult. There is no ‘wrong’ place to search for discourses, but there are
better sites than others if one is to examine discourses of particular interest. One selects
18 I will discuss this further when I conduct my analysis in relation to Afghan and Iraqi men and women. Not
only is race a ‘oppositional’ identity component interacting with their gender, but also ethnicity and religion.
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processes where social reality is considered to be constructed. (Jokinen, 1999: 40-41) Because
meaning is not found in just one single place but many or, in fact, anywhere, choices must be
made. My choice is to draw from sources where I identify particular prevalent discourses of
the War on Terrorism. By particular discourses, I mean the dominant, and therefore assuming
the  most  influential  and  ‘significant’ discourses.  The  texts  or  sites  where  they  can  be  found
include speeches, articles, websites, books (including biographies), and visual images.
As justified in the discussion of representation, discourses can be found in language,
writing, images, people and events. These sources will primarily be from the US, as the
interest is in how the War on Terrorism is maintained and justified by the dominant
discourses in the US for first and foremost American audiences. These discourses construct
different gendered identities, for example, what it means to be an American man in contrast to
an Iraqi man, or an American woman as opposed to an Afghani woman, by examining how
their masculinities and femininities are relationally constructed. Because I am interested in
how gender identities are militarised to support war and militaristic activity, this will be the
central determinant of what will be studied— which identities give legitimacy to War on
Terrorism militarism, and in what ways.
Various sources materials are chosen and put to use with a substantial amount of
liberty. There are some predominant sources, however, and as such deserve a degree of
recognition and explanation. First of all, in examining the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001, feminist academic articles are often referred to. The buzzing feminist discussions of the
attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan that continue still were of great interest to
this project, and the observations made in these were an asset in demonstrating the variety
different interpretations available. However, this does not steer one away from the further
development of ideas already published, or their criticism. They provide information and
analysis, but should not be taken for granted.
Speeches are another recurring source used in the examination of the early years of the
War on Terrorism. George W. Bush, as the president and leading political figure of the US, is
the most quoted. Not only do his words produce discourse, but also the self-image he projects
in speech making is a significant contribution to the construction of hegemonic US
masculinity. These speeches, including those of Laura Bush, are from the War on Terror
speech archive of the official White House website. Likewise, the US Department of Defense
and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library websites archive the speeches of Donald
Rumsfeld and Ronal Reagan, respectively.
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As this thesis proceeds chronologically with the War on Terrorism, newspaper and
magazine articles become increasingly valuable to understand how sexuality in various places
like the detainment camp at Guantánamo Bay, phenomena like female terrorists, and scandals
like the torture of Muslim men by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib is discussed, and thus,
constructed. Two popular and respected US newspapers, the New York Times and Washington
Post, and the also popular Time and Newsweek magazines are the four dominating textual
sources for readings of such discourses. Because these publications are so widely read, they
can be expected to participate in the production of popular, hegemonic discourses. Not only
are they accorded respect in the US, but also they are also widely internationally distributed,
being some of the main bearers of US news abroad.
These publications are also sources for images. As mentioned of the strength of visual
cognition, these images are just as powerful producers of discourse as the texts they
accompany and support. They construct and reconstruct gendered politico-cultural
representations of places and people, both in the US and abroad - of the self and the Other -
that have bearings on the value of one group of people over another, of one individual over
another. For example, the Orientalist gaze, as shall be discussed, romanticises and demonises,
victimises and dehumanises.
For an examination of the identities of US soldiers in Iraq, I have selected two recently
published autobiographical works describing personal experiences of soldiering in Iraq in the
US Army. Colby Buzzell’s successful autobiography My War: Killing Time in Iraq provides a
male perspective, and Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female In The US Army by
Kayla Williams reflects on her Iraq experience explicitly as a woman. While simply one work
might suffice to examine gender in soldiering, it is nonetheless probable, in accordance with
standpoint feminism, that women experience the world differently due to their different
positions. This choice therefore enriches the analysis by demonstrating not only how
differently each author, both White and of lower-class origin, sees gender in their respective
worlds, but also especially how they construct their own sexual identities, and those of others
- of other soldiers, countrymen, and Iraqi men and women.
V.   GENDERING THE WAR ON TERRORISM
The War on Terrorism is considered to have begun with the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 when commercial airplanes were hijacked by terrorists. Two dramatically
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smashed into the World Trade Center (WTC) buildings in New York City, one into a wing of
the Pentagon in Washington D.C and a fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. A new
foreign policy discourse officially titled the ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ came to dominate
American foreign policy narratives.
The phrase is not new. Among other ‘wars’ such as War on Drugs, War on Crime and
War  on  Poverty,  the  War  on  Terrorism  has  existed  in  US  foreign  and  domestic  policy
discourse for long. In 1977 for example, the 31
October  cover  of Time magazine featured an
image of the hijacked Lufthansa airplane in
Mogadishu, with the title War on Terrorism
written in bold letters above it. A victim
giving a peace sign, black-and-white stern
male faces and finally a snapshot of a woman
holding  flowers  with  a  young  boy  and  an  old
man  by  her  side  scrawls  the  bottom  of  the
cover between lightening bolt-like zigzags.
‘Terrorism’  was  already  publicised  as  a
dramatic and destructive phenomenon that
claims the lives of the innocent and obliges
women, children and the elderly (as the
vulnerable, peaceful, thus passive members of
society) to mourn the victims. The impression was that it required decisive and
uncompromising men of solid ‘black-and-white’ fibre to counter this aggression was
reinforced for example by Ronald Reagan’s forceful anti-terrorist rhetorical imagery during
his presidency19.
Terrorism, however, is by no means new to the United States. Ann Larabee is one
amongst many to point out that terrorism in the US is “as old as the nation itself” (Larabee,
2003: 22) and proceeds to examine terrorism in the US since the 1800’s. More recently,
however, despite notable terrorist attacks in the 1990s in the United States, such as the 1993
WTC bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, or the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole,
terrorism did not become a defining national discourse until the attacks of 11 September
19 For example, in his Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat International
Terrorism with great rhetorical fervour about the evils of terrorism encouraged Congress to pass four bills to
“attack the pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism” (Reagan, 26 Apr. 1984).
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2001. As Jacques Derrida comments in an interview with Giovanna Borradori, it was not
unthinkable to anticipate the attack on US soil (Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 91).
11 September 2001
Valuable Bodies
The attacks of September 11 have been endowed with much academic attention.
Feminist voices have also participated in the discussion. Although the question of women’s
rights in Afghanistan forms the vortex, there have been some fascinating critical feminist
insights into September 11. This section therefore draws on them for discourse analysis. The
intention however, is not simply to take this ready research for granted, but to approach them
critically as well and contribute to the feminist discourse by presenting personal observations
and criticisms in conjunction.
Gender examinations of the events have first of all highlighted the maleness of the
visible actors of the event. Secondly, I focus on the discourses of their masculinities, in other
words, what kinds of masculinities were articulated, in what order of hierarchy, and with what
effects. Thirdly, a point I wish to develop on, is the performance and location of bodies, and
in  particular  what  or  whose  bodies  were  in  question  in  the  events  and  how.  The  focus  will
mainly concentrate on the World Trade Center (WTC) incident, because this was the most
publicised  of  the  three  targeted  sites.  It  has  also  remained  the  most  important  one  in  the
popular imagination, which was felt by many to be the event where “the US lost its virginity”,
as said by 2001 poet laureate Billy Collins (Puar and Rai, 2002: 124). Indeed, the event was
seen as a violation, a penetration of American purity - a rape of the national consciousness.
This feminisation was an unbearable humiliation and insult that resulted in the
remasculisation of American identity to reclaim its stripped honour.
Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin argue that men were the visible actors of
the day, and women were visible only secondarily as victims. Men planned, hijacked and
attacked, and a male team 20  in the White House retaliated. Charlesworth and Chinkin
emphasise the importance of this by imagining if the all the actors had been women; “A
20 While Condoleezza Rice was in the cabinet as the head of the National Security Council, she “played a
relatively limited over role in responding to the hijackings and the war in Afghanistan” (Charlesworth and
Chinkin, 2002: 600). Also, the positions she has taken on the War on Terror do not diverge from those of her
male colleagues, similar to most high-ranking women who must do so to be accepted in a ‘man’s world.’
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phenomenon of nineteen women hijackers willing to kill themselves for a cause would very
likely be read as a product of women’s instability, excitability, and unreliability. It would
confirm the inappropriateness of allowing women into public life” (Charlesworth and
Chinkin, 2002: 602).  The heroes of the day were also men: Major Rudolph Giuliani, the fire
fighters, policemen and rescue workers. By contrast, women were victims— often mothers
killed in the attacks or mothers of other victims, widows of men killed, and victims in distant
Islamic countries like Afghanistan. Höglund points out that the functions of gender in war
remains unchanged, where men are the actors and women the victims of their actions.
Simultaneously, however, these roles are being broken down and remoulded. (Höglund, 2003:
244)
Lorber notes that, as in most wars, two different categories of masculinities were
constructed: “the good-doers and the evil-doers” (Lorber, 2002: 383, italics original). The
masculinity of the ‘good-doers,’ however, was a selective type of masculinity— one
associated  with  heroism  and  strength.  As  a  result,  fire  fighters  were  honoured  by  being
crowned as heroes, whereas the “the poorer, non-White, working-class men— the cooks, the
dishwashers, the busboys of the World Trade Centre restaurant, the mail handlers and
maintenance personnel of the building— the strata in the least desirable jobs, many of whom
were immigrants [were forgotten]. Their masculinity was not valued enough to be called
heroic” (Lorber, 2002: 385). Indeed, considering the monetary fantasies of the American
Dream and historical xenophobia targeted at immigrants, such masculinities have never been
held in high esteem. These men were thus overshadowed and silenced in 11 September
discourses. They were the “unreal” that suffered the additional double negation of the
“violence of derealisation” (Butler, 2004a: 33). The unreal cannot be mourned because they
never existed in the national imagination. There cannot be obituaries for lives not worth
living.
Instead, the wealthier, often White, heterosexual white-collar workers were given
names, faces, personal stories, families, and hobbies, and thus recognised as valuable lives,
valuable bodies. Indeed, the destruction of the WTC towers was a representative attack on
Western capitalist domination. The target was a pair of enormous symbolic buildings standing
erect out of the New York City skyline marking the territory around it as a dominant home to
economic liberalism that is central to US national identity. The instantaneous destruction of
this icon and the economic professionals that gave it meaning and purpose resulted not only in
wounded national pride, but also in a decline of white-collar businessman masculinity. The
hegemony of this rationalist-bourgeois masculinity that so dominated the 1990s (Hooper,
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2001) suffered a decline with the realisation of its vulnerability. Ahead of it was positioned a
new hegemonic masculinity that also embodied American principles, but unlike the latter was
capable of physically protecting itself and the community. On September 11, this masculinity
was performed by fire fighters of New York City - muscular lower-class White men rescuing
other, bourgeois but powerless, White men. Their gadgets, the technological tools of the
information age - computers, calculations, and mobile phones - were impotent against the
threat of fire and destruction. The failure of top intelligence agencies like the CIA to foresee
the attacks also contributed to the loss of confidence in new methods. Hegemonic masculinity
circled around confrontation, rather than knowledge. Knowledge was not regarded as
sufficiently powerful to assert superiority over the terrorist humiliation and overcome the
displayed vulnerability. It appeared as if only brute physical force had sufficient muscle to
protect citizens and counter evil after all. Thus, in
accordance with the pattern discussed earlier,
American masculinity has a tendency to become
ruggedly militaristic during crisis periods for
masculinity.
The post-September 11 discourse of hegemonic
masculinity that emerged was therefore one celebrative
of physical force, muscle, determination, emotional
control  and  unwavering  courage  in  traumatic  and  life-
threatening circumstances. It is the strong nationalistic
dimension  of  this  masculinity  that  provides  the  above
qualities with honour and respectability, and a
seductive motivation for the individual to practice
them. He makes the most unselfish sacrifice for the
larger community and the greater idea of ‘America’21
by surrendering one’s existence for the largely psychological survival of the nation. The link
between this masculinity and nationalism was constantly produced and validated by images
such as Image 2 (above), where firefighters venerate the ‘Americanism’ by unfurling an
enormous US flag across a building damaged by the terrorist attacks. Hard male bodies are
rendered representative of the national security potential. They are transformed to embody the
ideological texts that constitute the idea of the American nation while simultaneously in
21 I refer to the discursive construction of the idea of ‘America’ as explored by David Campbell (1993),
involving particular values and practices considered to constitute the ideal American way of life.
Image 2 Firefighters unfurl the US flag on
12 Sept, 2001
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possession of the means to protect it;  it’s values,  ideals and way of life.  The New York Fire
Department (NYFD) could be described as an army of heroes because it became an institution
of national security in its participation in protecting the security of American citizens. Indeed,
the chaos of the WTC was described by many witnesses as a “war zone”, emotionalised with
images of the uniformed muscular men of the NYFD struggling in for national survival
against the destructive infiltration of the enemy Other (an infiltration that the Bush
Administration concluded was a declaration of war22). The masculinity of fire fighters was
thereby not only celebrated, but also militarised when they became temporary protectors of
the national good.
Indeed the NYFD was not the only group of people to be militarised by the events of
September 11, but it accelerated the militarisation of US culture as a whole. 23 More US flags
were flown outside buildings, both public and private, booming the flag-manufacturing
industry. Flag pins also became extremely popular as ways of expressing national loyalty and
allegiance  for  the  new  national  cause.  As  Cynthia  Enloe  writes,  “when  something  becomes
militarised, it appears to rise in value [because] militarisation is seductive” (Enloe, 2004:
145). A social pressure to conform to the patriotic extravaganza accompanied this
seductiveness. As widely observed by many critics, public criticism of militarising activities
has since been viewed as disloyal and ‘unpatriotic’. Enloe also remarks that waving flags and
wearing pins may have been the only socially acceptable expressions of public grief available
to individuals, especially those lacking in power. Indeed, pins were donned also by those
opposing militarisation, unaware that they were contributing to the beliefs of others that
militarised views of the US flag was a bias universally shared, and thus deepening the
militarisation of American culture. (Enloe, 2004: 146, 257-258)
All citizens were also subsequently called upon to contribute to the cause. George W.
Bush, for example, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush calls for every citizen to
devote two years of their life to the service of their nation, and introduces the new USA
Freedom Corps to “sustain and extend the best that has emerged in America” (Bush, 2002).
Although it  is  not a military unit,  its  possess a militaristic name that appeals to citizens who
wish to volunteer in community action in support of the larger military operations of the War
22 This was decided Sept. 12; “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our
country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Bush, 2001a) The accompanying picture shows a
table full of men, depicting them as rational strategists capable of clear objective problem-solving.
23 As Jacques Derrida discusses with Giovanna Borradori, naming of the events “9/11” after the emergency
number not only gives it historical, monumentalised stature, but also  “alleviates the sense of responsibility for
the failure to prevent them as well as the sense of vulnerability that such failure inevitably provokes” (Borradori,
2003: 148). Retaliation and a sense of national pride is thus easier to foster without sentiments of personal (US)
responsibility.
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on Terrorism. The psychological effect of such a name on its participants is such that they
imagine  themselves  in  a  civilian  ‘army’,  ensuring  national  security  at  home.  It  appeals  to  a
nationalism that exalts an aggressive approach to national security at all levels of society in
accordance  with  a  robust  heterosexual  masculinity.  It  its  programmes  are  such  that  they
penetrate deep into the social fabric - of men, women and children - and partaking in the
transformation of their identities, and militarising them, not only in the US but abroad as well.
For example, underprivileged children in “troubled schools” and the “Islamic world” will be
staffed be USA Freedom Corps volunteer teachers, militarising the educational standards,
institutions and the pupils that inhabit them. Here it is appropriate to bear in mind Foucault’s
discussion of discipline and surveillance (Foucault, 1987) and the treatment of establishments
such  as  prisons,  hospitals  and  schools  as  examples  of  institutions  that  were  created  and
organised  in accordance with purpose of disciplining bodies and minds. The attachment of a
body such as the USA Freedom Corps to an educational disciplinary institution is likely - as it
is intended - to instil youths to aspire to particular ontological foundations that perceive the
military as a positive, natural, and necessary establishment. Their bodies are subjected to the
surveillance of a militarised organ, and thus its disciplinary mechanisms compel them to
submit to its militarising control. And it is thus that individuals are discouraged from certain
‘soft’ or ‘feminine’ reactions and approaches to their national crisis.
Sexualising Monsters
The masculinity of the ‘evil-doers’ was also specially discursively constructed,
functioning to demonise and dehumanise Muslim men as the Other, victimising Muslim
women and idealising American men and women to legitimise the US military retaliation
(Lorber, 2002: 379). This discourse not only constructs a particular the enemy Other, but also
to  define  the  righteous  self.  The  terrorists  were  diagnosed  as  excessively  emotionally  to  the
extent  of  unpredictability,  which  substantiated  by  their  irrational  and  uncivilised  Islamic
fundamentalist motivation renders them exceptionally dangerous. These qualities are in direct
contrast to the qualities of Americans that where the self/Other distinction is defined by
oppositional dichotomies of the masculine/feminine division respectively; rational/emotional,
civilised/primitive, etc.
Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai (2002) argue that Muslim men have been Othered into
monsters by particular dynamics of feminisation, resulting in an intensification of the
heteronormative nature of a militarist, racist and class-specific US nationalism. They draw on
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Foucault’s conception of ‘abnormals’ to examine the notion of monstrosity, which has been
historically tied to questions of sexuality and race. The terrorists were deemed
psychologically dysfunctional, and this was frequently attributed by psychologists and
‘terrorism experts’ to negative childhood or dysfunctional family experiences that resulted in
self-resentment and a subsequently debased and sexually frustrated heterosexuality.
Despite being educated individuals, their monstrosity was nonetheless characterised
by their lack of civilisation. George W. Bush contributes to this discourse by calling the war a
struggle of the “civilised world” against “terrorist parasites” that “operate in remote jungles
and deserts, and hide in centres of large cities” (George Bush, 2002). This is reinforced by the
vocal condemnation of the treatment of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban, which shall
be returned to later. They are not only represented as uncivilised, but also as subhuman,
deceitful, perverted. They are outside of ‘civilisation’ and thus ‘rationality,’ therefore their
mind-set is inestimable, demented. This mental degeneracy is a cause for fear because of its
creative and primitive taste for excessive violence.
The discourse of their masculinity is therefore not simply a failed one. It is a distorted,
debauched and corrupt sexuality that defines queerness as sexual deviancy. As Puar and Rai
describe, shortly after the attacks, posters began to appear in Manhattan that featured Osama
bin Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State Building, with the caption “The
Empire Strikes Back” or “So you like skyscrapers, huh, bitch?” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 126). A
website was also posted where one could torture Osama bin Laden to death with a variety of
weapons with final one being sodomy (ibid.). This imaginary homosexual rape represents a
feminisation of Islamic men, subordinating them to the power of heterosexual American men.
If we understand homosexual rape by heterosexual men as a violent act of domination, we can
begin to understand how this representative rape homosexualises the terrorist enemy.
Homosexual rape in prisons functions in the same way. (O'Donnell, 2004: 243) Male rape is
connected to high levels of homophobia. The damage is not only physical, but also
significantly psychological. The victim is forced into the ‘feminine’ role by submitting to the
penetration of the attacker. The victim is stigmatised with feminisation, lost manhood and
rendered queer, and thus is weak, substandard, and abnormal.
The demonisation of queerness not only others terrorists, but also disciplines the
heterosexual masculinity of the self, possibly resulting in an increase in violence against
homosexuals in US, especially against those of colour. In other words, domestic homosexual
bodies are subject to coercive forces upon the body in attempt to compel them to conform to
or acquiesce to the rugged heterosexual masculinity of militarisation. In addition, Puar and
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Rai argue that September 11 was a symbolic castration of US masculinity (Puar and Rai,
2002: 126), hence its ensuing homophobic narratives and representations could be interpreted
as rhetorical reclamations of its crippled manhood.
Homophobic narratives are produced and sustained without much hesitation much due
to persisting postcolonial imaginaries that are bound to larger racist discourses. Discourse of
prevailing convictions of racial and civilisational inferiority is necessary to identify the racism
of statements like “Hijack these fags” written across a bomb on the U.S.S. Enterprise. (Puar
and Rai, 2002: 127) Tickner points out that indeed not all others are feminised. She argues
that American discourses did not, for example, feminise the Soviet Union to the same extent
as they feminise Islamic nations. Non-white nations are more likely to be feminised, and
therefore demonstrating a significant racial dimension to the gendering of colonialism.
(Tickner, 2004: 54-55) Significantly, it provides a moral alleviation for US military
involvement in the War on Terrorism. The “greater good” (George Bush, 2002), that the US
military proclaims to serve is the spread of democracy to such uncultivated savages, and in
doing so transform their otherness to sameness with the reason and knowledge of men as
knowers24 by violently force-feeding them the masculinising fruits of the Enlightenment that
they have yet to experience. While democracy (in the abstract) is certainly an ideal to strive
for, previous attempts to impose the system have frequently fallen short of its promises.
Feminists in particular have special cause for scepticism about democratic ‘crusades’, which
run the risk of deteriorating women’s suffering even further.
Until now the discussion has largely been one of discussing visible and invisible male
bodies.  Women,  on  the  other  hand,  are  glaringly  absent  from  11  September  discourses.  As
Charlesworth and Chinkin observe, the only consistent distinguishable female voices belong
to  victims,  of  either  the  hijackers,  or  as  widows  of  men  killed.  (Charlesworth  and  Chinkin,
2002: 600) Women did not feature as actors of that day, nor were their voices granted much
attention.  Femininities  were  significant  in  mobilising  the  masculinity  of  the  self  and  Other,
but the femininities of women were not yet a matter of concern, only to the extent that they
remain passive and supportive of the developing machinations of the War on Terrorism by
silently mourning the victims of September 11. Their silence and submission served to bolster
the legitimacy of the hegemonic masculinity. It supported the discourse of ‘femininity’ as
weak and impotent, thus permitting the construction of masculinities in relation to this
24 “Beginning in the 17th century, scientific reasoning was explicitly constructed as ‘male’ and promoted as
superior to and exclusive of that which was marked as ‘female.’ Man, the knower, was identified with science
and reason; women were associated with emotion and irrationality.” (Tickner, 1999: 46)
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femininity. Women were soon to become a central question, however, when the military gaze
was redirected to Afghanistan, when a pitiable femininity became a cause for militarisation.
Afghanistan
The US led the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 under the title of Operation
Enduring Freedom. It was an impassioned time of demands for revenge and justice, and any
form of justice could be accommodated to justify the retaliation. Thus, to reinforce the
justifications for the invasion of Afghanistan, a discourse of women’s rights surfaced as one
of its leading motivations. Before delving further into the problematisation of these
discourses, it is interesting to examine the gender identities of the presidential couple,
President George W. Bush and First Lady Laura Bush. Their leadership styles and discourses
are very specifically gendered, and this will be discussed much in relation to Afghanistan,
where President Bush’s new leadership style was confirmed and Mrs Bush’s sexuality was
most publicly activated. Being the leading political couple, their public images are formative
of national sexualities by providing gender archetypes, as the national ‘parents’, to which
other male and female citizens should aspire. Their bodies too are militarised in support of the
violence of the War on Terrorism.
“Let's Roll” - Leading the Crusade
In US politics, there seems to have long been a consensus that the valiant male is an
ideal of leadership; he is the ultimate protector of his national family. Valenty and Feldman in
their examination of modern American leadership recognise ‘heroic leadership’ in American
society as the traditional model. It demands a hierarchical chain of command and functions on
the motto ‘decide and command’; “The task of the heroic leader is to convince the public of
what it is that he already thinks they must do… The heroic leader stands above, and beyond,
his supportive publics” (Valenty and Feldman, 2002: 205). President George W. Bush fits this
description, whereas his predecessor Bill Clinton fits the alternative ‘reflective leadership’, a
less forceful and more pensive and consensual style of leadership that has since in particular
been feminised.
In his analysis of gender in American politics, Mark Kann reflects on the historical
heritage of patriarchal leadership in the United States. The founding fathers, he writes, often
discussed “the need for strong political leadership… They portrayed great leaders as national
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fathers and political father figures” (Kann, 1999: 97). Their ideal of political leadership can be
considered to resemble that as described by their contemporary Lord Bolingbroke in The Idea
of the Patriot King;
He governed like a ‘common father’ and treated the people as a part of his ‘patriarchal
family’… A Patriot King also epitomized manhood. He acted with integrity and civility,
refused the lure of flattery, resisted factionalism, practiced manly virtues, and avoided
unmanly vices
(ibid.).
These qualities— classical as they are in their chivalry— in President Bush became
highly visible after the 11 September attacks as he declared war on terrorism and vowed to
avenge the victims. Subsequently, success of the war in Afghanistan increased public
approval to over 90 percent in polls (Gould, 2003: 235), therefore applauding such behaviour.
Charlesworth and Chinkin also discuss the connection between military action and
masculinity in leadership perceptions;
To be a leader, it seems, requires displaying masculine qualities, such as decisive military
action as opposed to negotiation and compromise, which are coded as feminine. As a result,
President Bush’s conduct of the war was praised even by former Democrat adversaries
because he was seen as displaying resolute strength, in contrast to his opponent in the
presidential election, Al Gore, who was seen as too much of a ‘talker.’
(Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002, 604)
Cynthia Enloe takes an interesting approach to the topic, albeit briefly. She finds it
peculiar that Bush has managed to persuade his public of his militarised masculinity, despite
his infamous escape of the Vietnam War draft. The importance of military records of
presidential candidates in election campaigns itself shows how admired this form of
hegemonic masculinity is in popular American political culture. One only needs to recall the
frequent mention of presidential candidate John Kerry’s four Purple Hearts for his injuries
from the Vietnam War in the 2004 elections. Enloe therefore argues that Bush exploited the
post-September 11 national vulnerability to further cement this masculinity into the
presidential office and display himself with this identity. It is thus surprising that a president
whose Vietnam ‘dodge’ was publicly investigated by the media managed to achieve a popular
position a strong wartime leader of exemplary masculinity. While effective in the short term,
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Enloe warns that “this distortion is certain to undermine international stability and to shrink
political life by marginalizing women as full citizens and by privileging the narrowest version
of masculinity.”  (Enloe, 2004a: 152-154)
“Let’s roll,” Bush declared in his 2002 State of the Union Address25 as the “new ethic
and new creed [of America]” instead of an older “If it feels good, do it” (George Bush, 2002).
The new motto nationalises an act-don’t-think mentality that calls for firm resolve and quick,
forceful action, disapproving of a previously calmer and emotionally sensitive policy. In
constructing the identity of others, he also produced discourses articulating his own identity.
“Let’s roll,” therefore, produces the impression of a dynamic leader that does not hesitate
employ the power codified in his office. Ruthlessness towards the enemy and the
uncompromising resolve to defeat them is essential to protect his citizens; “Whatever it costs
to defend our country, we will pay.”
His masculinity reaches almost divine proportions as it intersects with the religious, an
aspect of othering that has thusfar been left aside from the analysis. The concept of evil that is
constantly repeated in reference to the elusive enemy is attributable to a religious heritage,
which in Bush’s case is Christian. The idea of an eternal battle between good and evil, God
versus Satan, divides moral fabric into two extremes - rationality and enlightenment versus
chaos and darkness. These extremes were expressed from the start - states were either “with
us or against us” (George Bush, 2001d). “God is near,” (George Bush, 2002) and on his side
to conquer “real” evil in a “unique role in human events” by “the greater good” The enemy is
essentially non-Christian, immoral, barbaric by sending their children on suicide and murder
missions and “embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed.” Indeed it is a classic
dichotomy, where claim ‘A’ is prioritised at the expense of ‘not-A’; If God is on his side, then
he cannot be on the other.
Recalling David Campbell’s (1998) examination of the Christian Puritanism of the
American colonisers, one can argue that it is Islam and specifically Islamic fundamentalism
that is demonised in War on Terrorism discourse. Indeed, racial violence increased in the US
after September 11, often indiscriminately against anyone appearing to be “Muslim.” Many
Sikhs stopped wearing their turbans after hearing reports of turban grabbing and the shooting
of  a  turban-wearing  Sikh  gas  station  owner  in  Arizona.  Referred  to  as   ‘towelheads,’  such
derogatory references have increased in number. US Representative John Cooksey on 17
25 The State of the Union Addresses produce interesting discourse for examination. The annual speeches are
globally televised and considered to be the most important of each year as they are intended to articulate the
current political situation and a vision for its future. Thus, they can be expected to produce hegemonic discourses
that shape and have been shaped by contemporary identities.
58
September said that anyone “wearing a diaper on his head” should expect to be questioned by
police about the terrorist attacks (Puar and Rai, 2002: 137). On the same date, George W.
Bush held a speech at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. condemning violence against
Muslims in the US, and declaring, “the face of terror is not the true faith of Islam... Islam is
peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and war” (George Bush,
2001c). Despite also citing from the Koran, Bush’s defence of Islam amounts to little. He
does not define it as a faith of America26, but one existing within its territory that must be
tolerated. Again, the idea of tolerance is derived from the Christian virtue of tolerance for
non-Christians. Although tolerance is preferable to intolerance, it is nonetheless a discourse
used as a kind of “condescending concession [by the side of those with power]” (Derrida,
2003: 127). It is, he argues, a form of charity that is always on the side of the strongest
presenting the  “good face of sovereignty” but the limits of hospitality. Tolerance defines the
limits of acceptance of the foreign body, therefore conditional hospitality on the terms of the
ones with power. (Derrida, 2003: 127-128) Religious difference therefore exists alongside
racial and sexual difference as a disparity that is too easily negatively coded to epitomise the
perversion of the male Other. While Osama bin Laden embodies these evils to the extreme,
Bush, by contrast and in relation, represents himself as a divine warrior messiah, not only sent
to vanquish the enemy, but civilise him by bestowing upon him modern “civilisation” that is
explicitly Christian in tradition. Thus gender in conjunction with racial and religious imagery
in discourses is mutually important in “understanding how first-world countries represent
their relation to third-world countries [as a] mythic drama that contains no thinking and acting
third-world subjects” (Schott, 2003: 6-7).
Claiming Bodies
Discourses of women’s rights were instrumental in reinforcing the justification of the
invasion of Afghanistan. This way the invasion was not just a revenge operation; it was given
the additional humanitarian goal of alleviating suffering and delivering freedom to oppressed
and helpless women in a faraway godforsaken land ruled by terrorist monsters. Laura Bush
engaged in an important role to highlight women’s rights issues in Afghanistan, and thus was
explicitly elaborative of the sexualities and gender issues that this “crusade” (George Bush,
26 As reflected in the controversy to delete the phrase “one Nation under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance,
this official disciplinary mantra states and legitimises Christianity as the religion of the United States in practice
(albeit not legalistically).  In addition, Bush regularly ends his speeches with the words “God bless America” -
and it is the Christian God that is summoned in this prayer-like conclusion.
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2001c) functioned to discipline. It formed a significant part of a larger hegemonic effort to
claim, possess and discipline bodies.
If the President represents the national father, then the First Lady is regarded as the
national mother. This is reflected also in the tasks that she is appointed to by her husband and
position in general. In addition to numerous ceremonial duties, for Laura Bush these include
overseeing youth programmes, educational development, women’s health, and cultural
heritage protection and promotion initiatives. Compared to issues of national security,
taxation, and so on, these issues are distinctly feminised policy areas that continue to be swept
towards the ‘private’ of the public/private divide. As the First Lady, she is the national
figurehead of such concerns. She is to be an example of womanhood, which in her
performance includes participation in charities, women and children’s issues and providing a
sympathetic ear to society’s less fortunate members and mouthpiece to voice their concerns -
that are significantly overshadowed by her husband’s news-making politics. She is a warm-
hearted, generous and devoted Christian wife of pious morals and chaste virtues, representing
strong heterosexual family values27.
Indeed, when an interviewer asked her to comment on accusations that the US was
trying  to  impose  values  of  “promiscuity  and  selfishness  on  the  Arab  world,”  Mrs  Bush
vehemently  denied  the  sexual  desires  of  US  citizens.  “That’s  not  a  real  view  of  what  the
American people are like,” she replied. “Americans are very religious [and honest]... When
you in any part of the world see only American television or listen only to some parts of
American music, you get a very unrealistic picture about the way the people of the United
States really are” (Laura Bush, 2004). Mrs Bush confirms the prevailing taboo on sex and
sexuality. Frequent sexual intercourse, especially with different partners constitutes socially
intolerable and condemnable licentiousness. American television and music, which gets
worldwide distribution and is regularly explicitly sexual in content may represent parts of
America, but it is not the ‘true’ America. ‘True’ Americans do not expose their bodies, for the
signification encoded in the forms of the body imply sexuality, and sexuality implies moral
and spiritual decadence and degeneracy - as the Bible describes it as “sins of the flesh”
(Colossians 2: 11). For the Christian Church, sex has always been hidden in the private as a
reproductive function, not a source of pleasure. This forms the basis of the well-known
27 Recipes for home baking are available on the Laura Bush’s White House website pages, as well as her
husband’s pages under the “Holidays” section (http://www.whitehouse.gov/). Cooking and baking has been one
of the traditional American housewife chores since the 20th century representing the successful virtues of the
nuclear family and a fundamental building block of the ‘good American home.’ Betty Friedan’s The Feminine
Mystique (1963) (in)famously criticised this lifestyle, the principles of which have appear not to have eroded
over the decades.
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Madonna/whore dichotomy (Koivunen, 1995), where a respectable woman is a chaste and
virginal mother, or a social outcast due to the greedy promiscuity of her body. As we shall see
in the case of Afghanistan, however, there is a permissible extent of physical exposition of the
female body, but this is limited to particular norms of respectability. A total covering of the
female body is a shocking de-sexualisation. The performance of American femininity
therefore requires a degree of bodily exposure enough to make the female body an object of
pretty admiration, but modest enough not to cross over to whorishness. Mrs Bush is
exemplary of this with disciplined gestures, a endless warm smile, and a neat and modest
skirt-and-blazer outfit.
In November 2001, Laura Bush took on a leading role in the White House to promote
the ‘rescue’ of Afghani women and children. In a Presidential Radio Address, the first First
Lady ever to deliver one,  she dedicated the entire speech to connecting terrorism directly to
the oppression of women. “The brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists”
she  spoke,  “The fight  against  terrorism is  also  a  fight  for  the  rights  and  dignity  of  women”
(Laura Bush, 2001). Therefore, not only would the US war in Afghanistan destroy terrorism,
but also destroying terrorism would liberate women. Considering the reverence summoned for
mothers, the words of Mrs Bush were bound to be taken seriously, as they were from one of
the most charitable and honourable of mothers. The descriptions of the suffering of Afghan
women, who “face beatings for laughing out loud” and “threaten to pull out women’s
fingernails for wearing nail polish”, were emotionally delivered and intended to induce shock
and sympathy to justify military action. The rest of the Bush Administration also participated
in these descriptions of how the “dreams of the terrorists and the Taliban [as a] waking
nightmare for Afghani women and children” (George W. Bush, 2001e).
First  of  all,  this  discourse  is  a  part  of  a  wider  enduring  colonial  discourse  of  “white
men saving brown women from brown men” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127). The enemy
community’s men may be the villains, but their women and children are their victims just as
much, or even more, than the self on September 11. Indeed, the self may be a victim, but the
women and children are helpless Others in need of liberation. In this discourse, women’s
oppression is the mark of an inferior society. Dana L. Cloud discusses the “paternalistic gaze”
adopted by Americans toward Afghani women. (Cloud, 2004: 291) For example, Time
magazine’s photo essays offer images of modernity that contrast with images of chaos and
backwardness. Numerous biographical and autobiographical books were published and
reached bestseller status. These narratives told women’s stories of tragic suffering under an
oppressive society ruled by brutal Taliban men. Their covers (see next page, Images 2-5) were
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invariably featured women in burqas, representing the denial of their individuality and
femininity. The nets in front of their eyes hide their identities. To the Western gaze these nets
are reminiscent of nets, or cages, that imprison bodies and identities and rob them completely
of their individuality and sexuality. Their bodies are overly modest, and their femininity thus
oppressed along with their physical and vocal freedom. The viewer can only see the obscure
shape of their eyes through the exotic, perverse embroidery looking straight into the camera
lens as if yearningly pleading the viewer for salvation. The sexually repressive cage also has
sadomasochistic (S&M) implications. For the Western gaze, the burqa is a permanent
Orientalist prop of sexual bondage imposed by Muslim men on their women. The men are in
the sadistic role, getting sexual pleasure or gratification from inflicting pain and suffering by
caging the women and beating them at will. The interpretation of S&M in the US as a form of
sexually perversion and moral sickness renders Afghan men as bodies to be sexually
disciplined - either by reform or destruction - to rescue the women from their submissive
masochistic positions. These images represent this repression, and simultaneously attempt to
give voices to such anonymous ghosts, voices that were intended to generate emotions of pity
for these victims, and anger for their oppressors.
These images form binary oppositions with the West and encourage viewers to adopt a
paternalistic stance to less fortunate beings. It is a continuation of the colonizer who has the
power  to  subject  Others  to  his/her  gaze,  thus  defining  Afghan  women  as  objects  of  US
cultural hegemony (Cloud, 2004: 293). As Enloe discusses, colonised women have been the
objects of the colonial gaze for centuries, as demonstrated for example by a series of
postcards. (Enloe, 2000a: 42-43) Such images mystify and eroticise female Others. The veiled
woman romanticises the Oriental female; it is hidden, forbidden, yet an object of desire - the
desire to unveil.
This  unveiling,  a  destruction  of  the  burqa,  results  in  a  demolition  of  Islamic  culture
and tradition, and aggrandising US cultural assumptions of how sexuality and agency should
to be organised and represented. Their possession is achieved only by fighting their current
owners, Afghan men, with American men.
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Images 2-5: Cover images of post-September 11 books on women in Afghanistan
Image 2: Unveiled: Voices of Women in
Afghanistan (2002) Harriet Logan
Image 3: My Forbidden Face (2002)
Latifa
Image 4: Zoya’s Story: An Afghan Woman’s Struggle
For Freedom (2003) Zoya Image 5: Behind the Burqa: Our Life in
Afghanistan and How We Escaped to Freedom
(2002) Sulima and Hala, Batya Swift Yasgur
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But, such romanticising is controlled by a belief in their inevitable inferiority as
a consequence of membership in an uncivilised society. Thus, recollecting Runyard Kipling,
they comprise “The White Man’s Burden,” which is to save women and children from (male)
savages, and from their own helplessness. (Cloud, 2004: 293) It is thus that the colonialist
gaze militarises women’s bodies by claiming them as objects of possession requiring military
aggression for protection and civilisation. As such, it was inconceivable that the burqa, like
the veil, had the potential to be manipulated by women to assert their agency by rendering
them invisible and permitting them to safely traverse masculine space, public space.
(Ye?eno?lu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 558). After all, there are women who continue to wear
the burqa although it is no longer necessary, albeit at the insistence of their masculine
relatives.
Laura  Bush’s  encouragement  not  only  seeks  to  justify  the  use  of  violence  to  realise
women’s rights, but also implies that this is the only possible method to achieve this. It
disregards the appeals of women’s rights groups prior to September 11 that endlessly
petitioned for the attention and support of world leaders. The pleas continued to be
disregarded after September 11, however. Instead, the Bush Administration adopted the
women’s rights campaign as its own cause. All the sudden Afghani women, from being
“completely  absent  from  media  representations  and  discussion,  …  were  now  the  [saved]
other” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127). Simultaneously other realities were hidden or altered to
support the US ‘saviour’ image. Afghani women were denied agency. Their experiences of 22
years of civil war were limited to victimisation. There was little mention or realisation that as
social actors, women “sought alternative ways of surviving and formulating their objectives
within a context of restricted resources and restrictive cultural practices” (Povey, 2003: 275).
For example, the efforts Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)
were downplayed, and then congratulated by Western feminists both as a saviour and one of
the saved— and even such portrayals did not receive serious attention. Another contradictory
example  is  the  US  alliance  with  the  Northern  Alliance  that  has  a  tarnished  women’s  rights
record itself. Similarly there was no attempt to explain the blind-eye to women’s rights in
other allied countries, like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002: 602)
This is explainable in terms of how women’s rights is seen by the larger Bush Administration
as an instrumental good. It is not the goal of the Bush Administration to promote women’s
rights in Afghanistan, but freedom and democracy. The discourse of women’s rights,
therefore,  prescribes  that  women’s  rights  are  not  to  be  protected  for  their  own  sake,  but
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because they are instrumental the democratisation of Afghanistan, which is ultimately
beneficial to US national security. (Ferguson, 2005: 25-26)
The assertion of a paternalistic stance towards women’s rights in less developed
countries implies the ability to proclaim an ideal or near-ideal situation within the boundaries
of the self. This is not the case in the US, or the rest of the idealised liberal West, however,
and therefore these discourses disregard and conceal the oppression of women in the US and
other democracies. (Cloud, 2004: 289) Violence against women, abortion rights, unequal pay,
and maternal rights - a number of structural problems - continue to sustain gender equalities
(that also include gay and transgender rights) in the US. Laura Bush may very well believe in
her  statements,  for  the  suffering  of  any  individual  is  a  cause  for  compassion.  However,  her
feminist discourse represents a liberal feminist position that is consistent with older colonialist
missionary feminist projects such as humanitarian civilising missions used to justify the
British Empire (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127; Young, 2003: 19). Chandra Mohanty (1991) argues
that Western feminists too often employ an objectified category of third-world women, as
passive and victimised by their uncivilised cultures and political regimes. This certainly
applies here too. In addition, the liberal feminist predisposition to give priority to legal rights
and initiatives assumes that their fulfilment will realise women’s equality to men while
remaining unaware of larger social ideologies that sustain structural inequality. In the case of
Islamic  countries,  Western  liberal  feminists  are  also  frequently  unaware  of  the  forms  of
Islamic feminism that specifically attempts to deal with complex issues such as rights,
modernisation, kinship obligations and religious traditions that conflict with Western feminist
ideals.28
As suspected by many sceptical feminists, US promises of women’s liberation have
fallen short of its pledges. Since US foreign policy began to turn its attention to Iraq in the
build-up to the war that began in March 2003, Afghanistan has received less attention as a
democracy was established and women’s rights were declared. Problems persist, however.
Despite the resumption of female education and the right to practice in professional fields, the
realisation of rights into practice is slow and mediocre. It has been more difficult than
predicted to shake off misogynistic cultural values that prevail over codified rights. Women
are still targets of violence, including widespread rape. Expectations of political participation
28 The issues surrounding Islamic feminism can be summarized in three trends: One that is Islamist, countering
Westernisation, and returning to prestate Islam, where Islam and gender equality are believed to have been
compatible. The second is secular, participating in modernisation and democratisation. The third trend seeks a
middle way as Islamist but also enabling gender equality in public and in the family (Lorber, 2002: 291).
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were a disappointment. Female candidates face danger and death. (Off Our Backs, 2005a: 5-6;
2005b: 5) In forming alliances with groups like the Northern Alliance, the invading US
military privileged certain forms of local masculinity that cared little if at all for women’s
empowerment. The emerging competing masculine groups after the removal of the Taliban
regime were described as warlords like Ismail Khan and civil servants in President Hamid
Karzai’s cabinet. As such, the political arena remained a masculine space of competing
masculinities. As Cynthia Enloe comments, “Men rivalling each other in the arena of
politicsed masculinity always have needed to ensure that ‘their’ women will play those
politically salient feminised roles [of symbols, subordinates, admirers or specators]” (Enloe,
2004: 285). Indeed, what Enloe does not explore further is their shared masculine values that,
from women’s perspectives, make the separate groups hardly distinguishable.
This is not to say that there have been no improvements whatsoever in the position of
women.  As  the  Bushes  and  many  feminists  such  as  Enloe  narrate,  there  are  stories  of
individual women with success stories (e.g. 2004: 286-289; George W. Bush, 2002).
However, these women are fewer in number than imagined, and those who obtained
prominent positions in the new government, such as Sima Samar, Minister of Women’s
Affairs, were summoned from their prominent lives in exile. But, there are emerging female
political figures from within Afghanistan. The Afghan Constitution guarantees 68 seats for
women in the Lower House and 2 in each Provincial Council. One of these female Members
of Parliament, 28-year old Malalai Joya, has frequently spoken out against the ex-
mujahedeens,  drug  dealers,  and  warlords  holding  seats  in  parliament  whom  she  calls   “war
criminals.” Her behaviour is undeniably courageous. As articles from the New York Times (18
Dec. 2003) and The Washington Post (17 Mar. 2006) describe how her 17 December 2003
speech in the constitutional council caused uproar amongst male MPs, who rushed forward to
the  stage  to  attack  her.  She  frequently  refuses  to  apologise  to  the  assembly  for  her  remarks,
and her microphone has been silenced as she continues to describe continuing atrocities
against women, such as murder, rape, and kidnapping, acts which warlords are also guilty of.
Despite frequent death threats, her audacity has not abated.  The discourse of her struggle
proclaims it a vigorous one against all odds that has gained the widespread support of the
Afghan people, against oppressive male government officials that are really warlords that
destroyed the country in the civil war before the establishment of the Taliban regime in 1996.
These discourses, like Enloe’s, distinguish clearly between “the country’s American-
backed interim president, Hamid Karzai, and his allies, who support a draft constitution that
ensures a strong presidency, in part to check the power of the warlords [and...] the jihadis
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[who] give greater weight to Islam [and] are suspicious of Western involvement” (NY Times).
The parallel is made between the American-backed officials as enlightened and progressive in
support of women’s rights and Westernisation, and the Islamists as Islamic fundamentalist ex-
warriors still bloodthirsty and insistent on a backward society that oppresses women. The
division between good/bad men divides Afghan masculinities into two opposing groups that
sustains the US self-image of democratic liberator used in the humanitarian discourse for
additional justification for the war. The US and its Afghani supporters are still characterised
as woman-friendly, and any association with the Taliban as woman-repressive. The continued
sentimentalisation of Muslim women and demonisation of Muslim men simplifies a more
complicated political status quo that threatens to destabilise and delegitimise post-September
11 US identities.
First of all, these news stories in the mainstream US mass media leave out Malalai
Joya’s  condemnations  of  US  policy. The Orange County Register quoted Joya on 5 March
2006 directly criticising US government policy while visiting a local mosque in Orange,
California;
If Americans want to bring real democracy to Afghanistan, then the American government
must change their policies... The United States has its own strategic policies in Afghanistan
and they do not think about the innocent people. They need to support the real freedom-
loving people and stop supporting the warlords.
(Joya in The OC Register)
In  addition  another  smaller  US  news  reportage, Fosters Daily Democrat also
published Joya’s criticisms in the sidelines on 12 March 2006, when she appealed to
American listeners at the Quaker House Meeting in Dover, USA;
In the name of God, democracy and peace, from my sisters — the women of Afghanistan —
Taliban may have gone, but abuses are not over... This democracy brought the Afghani
people out of the pan but into the fire. The United States is supporting fundamentalists more
than ever. It supports the Northern Alliance — the most brutal and ignorant fundamentalists.
Dear  friends...  Such  a  country  cannot  be  free  and  liberated.  My  country  is  not  free.
The presence of U.S. troops is not to establish democracy: it is only for its own strategic
interest. America was never concerned about the establishment of democracy.
(Joya in Fosters Daily Democrat)
67
Joya accuses the US of hypocrisy and cold self-interest in its treatment of Afghanistan.
Democracy is not more an objective of the US-backed Northern Alliance than it was of the
Taliban, she argues. She appeals to values like religion, democracy, peace, sisterhood and
friendship to gain the empathy of her American listeners. While popular nation-wide media
sources like the NY Times and Washington Post contend that women’s rights have advanced
in  post-Taliban  Afghanistan,  with  Joya  as  proof  of  US  success,  they  nonetheless  remain
uncritical of the US-backed regime. Turning to smaller local news sources, Joya’s more
critical opinions are published, but their reporting still contains anti-Islamic traces in the
demonisation  of  “fundamentalists.”  Thus,  US  discourses  of  women’s  social  and  political
positions in Afghanistan still blames Islamic fundamentalism and demonises brown, bearded
Muslim men for women’s suffering and their lack of political progress. The self is preserved
as an enlightened and blameless mentor. Joya is represented as its leading righteous activist
heroically  struggling  for  rights  and  democracy.  She  is  presented  as  if  she  were  the  Afghan
Joan  of  Arc  of  liberal  democracy:  A  woman  in  a  ‘man’s  world,’  leading  a  struggle  of
liberation for her people.
Non-US sources, like Canadian CBC News (Straziuso, 14 May 2006) or indeed
Malalai Joya’s own Internet homepage provide different insights to explore. They describe
how on 7 May 2006 Joya delivered her first extended speech in parliament since her election
in 2003 in which she again attacked the “criminals” in parliament and spoke out on behalf of
the sufferings of Afghan women. In the commotion, some former mujahedeen leaders began
shouting, walked out, other members threw plastic bottles at her, and shouted insults. Some
yelled calling her a prostitute and shouted that they would rape her and stab her. In her
speech, she made a distinction between “true” mujahedeens that fought against the Soviet
Union in the 1980s and those involved in crime and abuses of power but nonetheless, former
mujahedeen leader Alam Khan Ezadi stood up to protest the presence of someone who insults
the mujahedeen “who sacrificed their lives to defeat the Soviets, to defeat terrorism.” While
this repartee involves an interesting use of religious and nationalistic appeals by both parties -
especially how Joya links these to the justification of women’s rights, it shall not be explored
further here, as the interest of this analysis is examining the exclusion of these elements from
US discourse of Afghanistan.
First of all, the exclusion of the mujahedeen-distinction made by Joya is not present in
US discourse. All mujahedeens are considered to be fundamentalists, and thereby dangerous
savages of irrepressible aggression. Joya is depicted as a success story of Afghan
democratisation; how a young, female former refugee from the Farah Province rose to
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popularity, won a seat in the new parliament in ‘free elections,’ and there stands as a pillar of
democracy, seeing through the hypocrisy of male MPs who are secretly dedicated to the
Taliban extremism. This is reminiscent of the Christian teaching of a ‘hidden enemy,’ to
“Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are
ravening wolves” (Matthew 7: 15). But there is no mention of the deep and widespread
nationalistic respect for the mujahedeen that fought for the independence of Afghanistan
against the Soviet Union. Although the CIA funded and armed these mujahedeen in the 1980s
as an anti-Soviet Cold War strategy, such details are not discussed in dominant discourses.
Indeed, an acknowledgement that the US government trained and armed its present enemy
would have disastrous domestic (and possible international) consequences.
Likewise, the distinction between jihadists (ex-mujahedeens) and democratising
officials is a stark division that assumes the latter to be a woman-friendly political force.
Certainly, there are competing masculinities at hand, but even they are not so simply
tyrannical/democratic ones. They also involve dimensions like of former exiles, religious
intensity, pro/anti-Westernisation or modernisation, conceptions of nationalism, or treatment
of women (extent of misogynistic beliefs) that construct one’s masculinity. The hegemonic
masculinity of Taliban Afghanistan has been challenged alternative masculinities empowered
by  the  US  invasion.  However,  as  R.W.  Connell  writes,  although  “the  dominance  of  a
particular masculinity [erodes, and] new groups may challenge old solutions and construct a
new hegemony,” all men and hegemonic masculinities nonetheless collectively gain from the
“overall subordination of women” (Connell, 1995: 77, 79). Indeed, Malalai Joya’s male
defenders are few, for it is preferable to appease ex-mujahedeens that become the target of
death threats by defending Joya - as has occurred to those protecting her in parliament from
physical attacks and subsequently organising a press conference for her.
In addition, the female MPs cannot all be classified beautiful, liberated, post-Taliban
empowered female bodies. Of course Malalai Joya enjoys support from female colleagues.
Yet, there were those who participated in her assault, such as MPs Noorzia Atmar, Malalai
Ishaqzai, Parvin Durrani and Safora Niazi. They act as supporters the masculinity of the
angered male MPs by performing a submissive femininity that attempts to silence other
femininities, like Joya’s, that attempt to challenge those prevailing masculinities.
The US discourse of Afghan bodies is disciplinary, distinctly enabled by the simplicity
of their representations. It limits the available Afghan identities to particular gendered
stereotypes consistent with the thematic good/evil characterisations of the War on Terror.
Malalai Joya’s body is not austerely a Central Asian embodiment of Western liberal
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feminism. It is too crude to regulate the ‘truth’ about her to an Afghan suffragette. It ignores
her definition of her womanhood, which includes strong religious and nationalistic elements
that are also strategically politically vital for the successful improvement of women’s lives in
Afghanistan. The overall disappointment of the US humanitarian cause in Afghanistan is
overwhelmingly so for women, whose lives remain principally unchanged despite legal
statures  declaring  their  rights.  However,  as  in  the  liberal  democracies  of  Europe  and  North
America, such text means little without a change in social attitudes, and the conception of
gender itself - which is a long-term process that no military campaign can force, as militarism
and misogyny are intimately and necessarily mutually supportive. And therein lies the irony
of the US women’s rights discourse on Afghanistan.
Detaining Bodies
Gender and Sexuality at Guantánamo Bay
While the previous section concentrated on women’s rights and democratisation
discourses in Afghanistan, the analysis will now turn to the discourses on punishment. The
post-September 11 feminisation and demonisation of Muslim male bodies has already been
discussed. As the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan in response to such motivations
progressed and the US captured terrorist/Al-Qaeda/Taliban suspects, the US naval base in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba was selected as a destination for their imprisonment. The current
detainee figure is 520, plus 234 transfers or releases. However, according to Amnesty
International, the US continues to hold about 70,000 detainees outside the US, many locations
of which remain secret. (Amnesty International, 2005)
Muslim men - Afghan or not, but terrorist suspects regardless - are bequeathed with a
demonisation that necessitates punishment. The punishment comes in the form of death by US
military  action,  or  detention  in  Guantánamo  Bay  or  in  some  other  obscure  centre  of
incarceration. The act of killing is an act of the elimination of existence, a termination of
consciousness, a silencing of the sentient body and its reduction to lifeless matter. The lifeless
body, although inanimate, is representative of the existential destruction of the enemy. The act
of killing does not leave a vacuum, but is constitutive of the discursive power relations. As
Joanna  Bourke  writes,  “combat  does  not  terminate  social  relationship:  rather,  it  restructures
them” (Bourke, 1999: xxiii). The process of military combat will be examined more closely in
the following section (Iraq). However, both killing and imprisonment in the War on
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Terrorism engage in the violent dehumanisation of the Other. This violence to Muslim male
bodies is  deemed essential.  It  also considered to be rational and natural,  just  as leniency and
pacifism  are  held  as  irrational  and  unnatural,  as  restraints  on  human  nature.  As  Hannah
Arendt writes;
The glorifiers of violence can appeal to the undeniable fact that in the household of nature
destruction and creation are but two sides of the natural process, so that collective violent
action... may appear as natural a prerequisite for the collective life of mankind as the struggle
for survival and violent death for continuing life in the animal kingdom.
(Arendt, 1970: 75)
The power to destroy and incarcerate bodies is the performance of power on the body,
“[power relations] invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform
ceremonies, to emit signs” (Foucault, 1987: 25). Power works on the body and disciplines it.
This discipline, recalling Foucault’s Discipline and Punish,  is  not  a  mere  function  of  an
institution, but an entire technology of power that controls the physical and psychological
performance of the body (Foucault, 1987: 215).
The bodies on which power is exercised in Guantánamo are distinctly all-male,
therefore punishing Muslim men as the evil-doers. The conditions of the selection of
prisoners, all denied a prisoner-of-war (POW) status, do not appear to have much consistency.
As the UN report points out, six of them, of Algerian origin, were captured in October 2001 in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the absence of combat. The only confirmable likeness between
these men and those captured in other locations of the US reach in Islamic areas is that they
are men and that they are Muslim, precisely the discursive criteria constitutive of the terrorist
monsters determined to destroy American civilisation. The camp is a branch of the military,
an institution that is defined and its very existence sustained by aggressive and misogynist
masculinity. The power relations of the camp are thus composed of US militarised
masculinity practicing power over and thus asserting its superiority over Muslim masculinity.
The technology of power that disciplines these male bodies is complex. Firstly, the
camp’s architectural structures designate spaces to be occupied that control movement. They
divide the space between the dominating and the dominated masculinities. The allocation of
space thus involves a gendered hierarchalisation. The dominating masculinity has the ability
to intrude in the space of the dominated, where the dominated will always repossess authority
within that space, be it the cell of an inmate, the prisoners’ walking grounds, or an
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interrogation room. The relevance of Foucault (1987) is clear. The physical structure of the
prison controls the activity therein by establishing meaningful barriers between the guards and
prisoners. The examining gaze of the guards creates particular individuals out of the
imprisoned. Adding a gender perspective to Foucault’s ideas, one could argue that within
these empowered spaces, the bodies of the dominating masculinity exercise power on the
bodies of the dominated masculinity by the employment of various methods and techniques.
Concerned international organisations (Amnesty International, 2005; United Nations, 2006)
have reported that brutal interrogation techniques,29  inconsistent rules, excessive violence
such  as  beatings  are  systematically  employed.  Such  methods  carry  out  a  collective
punishment on psychologically constructed enemies. Indeed, as not a single prisoner has been
tried or convicted of a crime, their guilt remains legally undetermined, but is nonetheless
psychologically established for US
soldiers that run the camp.
However,  it  is  not  simply
the  brutal  acts  of  physical  torture
that constitute violence at
Guantánamo Bay, if the spatial
architecture is already a tool of
repression. Image 7 is an official
military handout photographed
distributed to media like Reuters,
here. Anonymously uniformed and
masked bodies are submissively
crouched on the ground to the will
of their fatigue-wearing captors.
Both groups of men are
homogenously dressed in the
uniforms distributed to each group
by US forces (prisoners in orange overalls, guards in military fatigues), and thus eliminating
the existence of physically distinct individuals in both groups. However, while the prisoners
29 Time magazine released the report of the interrogation of the suspected “20th hijacker” Mohammed al-Qahtani
in its 20 June 2005 issue giving a detailed account of the techniques used to break him down for information.
They included the deprivation of sleep, food and water, prayer, intimidation with dogs, telling the prisoner that
he will be there forever, that no one cares about him, that his is worthless, etc. Therefore, it is a combination of
psychological and physical blackmail. (Time, 20 June 2005: 18-25)
Image 7 11 January 2002 Male prisoners sit in holding area
during their processing into the camp, watched by male military
police.
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are silently lined up and all crouched in the same immobile position, the guards are able to
individually roam around them freely, speak to one another and yell and give orders to
prisoners. Like dangerous wild animals at a zoo, the prisoners are caged in fencing, and
always at the mercy of the gaze of their audience (their US captors).
That at least a fifth of detainees are reported to be on anti-depressant medical
treatment, and the first three successful suicides of June 2006 and numerous other attempts
exemplify  the  desperate  psychological  strain  of  incarceration.  The  will  to  survive  a  dire
existence of the prospect of unending suffering and infinite containment is heavily
emotionally  burdensome.  As  prisoner  Fawzi  al-Odah  told  the  BBC  in  an  interview  on  3
March 2003, “the real problem here is not the horrible conditions - the lousy food, no reading
materials, bad medical care, being in isolation. The real problem is being here without reason,
without hope, without a hearing” (Al-Odah in BBC News, 01/03/2006). The harm is long-
term.  As  the  UN  report  points  out,  prisoners  are  at  risk  of  suffering  from  permanent
psychological damage from traumatic experiences at the camp. After their release, whenever
that may be, it is also highly probable that their mental instabilities will be adversely felt by
their family and others close to them— possibly dangerously so for female relations. The
violence done to these minds therefore will be intimately extended to their relations.
Crucially,  the  effects  of  violence  survive.  Scars  from  cuts  remain  as  reminders  of  their
physical helplessness under US military masculinity, while psychological scars leave a more
serious and disturbing legacy. Long-term psychological injuries will continue to sustain and
propagate deeply engrained disciplinary effects of power.
The only female presence in Guantánamo is the female US military officials. They are
visible in Guantánamo discourses only as disciplinary agents of Muslim men. On 10 February
2006 The Washington Post published an article reporting that, “Female interrogators
repeatedly used sexually suggestive tactics to try to humiliate and pry information from
devout Muslim men” (Leonning and Priest, 2006). Amongst these tactics including rubbing
their bodies against the men, revealing clothing, sexually suggestive remarks, and spreading
dye on the men’s faces saying it was menstrual blood. This was often done before prayer,
because for some Muslims, if touched by a woman before prayer “he is dirty and cannot
pray.” Contact with other women other than their wives is also believed to reduce one’s
purity. Therefore, first of all, the masculinity of the Other is degraded even further in the
hierarchy of masculinities by the bodies of the female self. Their power over Muslim male
bodies places their masculinity not only below US masculinities, but also US femininities.
Here US femininities are conferred as sexually emancipated female bodies that have
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sacrificed their bodies for the national cause. It is ironic that the exposure of the female body
and their suggestive promiscuity become acceptable in matters of national security, but
condemnable in the larger public sphere (as expressed by Mrs Bush). However, as understood
in the theoretical discussion, women’s bodies and their sexuality are frequently militarised for
the purposes of national security.
In  this  case,  the  bodies  of  female  soldiers  also  function  to  heterosexualise  US  male
soldiers and desexualise or homosexualise the prisoners. The male-directed sexual attention of
US female soldiers eroticises bodies for male consumption, and automatically assumes the
heterosexuality of their American male counterparts. In turn, the refusal of Muslim men to
respond to this female sexual provocation strengthens the implications of their sexual
impotence and lack of heterosexual prowess. Their homosexuality is strengthened even
further by US male soldiers who have on several occasions threatened them with homosexual
rape. As discussed, homosexual rape serves to homosexualise the rape victim, and inflate the
heterosexual masculinity of the rapist.
However, the Washington Post article is written in defence of the prisoners. The tone
expresses  concern  for  their  well-being  and  respect  for  their  cultural  rights  and  religious
dignity. The stories provided, like Muslim men being unable to pray after being sullied by the
touch of a woman, are intended to induce sympathy for the male sufferers. Unlike the
dominant discourse on Muslim men, humiliation and insult to their masculinity is a shocking
and unacceptable occurrence. Excluded are insights in the sexism of Islamic culture. For
example, The Washington Post could have chosen to criticise the Islamic discrimination of the
female body, not only how it is “dirty” to a man’s spiritual purity, but also in the eyes of God.
Instead, such analyses were excluded, and such views became something to be defended and
respected. This contradictory perspective on Islam in the US has existed from the beginning
of the War on Terrorism. From 17 September 2001 onwards, responding to suspicious
accusations  of  the  War  on  Terrorism  as  a  specifically  anti-Islam  policy  Bush  spoke  of  the
need for Americans to treat Muslims with respect, because “Islam is peace” and that
“terrorists violate the fundamental tenants of the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001c). The respect for
US Muslims is necessary for to avoid domestic social unrest and counter accusations of anti-
Islamicism. However, the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay are supposedly the very terrorists that
violate the Islamic faith, thereby deepening the discursive contradictions of the War on
Terrorism. However, the confusion arising from this contradiction is not so disorienting if we
consider that the defence of Islamic sexual morality is actually a defence of the sexual purity
of the US self.
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The comments from American observers provided in the article also provide
interesting insights into the sexualities of the self to elaborate this understanding. Michael
Ratner,  for  example  of  the  Center  for  Constitutional  Rights  that  represents  numerous
detainees, commented “what they’re doing, it reminds me of a pornographic Web site -- it’s
like the fantasy of all these S&M clubs.” Ratner’s disapproval appeals to principals of sexual
propriety. He rejects the image of a promiscuous US sexual identity; like Laura Bush, for him
it is not “a real view of what the American people are like” (Laura Bush, 2004), or rather,
what they should be like. Pornography and S&M clubs equated with sexual perversion
resulting from moral deviancy from the Puritanistic self. Like S&M clubs, Guantánamo Bay
is regarded to have become a space of reprehensible moral decadence, a sinful space. No
differentiation is made between the sexual politics of the prison camp, pornographic media, or
sadomasochistic experimentation. The breaking of Puritan moral code justifies the calls for
Guantánamo’s closure. Christian morals are allied with Islamic morals of sexual chastity,
strengthening particular norms of sexual purity to a universal level, strengthening their claim
to ‘truth.’The Washington Post reproduces the discourse of the Center for Constitutional
Rights as the morally acceptable and truthful discourse. The article therefore participates in
the hegemonisation of a wholesome US sexuality.
Legality, Ethics, and Masculinity
When The Washington Post asked the Pentagon to comment on the allegations
concerning the inappropriate interrogation tactics of the female staff at Guantánamo, the
Pentagon condemned such behaviour. However, the spokesperson added that “good
interrogators ‘take initiative and are a little creative’” and that “‘using things that are
culturally repulsive is okay as long as it doesn’t extend to something prohibited by the
Geneva Conventions’” (Leonning and Priest, 2006). Therefore, though sexual tactics were
declared as unacceptable, the Pentagon nonetheless was prepared to defend and even
commend creative tactics on prisoners so long as they do not violate the Geneva Conventions.
This statement expresses governmental approval for such methods, which not only legitimises
the acceptability of such procedures for those who approve of them, but also has implications
on  US  hegemonic  masculinity  as  one  ready  to  assert  its  power  over  all  other  sexualities  to
service its will.
The will of its power, however, has fallen under legal scrutiny. Since the opening of
the Guantánamo camp, the Bush Administration has been under the pressure of the US (and
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international) press and human rights organisations that constantly question the legal and
ethical aspects of the camp’s procedures. In the early days of the detention camp, the
Pentagon assumed an  aloof  attitude  to  legal  complications.  For  example,  David  Frost  of  the
BBC asked Secretary Rumsfeld in an interview about the legal and ethical limits of torture,
the exchange went as follows;
FROST: You can probably understand that’s shocking to think of people trying to widen the
definition of what they can do that isn't torture.  It just seems bizarre, or worse.
RUMSFELD:  Well, it seems like a bunch of lawyers debating legal points.  In fact, that set
of debates took place not in the Department of Defence, as I recall, but in the Department of
Justice.
(Donald Rumsfeld, 2004)
Frost’s statement gives Rumsfeld the chance to acknowledge the awfulness of
attempts to devise forms of torture that fall outside legal definitions of torture. Rumsfeld does
not  seem  to  understand,  or  perhaps  he  does  not  care  altogether,  but  his  reply  dismisses
concerns  for  the  well-being  of  prisoners  by  saying  it  is  not  the  job  of  the  Department  of
Defence, but the Department of Justice, where he demeaning says “a bunch of lawyers”
debate such apparently petty things. On another occasion on 22 January 2002, he remarked
that he would “leave [legal questions] to the lawyers” who, he joked, “did not drop out of law
school, as [he] did” (Rumsfeld, 2002). As Judith Butler comments, such a sarcastic remark,
followed by laughter, was “as if some praiseworthy evidence of his own American manhood
was suddenly made public” (Butler, 2004: 84).
This “show of strength indifferent to the law” (ibid) that gives the Bush
Administration its so-called cowboy masculinity was also summarized by Bush, who wanted
Osama bin Laden “dead or alive” (George Bush, 2001f). This masculinity is defined by a
refusal to yield to the rules of others (lawyers and international law), an act which is
feminised along with its object. Instead, masculine power lies in the independent ability to
make unrestrained decisions that harm others in whatever way it sees fit. The indifference to
the law is ensued from an indifference to the reasons for their creation and codification, which
in turn confirms an indifference towards other human beings and a lack of empathy for their
physical and psychological suffering. Of course, leaders can hardly display sympathy for
enemies,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  leaders  cannot  display  respect  for  legal  statures.
Rumsfeld’s comments also reflect this aloof indifference with a dismissive propensity for
debasing mockery; “To be in an eight-by-eight cell in beautiful, sunny Guantánamo Bay,
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Cuba, is not a -- inhumane treatment” (Rumsfeld, 2002). Indeed, complete disinterest in the
state of the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay characterises the hegemonic discourse of
punishment. As Rumsfeld plainly puts it, “I’m not a lawyer and I’m not into that end of the
business. The most important thing for us from our standpoint is gathering intelligence”
(ibid.). And it is so that governmental actions are masculinised by divorcing them from the
law, which is depicted as unrealistic and impractical, compared to the flex of staunch and
merciless muscle.
The condemnation of the Guantánamo Bay detention centre has escalated, particularly
in 2006, when both the European Parliament (resolution 1.4.19) and the United Nations (15
Feb. 2006) condemned the torture there and called for its immediate closure. The suicides of
three detainees on 10 June 2006 demonstrated the increasing conflict over the prison camp,
not only by increased foreign pressure for its closure, but in conflicting governmental
statements. The first report of the suicides was through a telephone press conference with
Prison Camp Commander Harry Harris of the Joint Task Force Guantánamo. “They are smart.
They are creative, they are committed,” he said, sustaining the discourse of monstrosity, “This
was not an act of desperation, but an act of warfare waged against us” (Harris in Reuters, 10
June  2006).  The  deliberate  interpretation  of  suicide  as  an  act  of  war  reflects  the  extreme of
militarised masculinity, where the desperation of others is approached with paranoia
entrenched in constant preparedness for attack and self-defence. It is not surprising that a
masculinity determinedly and systematically trained daily to sustain emotional detachment is
incapable of perceiving suffering. This desensitisation in turn is increases the danger posed to
the detained bodies at Guantánamo Bay, who, for their guards, are not human.
Colleen Graffy, the U.S. deputy assistant Secretary of State for public diplomacy,
supported Harris’ stand and told the BBC World Service the suicides were a “good PR move
to draw attention,” and that “this is part of a strategy... a tactic to further their Jihadi cause,”
(Graffy in Reuters, 11 June 2006). By contrast however, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense  for  Detainee  Affairs  Cully  Stimson,  speaking  to  BBC  radio  on  Monday,  distanced
himself  from  such  comments;  “I  wouldn’t  characterize  it  as  a  good  PR  move...  we  [as
Americans] are always concerned when someone takes his own life” (Stimson in Reuters, 12
June 2006). Likewise, President Bush expressed agreement for the camp’s closure and trials
on US soil already before the suicides in a press conference with the Danish Prime Minister
Anders Rasmussen the day before (The White House, 9 June 2006).
Whether the machoistic hegemonic masculinity Bush Administration is beginning to
change is not possible to say. However, recent events of 2006, such as the suicides at
77
Guantánamo show conflict with this masculinity. President Bush, in a press conference with
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair Bush expressed regret for previous expressions;
Saying ‘bring it on,’ kind of tough talk, you know, that sent the wrong signal to people. I
learned some lessons about expressing myself maybe in a little more sophisticated manner --
you know, ‘wanted dead or alive,’ that kind of talk. I think in certain parts of the world it was
misinterpreted, and so I learned from that.
(Bush, 25 May 2006)
Bush articulates his awareness of the displeasure of others with his image, and seeks
to change it. While the then-Bush could not be imagined to admit regret, it is now expressed.
However, the regret is not from shame of his previous expressions, but from a realisation that
“more sophisticated” language would avoid misunderstandings of his words. It is a regret of
word choice, not intention. While it could be argued that machoistic hegemonic masculinity is
being challenged by a liberal-rationalist masculinity, this scenario is unlikely. US foreign
policy discourses continue to express faith in its aggressive War on Terrorism policy and
interventionist worldview. In the same conference, Bush commended Blair’s leadership style;
You know, the amazing thing about dealing with Prime Minister Blair is never once has he
said to me on the phone, we better change our tactics because of the political opinion polls.
And I appreciate that steadfast leadership.
(Bush, 25 May 2006)
This statement continues and reiterates a continuing discourse that conveys admiration
for strong and resolute leadership as he did in the 2002 State of the Union Address, where he
expressed admiration for “the strong leadership of President Musharraf” (Bush, 2002) - the
military ruler Pakistan. For the case of Guantánamo, Bush’s expressed intention to close the
camp as soon as possible is not presented as a president succumbing to international pressure,
but as a noble, conciliatory gesture. Bush’s desire to adopt a more  “sophisticated” image
includes an awareness to international treaties and statures, and readiness for conciliation.
Such apparent readiness for cooperation is no longer demeaned by feminisation. Instead, it is
presented as a follow-up to previous severe attitudes that are no longer deemed necessary. It is
a change hailing the manifestation of traditionally ‘masculine’ rationality and pragmatism.
These in turn are equated with the “sophistication” that constitutes ‘civilisation.’ Meanwhile,
the perception of ‘reason’ at work to correct the ‘unsophisticated/uncivilised’ happenings of
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both the prisoners and their guards at Guantánamo Bay is meant to be a reassuring signal that
the prevailing hegemonic masculinity is still the strong, decisive, Christian American man.
The sexual politics of and surrounding Guantánamo Bay are expressed in a series of
contradictory discourses. At times they intersect with each other, producing complex
sexualities for the self, the various selves of the self (different masculinities and femininities)
and the Other. Muslim men are both murderous demons and pitiable, humiliated men.
Regardless, the hate or sympathy is directed at an inferior Other, requiring either discipline or
the White Man’s salvation. US masculinities and femininities are always superior, namely due
to race and ‘civilisation,’ as well as heterosexuality and being neither ‘over’ or ‘undersexed.’
Even US discourses that defend the rights of the prisoner function to defend Western moral
principles of tolerance are also dependent on the articulation of sexual difference that in turn
hierarchalise the sexualities of the self. At the top of this hierarchy is the exaggerated
expression of the self’s sexual morality and purity that is a part of the wider sexual discourses
supporting and justifying militarisation in the War on Terrorism. More specifically, it is a
macho masculinity that places its self above the rules of men, and feminises legal practice,
undermining it. Important to note is that voices critical about Guantánamo condemn the
questionable  only  the  legality  of  the  camp  and  the  human  rights  violations  that  occur  in  it.
They do not criticise militarism or the institution of the military as factors that might be
inevitably formative of such problems. It is not the military that is blamed, but rather deviants
within the military of the self-image of the sexually uncorrupted self. In the end, discourses,
even  critical  ones  about  Guantánamo  Bay  remain  loyal  to  the  “good  ol’  boys  of  the  US
military.
Iraq
Hilkka  Pietilä  writes  that  “patriarchy  needs  militarism  to  say  in  power,  and  without
patriarchy, militarism has no legitimacy” (Pietilä in Jokinen, 2000: 186).30 To understand
such connections in IR and their continuity, this thesis has examined the War on Terrorism
from 11 September 2001, up to the consequences of the war in Afghanistan. Now the focus
turns to Iraq, and to a gendering of the discourses on Iraq. Concerning the War on Terrorism,
most feminist scholarship centres on September 11 and women’s rights in Afghanistan. The
30 “Patriarkaatti tarvitsee militarismia pysyäkseen voimassa ja ilman patriarkaattia militarismilla ei ole mitään
legitimiteettiä.” Translated by the present author
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Iraq War remains a minimally researched area in critical feminist IR. Admittedly, this renders
this part of the analysis the most exciting for the author, as originality and creativity are
indispensable.
The examination begins from the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq to observe its
discursive gendered connotations. Discourses surrounding female terrorists in Iraq will be
discussed afterwards, followed by the body politics of the Abu Ghraib prison and its sexual
discipline. The analysis then turns to the experiences of US soldiers in Iraq, and their
discursive contributions to the construction of racialised gender hierarchies. Finally, the
analytical gaze turns back to the home front of the US and the discourse on militarised
mothers of killed soldiers, focusing on the peace activist mother Cindy Sheehan in particular.
Gendering the Invasion of Iraq
The 20 March 2003, US invasion of Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom continues to be
an area of heated controversy, but it is not the aim of this analysis to resolve it. Instead, the
aim here is to understand how the discourse on militarisation for Iraq in 2003 was gendered,
and how its gendering was meaningful, in its constitution and effects. The focus will be on
two significant speeches of the Bush Administration, President George W. Bush’s State of the
Union Address of 28 January 2003 and Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations Security
Council on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech, first of all, was a part of the hegemonisation of
the discourse on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a global threat. Colin Powell’s UN speech, given a
month and a half before the invasion, convinced many of the war’s righteousness with its
provision of empirical evidence, and demonstrated the determination of the US to go to war.
From these, discursive parallels and continuities are perceivable, such as the gendered
processes of victimisation and demonisation. In this context however, instead of
‘womenandchildren’ being understood as the only feminised victims, this characterisation is
extended to the entire Iraqi population. All citizens are victims of Saddam Hussein’s
oppression and in need of a civilising Western protection and remasculinisation. Saddam
Hussein, instead, is identified as the ultimate mad and hypermasculine enemy to be defeated
by a US superhero-type masculinity.
Bush, in his speech, depicts the world as divided between “a world at peace” and “a
world of chaos and constant alarm,” (Bush, 2003) in which the US and its allies are the only
forces to sustain the former and thwart the latter to “end [the] terrible threats to the civilised
world.” Civilisation is masculinised not only in its capacity for reason and rationality, but its
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ability to end the chaos by an execution of the primitive and irrational by harming them.
Saddam Hussein is singled out as the sole perpetrator of chaos, and thus he, not the Iraqi
government, is personally targeted. He is described as a “dictator,” “deceiving,” with the
potential to “dominate, intimidate and attack.” The brownness of his skin and the
mysteriousness of his powerful persona render him hypermasculine, which implies a sexual
perversity combined with a mental insanity that cannot be trusted; “Trusting the sanity and
restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option” (Bush, 2003). Saddam
Hussein’s hypermasculinity is a masculinity that takes ‘masculine’ qualities of aggression and
mercilessness to their extreme, and thus become feminised as masculinity out-of-control. It is
thus regarded as a primitive masculinity-lacking civilisation, and thus is threatening to the
civilisation development of the Iraqi population. First of all, they are deprived from a decent
quality of life by his refusal to disarm and determination to spend money on armaments,
instead  of  the  development  programmes.  While  there  is  no  problem  with  the  US  and  other
Western or Westernised and thus ‘civilised’ nations possessing “world’s most dangerous
weapons” because of their rational capacity not to use them incorrectly, in the hands of
someone like Saddam Hussein, they are used on “whole villages - leaving thousands of his
own citizens dead, blind or disfigured.” His deviation from masculine norms renders him
unsuitable and untrustworthy to be in possession of weapons. His ‘feminine’ lack of
rationality and thus lack of emotional control makes his behaviour unpredictable and
deceptive, therefore introducing the threat of chaos to civilisation.
Bush’s use of language is famous for its use of colourful metaphors, making it a
treasure trove of rhetorical material for any discourse analyst. Colin Powell is generally
understood a more serious figure, and his speeches are relatively less metaphorically creative
than Bush’s. His speech to the UN, however, repeats the same understandings of Saddam
Hussein as Bush’s, and in no way less drastically. Saddam Hussein’s masculinity is depicted
as extreme and uncontrollable - the same hypermasculinity, feminised as it is beyond the
limits of what constitutes ‘normal’ rational and ‘civilised’ masculinity. His behaviour, like
those of terrorists he purportedly supported, is monstrous. This animalism is described by his
“Using the only means he knows, intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who
might stand in his way” (Powell, 2003). Powell depicts him as a cunning yet pathological
madman with delusions of world domination; “For Saddam Hussein, possession of the
world’s most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he most hold to fulfil his
ambition.” Evidence of this ambition to the Security Council was provided by obscure
photographs of dusty sites supposedly housing chemical complexes and audio samples of
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Arabic men scheming to hide evidence of weapons. The image of vague, murky buildings in
sandy, archaic deserted spaces and recordings of Arabic voices helped promote the image of
suspiciously secretive and deceptive behaviour in a primitive and faraway land, all as a direct
consequence of Saddam Hussein’s insane personal ambitions.
Descriptions of Saddam Hussein’s distorted masculinity indeed are also constitutive of
the masculinity of the self. As before, the contrast renders the US self as not-insane, therefore
sane, rational, reasonable, civilised, and ordered - qualities coded masculine. The US
masculinity is also determined, and unwilling to be dominated by another one. As Colin
Powell expresses; “Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops
him” so “We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us” (Powell, 2003) Bush similarly
expresses that if Saddam Hussein will not disarm, then the US will disarm him by force. He
also expresses a promise of liberation for the Iraqi people “the day he and his regime are
removed from power” (Bush, 2003). The US invasion, the penetration of the power of the US
military, is therefore depicted as a civilising force, curiously as warfare has never been a
reconstructive power, but always a move of destruction which is cleaned up by civilians
(often women) and aid agencies, costing them more time and money to rebuild than it did for
bombs to destroy.
The assumption that civilisation is established through the introduction of liberal
democratic rationality, also aims to remasculinise Iraqi male citizens from their victimhood.
The prevailing patriarchal beginnings of democracy continue to function to award men first
and foremost with political power. As Cynthia Enloe points out, the political bargaining in
Baghdad and its outcome happened in private, therefore its dynamics remain a mystery. But,
as Enloe continues “in virtually every political system we know about, the less transparent
any process of political bargaining is, the more likely it is to be governed by presumptions of
masculinised politics” (Enloe, 2004: 291). Out of the twenty-five members of the 2003 Iraqi
Governing Council, only three were women, and they possessed weaker resources than their
male colleagues, lacking their own political parties, militias, treasuries or connections to
Washington. While the women may have given an impression of gender legitimacy to the
Council, they were sidelined and ineffective from participating or influencing any decision-
making. Indeed, it appeared that the Bush Administration, US government and Iraqi
Governing Council all believed that “women’s future relationships to the state, to the law and
to  male  citizens  well  cared  for  in  the  hands  of  a  small  group  of  ethnically,  religiously  and
ideologically competitive men [...,] a highly questionable supposition” (2004: 300).
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Bush refers to US demands for Iraqi disarmament as a completion of Saddam
Hussein’s promise to disarm after the Gulf War. (Bush, 2003) The Iraq War has often been
referred to as the Second Gulf War (e.g. Wrage, 2003). As such, if continuities can be
assumed between the two wars, then certainly continuities in masculinities also exist, or at
least such a possibility is worth exploring. The US masculinity of the Gulf War has been
analysed in feminist IR with interesting results.
Cynthia Enloe argues that the Gulf War was “waged in the shadow of the sexual
politics of another war. The Vietnam War left a cultural legacy of gendered guilt: the betrayed
male vet” (Enloe, 1993: 176). The post-Second World War US masculinity was instilled with
the military victory of the war and subsequent rise to world superpower status that legitimised
a militaristic and imperialist US hegemonic masculinity. The mythologisation of this ideal-
type was severely shattered by Vietnam defeat. The crisis of US nationalism was also a crisis
of US machoistic hegemonic masculinity that fed US patriotism. The psychological damage
had physical repercussions in the form of violence against society’s most vulnerable groups as
if a punishment for their feminising influence on American men. As Charlotte Hooper
explains, “not only did the enemy turn out to be women, old men, youths and children, but US
masculinity was shown nightly on television, in a pathological and brutal light” (Hooper,
2001: 87).
This emasculation of American men and the desire to reverse this promoted Reagan’s
politics and consequently the Gulf War, in which the US finally itself as remasculinised. Not
only did the US regain a lost manhood, but this was further justified and given heroic qualities
by the war being fought, in a classical gendered scenario, against ‘evil’ men for the suffering
and oppressed “‘womenandchildren’” (Enloe, 1999: 166) of Iraq. The manner in which it was
fought was also a demonstration of the newfound US masculinity. It again proved its
superiority by its new creative ways of causing destruction and killing people in greater speed
and numbers with less effort with ‘smart’ weapons. In addition, this championing was
televised,  so  that  US  viewers  could  witness  the  success  of  their  men  by  the  colourful
explosions  in  a  faraway  desert  land.  As  Goldstein  affirms,  the  viewing  itself  can  be
considered a sexual experience - like pornography from which the viewer is sexually aroused
to masturbation, or self-gratification of one’s national sexuality;
The home consumption of distant bombing... can be seen as a form of violent and voyeuristic
pornography. Judith Butler argues that the Gulf War bombing - consumed euphorically on
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American TV sets - served to champion a masculinised Western subject who determines its
world unilaterally.
(Goldstein, 2001: 355)
This ecstatic celebration of regained masculinity, however, occurred alongside
immense  Iraqi  civilian  casualties  referred  to  as  ‘collateral  damage’  by  the  Pentagon  and
media, and damage to hospitals, schools, and the entire infrastructure. (Vickers, 1993: 50).
Indeed, the War on Terrorism repeats these themes. Both the Afghan and the Iraq
Wars involve a reestablishment of US masculinity that was humiliated by the terrorist attacks
on 11 September 2001 - the first attack on US soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Iraq was a continuation of the machoistic hegemonic masculinity that invaded Afghanistan.
US  military  expansion  is  also  a  territorial  expansion  of  the  dominance  of  US  hegemonic
masculinity. As mentioned, not only does US hegemonic masculinity condone a particular
masculinity with particular values domestically and oppresses inferior masculinities such as
homosexuality, this masculinity is also racist and imperialist, and therefore seeks to assert
itself  also  over  men  of  colour  elsewhere.  Saddam  Hussein  was  the  undefeated  brown  man,
already a feminised enemy in the Gulf War (for example by homosexualisation in references
to ‘Sodom’ Hussein, (Goldstein, 2001: 356)).
George W. Bush presents himself determined to finish what his father George Bush
started, son completing the mission of his father. The bond between father and son is joined
by the desire to generationally perpetuate their manhood, and the father ‘properly’ bringing up
his son to aspire to a hegemonic norm that enables him to legitimise this masculinity by
sufficiently hurting or even killing its enemies. Yet again, this masculinity is regarded as
sanctioned by God. At the end of his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush characteristically
emphasises that God is on his side; “The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it
is God’s gift to humanity” (Bush, 2003). Incidentally, God therefore appears to sideline with a
liberty that justifies the military invasion and social and environmental destruction of
unliberated places, namely developing countries with otherwise few means of survival. A
degree  of  detachment  is  also  present.  If  God  is  “behind  all  of  life,  and  all  of  history,”  then
wars that occur - which largely constitute the history of history books - are mainly the will of
God carried out by men. And Bush certainly depicts himself and other US men as masculine
figures worthy of such a mission, and capable of success.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 therefore involved a series of masculinities dependent on
the feminisation of other masculinities. Drawing back to the shattering of the illusion of
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immortality of hegemonic masculinity after the Vietnam War, and the reassertion of the US
superpower status in the Gulf War, the War on Terrorism is dependent on the global
projection of an imperialistic hegemonic masculinity that demonises and pathologises Others
like Saddam Hussein. It feminises him as an inferior to defeat and discipline his
hyperpsychotic sexuality, as his incarceration and trial seek to do.
Female Terrorists
The discussion now turns to the fighting of the Iraq War. While the War on Terrorism
in Iraq appears to continue to be a war by men against men, women be came involved in 2005
as suicide bombers in Iraq. Until now, only men have been identified as terrorists. In 2005,
female Al Qaeda terrorists became a media sensation as suicide bombers. This section is
interested in examining the discourses surrounding their coverage. If the demonisation of
terrorists has been dependent on a particular understanding their masculinity, it is fascinating
to examine the possibly problematic recognition of female terrorists, and how this
contradiction is discussed, and with what effects on involved masculinities and femininities.
Female terrorists are not new. In recent history, they have been visible in for example the
German  Baader-Meinhof,  the  Italian  Red  Bridgades,  the  Weatherpersons  of  the  US  and
Palestine. Still, as Elshtain comments, when we think ‘terrorist,’ we do not see ‘woman,’ but
instead young men. Despite women’s presence, the public are still shocked when a woman is
accused of an unusually dirty deed. (Elshtain, 1995: 178-179)
The cover story of the 12 December 2005 issue of Time magazine was titled Women of
Al Qaeda. “Jihad,”  wrote  Christopher  Dickey,  “used  to  have  a  gender:  male...  Al  Qaeda  is
using female killers now, and goading the men” (Dickey, 2005: 19). The article was published
three  months  after  the  first  female  suicide  bomber  in  Iraq  acted  in  September  2005,  whose
action was reproduced by three more women by December 2005. It is attributed to a tactical
move from Al Qaeda to fill a recruitment shortage in Iraq. Quoting the leader of Al Qaeda in
Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi31, the first aim is to goad men into fighting; “Isn’t it a shame for
the sons of my won nation that our sisters ask to conduct martyrdom operations while men are
preoccupied with life?” (Zarqawi in Dickey, 2005: 23) Secondly, the impression is given that
women really are needed to fill this shortage, and are thus hailed by Zarqawi as martyrs.
Women, says the article, are his “new weapon of choice” (2005: 20).
31 Zarqawi was killed 7 June 2006 by US bombing.
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The article expresses a disapproving, if not threatened attitude towards this new
development. Pictures of female suicide bombers displaying their belts loaded with explosives
and veiled women holding enormous rifles accompany the text. They possess a dangerous,
mysterious, and sexually hystericised ambience. For example, the security camera image
(Image 8) of Wafa Ibrahim trying to (unsuccessfully) set off twenty pounds of explosives
hidden in her pants conveys the impression of a hysterical and desperately motivated woman.
Female terrorists are a matter of concern, a problem that
is also “provoking new and growing concern among US
officials” (2005:20). This kind of women’s political
participation is understood as illegitimate. While such
behaviour can be expected from men, women should
have no part in it, and in addition, their participation in it
is a cause for worry. The engagement of women in
militant suicide missions on behalf of their community or
religious/political beliefs threatens to destabilise the
gender logic of social frameworks that allocate the roles
of the protector to men and the protected to women,
respectively. It also endangers the US justification of
protecting Muslim women from Muslim men. As Dickey
writes, “American soldiers in Iraq may become ever
more suspicious about women, particularly pregnant women” (2005:21), thus expressing
unease at the prospect of having to suspect women, particularly potential mothers, which are
discursively particularly valuable as carriers of life and future political aspirations. Confusion
arises from this challenge to the life-giver/life-taker dichotomy.
Such attitudes are not new. Sharon Pickering and Amanda Third, in their examination
of female terrorism in Ireland, claim that female terrorists are often believed to be “more
radical, more subversive, and more violent than their male counterparts They are constructed
as highly motivated, excessively emotional beings with the capacity to commit the most
heinous crimes and show no remorse” (Pickering and Third, 2003: 9). In addition, female
terrorists  are  believed  to  be  more  difficult  to  catch  or  rehabilitate,  making  them  even  more
dangerous. Because of assumptions of family care and motherhood, they are thought to
sacrifice more than male terrorists. They act on emotional instincts, which in the Western
imagination are constructed as more determined and impulsive than mere political motivation.
Image 8 Image of Wafa Ibrahim
attempting to set off explosives at the
Gaza border as published in Time.
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Thus,  they  are  more  committed  and  thus  an  “excessive  threat  to  both  society  and  the  state”
(ibid.)
Indeed, the article reports that after the precarious incidents of autumn 2005, US
officials are “taking the threat of female Islamic terrorists, particularly suicide bombers, much
more seriously” (Dickey, 2005: 21). Dickey calls the new phenomenon a “plague” that US
officials  are  worried  will  spread  to  Europe  and  the  United  States.  Female  terrorists  are  thus
depicted as a dangerous and capricious disease, or rather, a treacherous hybrid of male
terrorist monsters. This is constitutive of what Frances S. Hasso calls the ‘psychological’
explanation. It assumes that people who carry out such acts do so as a result of their “distorted
sense of the world” (Hasso, 2005:44), “They are pathological, brainwashed, barbaric, or
sexually deprived.”
Sexual deprivation is provided by Dickey’s article as one of the explanations to the
existence  of  both  male  and  female  suicide  bombers  in  Iraq.  Dickey  writes  that  Muslim men
are sexually frustrated in their mortal life because of the excessive demands for spiritual
purity that is sustained by sexual purity. These pressures are alleviated only in the next life
after  death.  So,  according  to  Dickey,  these  pressures  in  life  and  promises  of  rewards  in  the
next are “exploited as a part of a cynical spiel by jihadist recruiters looking for boys and men
to be suicide bombers” (Dickey, 2005: 23). By this reasoning, many male terrorists are
victims of religious manipulation of sexuality by the Al Qaeda framework. It de-monsters a
fraction  of  male  terrorists,  but  still  feminises  their  masculinity  for  being  sexually  frustrated,
weak-willed and easily duped by other smarter and malevolent men. Such men are seen to
require the assistance of US masculinities through the continued presence of the US military
for their salvation (from terrorists) and guidance (to improve their own masculinities).
Female suicide bombers, however, regarded as persons of desperate sexual perversion
and/or deprivation par excellence. Jayne Steel, referring to Irish female terrorists, writes of the
perception that “the threatening woman, or the woman who kills, has long been an object of
simultaneous horror and fascination” (Steel, 1998: 275). They are fascinating because such
apparently inexplicable deviant behaviour in women. But, they are horrifyingly threatening,
for their behaviour can only be explained by some kind of unrestrained and unpredictable
sexual perversion. They are romanticised as femme fatales - women of fascinating sexual
personality, but mercilessly lethal, especially to men. Such lethality is attributed to the
‘feminine’ lack of rationality and excessive emotional command over their decision-making
capabilities.  As  such,  the  discourse  of  female  terrorists  frequently  implies  that  women’s
murderousness is derived from their desire to seek vengeance for husbands or other male
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relatives killed in battle, or sacrifice their lives for the same cause. After discussing this
reasoning, Dickey reaches to the “black widows” of Chechenya to further exemplify this
trend. While many women decide to engage in suicide bombing for such reasons, these
explanations reduce women’s participation to a generalised continuation of masculine action
that  does  not  exist  beyond their  connection  to  their  male  relatives.  As  such,  women are  yet
again victimised as sufferers of the brutality of their male counterparts, which they escape by
their own death. Hasso calls this explanatory framework the ‘gender-cultural’ explanation,
which assumes that female suicide bombers “are the dupes of conniving men, doing so to
escape lives of patriarchal misery” (Hasso, 2005: 44).
On  another  level,  Dickey  describes  Al  Qaeda’s  fighters,  wives  and  widows  as  “one
extended family” (Dickey, 2005: 27) loyal to one another and all dedicated to one mutual
cause: terrorism. “Frequently,” writes Dickey “the sisters and daughters of a holy warrior will
marry  one  of  his  comrades  in  arms.  The  widows  of  slain  guerrillas  commonly  wed  one  of
their late husband jihadist relatives.” Here, the sexual perversion of terrorists is extended to
the institution of the family. The incestuously depicted marrying and remarrying within the
jihadist community is detached from possible culturally determined matrimonial traditions
and understood as a tactic for the reproductive continuation of the terrorist network;
“Although these networks appear isolated, they could form the enduring core of Al Qaeda in
the future, or a new incarceration of it.” The bodies of women associated with terrorists -
either as fighters or relatives - are therefore transformed into vessels continuing the cause of
their sexual partners, hence increasing to the US confusion of who they are meant to protect
from whom.
Outside familial terrorist networks Dickey gives attention explicitly also to “‘married
couples,’ either real long-term partners or couples who have been joined together for no other
purpose than a suicide mission” (Dickey, 2005: 21). This is regarded as another manipulation
of the institution of marriage. It is not explicitly stated why “agencies are particularly
concerned about the threat” of a man and a woman killing themselves together in a suicide
bombing. First of all, one could consider the sanctity of the institution of marriage in the US.
Civil  marriages  are  still  enshrined  with  the  Christian  values  that  formed  US  marriage  laws.
Homosexual marriages, for example, continue to be considered morally intolerable, and
continue to be illegal. The ideal marriage is an emotionally motivated, lifelong heterosexual
union. Suicide bombing couples are heterosexual, but is not conceived as an emotional
attachment between two people, nor is the attachment lifelong. In fact, marriage is not even a
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necessity. Ultimately, for Dickey, it is another example of Muslim men forcing women to
commit murderous acts for and with them.
In his article, Dickey discusses the interesting case of a Belgian female suicide bomber
in Iraq that explicitly depicts this manipulation. This case exemplifies not only the ‘gender-
cultural’ explanation, but also the racial Otherness involved in such depictions. On 9
November 2005, 38-year-old Muriel Degauque committed a suicide car bomb attack against a
US military convoy south of Baghdad. Dickey describes her as a “fair-skinned” Belgian, and
thereby making a racial remark explicitly calling attention to her White West European
ethnicity. Dickey describes her personal history as one of continual personal and emotional
instability. As a young girl she often ran away from home, and as a woman she had “a
succession of failed relationships with Muslim men” (Dickey, 2005:20). The last one was a
radical Salafist follower, a Belgian of Moroccan decent. They married lived together in
Morocco for three years, after which Degauque returned home converted to radical Islamic
teachings and fully veiled, “alienated, lonely, in the thrall of a husband who consumed her
entire world” (ibid.).
Dickey’s narrative of Degauque paints the picture of a “fair” Western woman whose
problematic childhood left her vulnerable to the perversions of Muslim men. The successive
Muslim boyfriends fuelled her dependency on dominating men that manipulated her
vulnerable emotional state. The last one who became her husband was a radical and thus
particularly dangerous, and was instrumental in her succumbing to suicidal terrorism. The
process was gradual, like the gradual spread of a disease into her body; first dating Muslim
men, converting to Islam, moving to a Muslim country, then wearing a burqa and finally
sacrificing her life to Islamic fundamentalism. Her body was gradually not only infected, but
physically and mentally transformed by Muslim men. This narrative not only participates in
the continuing monstrous Othering of Muslim men, but also has explicit implications for the
self. Muslim men are not simply an outside, foreign danger. They are also the enemy within
the  self.  Non-White  immigrants  bear  the  racial  markings  of  their  skin  that  label  them  as
potential threats to White Westerners, especially to White Western woman. The example of
Degauque is a warning of this inside danger. Western narratives surrounding Degauque
promote  the  reclamation  of  Western  women  by  Western  men  from  Muslim  men.  It  is  a
warning to Western women of the calculating sexual threat of brown men and Islam that will
de-sex and brainwash them into their service. It is a warning to Western men to protect their
women from their possession by criminal Muslim men. And such protection is believed to be
provided by tightening immigration controls and racial profiling, and ultimately, by the use of
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military might. However, for the women who are already ‘brainwashed,’ there appears to be
little hope for salvation. It appears to be preferable to kill a female terrorist rather than attempt
her rehabilitation if she is considered to be a ‘lost’ cause, and therefore, a certain threat.
The article concludes by questioning the idea of female violence as empowering.
Dickey quotes Mia Bloom’s observation of the increasing popularity of this idea among
Palestinian women. Frances S. Hasso also observes how female suicide bombers become
feminist  heroes  for  Palestinian  girls  and  women.  She  writes  that  when  women  “inserted
themselves - by dying and killing - into a sphere of politics dominated by men, the Palestinian
women militants allowed other Arab girls and women to contest their own marginality in
national and regional politics” (Hasso, 2005: 35). Dickey, although acknowledging Bloom’s
comment,  nonetheless considers suicide bombing as “a strange path to liberation for women
hidden behind veils and burqas” (Dickey, 2005: 27). Bound with this comment is the belief
that solutions to “defuse the explosive anger of jihadist widows bend on vengeance” would be
the US provision of equal rights and, education and jobs to women. A warning is nonetheless
given to even such “[seemingly] obvious” answers. Dickey quotes the explanation provided
by the Belgian director of the federal police for Degauque’s suicide attack, that “perversely,
emancipation allows women to aspire to martyrdom” (ibid.). The statement extinguishes the
possibility of female suicide bombers as individuals using desperate measures to participate in
the struggle for national liberation. They are not women seeking political participation in their
communities,  and  Western  democratic  solutions  might  be  increasingly  detrimental  to  the
problem.
In  sum,  the  discourse  on  female  terrorists  is  ultimately  a  continuation  of  the
demonisation  of  Muslim  men,  who  poison  the  minds  of  women  into  violent  suicidal
behaviour. These women are depicted as femme fatales, possessing a hypersexuality that
renders them excessively violent. The irrationality attributed to Muslim men is amplified in
female terrorists, for not only do they possess the assumed female irrationality, but also the
psychotic terrorist instincts of Muslim men. Islam is blamed for contributing to the creation of
terrorists by sexually frustrating its followers. The partnership suicide bombings they
encourage pervert heterosexual partnership and destroy traditional family values. In the
institution of marriage, women are meant to procreate, not murder, create families, not break
others.
These discourses continue to dehumanise Muslim men and victimise women, both
Muslim and Western. They partake in the construction of the US self’s sexuality of ‘good’ as
Christian, therefore sexually tame and unmanipulative, and highly respectful of the institution
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of marriage, which defines a set of nuclear, heterosexual family values. Women are still the
ones to be protected from the ‘evils’ of Muslim men, both in the West and in the Middle East,
and the ones to protect them are ‘heroic’ US soldiers. In this case, their heroism is obtained by
imprisoning, harming or killing Muslim men and female terrorists. Despite the shocking
suggestion of shooting a woman, even a pregnant one, it is justified by the idea that she is
brainwashed and beyond salvation, and will stop at nothing to complete the suicide mission.
Such narratives keep the gender logics of protector/protected and life-taker/life-giver solidly
attributed to masculinity/femininity, thwarting the challenge female terrorists pose to their
dissolution.
The Body Politics of Abu Ghraib
The continuity of these discourses extends across space and time, as we have seen.
This section returns to the question of torture and its Othering and dehumanising mechanisms
from a gender perspective. Guantánamo provided the first hints of detainee torture by the US
military. The torture at Abu Ghraib, however, became an immediate “scandal” because of the
worldwide-published photographic evidence that confirmed a breech of the Geneva
Conventions. This section, does not aim to compare the two prisons, but focuses on Abu
Ghraib, which by itself alone is a fascinating case. The aim is to understand the continuity of
gender and sexuality in discourses. The sensation caused by the publishing of the photos was
unforeseen, as was the condemnation of the scenes performed in them. The gruesome irony
was  that  the  prison  once  known for  brutal  torture  of  Iraqis  under  Saddam Hussein’s regime
was  still  a  space  for  torturing  Iraqis  -  but  by  the  US soldiers  that  were  supposed  to  be  their
liberators.
At the release of the photographs, as Jasbir K Puar remarks, suddenly “sexual torture”
was discovered to be the worst possible form of torture, somehow more intolerable than for
example the deaths of thousands of Iraqi civilians, or the slow starvation of millions from US
sanctions on Iraq. The tolerability border for torture is set at the place of a form of violence
that mimics sexual acts associated with homosexuality such as sodomy, oral sex, and
sadomasochistic practices of bondage, leashing and hooding. (Puar, 2004: 522-523).
Homosexuality as the shock-inducing aspect of the photographs can be understood as an
affirmation of not only the heteronormativity of US patriotism, but also the heteronormativity
of US militarism. As discussed, masculinism, homophobia, misogyny and racism are
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intricately mutually constitutive, and are instrumental in the realisation of militaristic national
projects. The case of Abu Ghraib is an explicit example of such.
As Neil MacMaster argues, the torture of Abu Ghraib was not an “isolated incident” in
the US military (MacMaster, 2004: 38). Indeed, as Rosalind P. Petchesky also writes,
racialised, and sexualised torture “have their prototypes throughout the US prison system and
in US slavery and the lynching and castration of African-Americans”. Documented
precedents of similar methods include the Second World War, the Korean War, Algeria (as
discussed extensively by MacMaster), Vietnam, Chile under Pinochet, 1980s El Salvador, and
Rwanda in the 1990s. (Petchesky, 2005: 312) No incident, however, can be examined outside
its context, as each case is historically and spatially specific, including Abu Ghraib. As
mentioned, the homosexuality of the acts was the main cause of concern 32 . Because
homosexuality is banned by Islamic law, it is discussed by Americans as socially
unacceptable  in  Islamic  societies,  the  homosexual  posing  of  Abu  Ghraib,  such  as  forcing
prisoners to simulate oral sex with each other, was recognized as dreadfully shameful for the
victims. This Orientalist discourse, assuming the repression of sexuality in Oriental spaces,
provided an excellently effective torture tactic from a military security perspective: to
manipulate their sexual self-repression for humiliation. (Puar, 2004: 526)
Torture was not used solely for extracting information out of detainees during
interrogation, but as the smiling faces of the pictures suggest, appeared to be a source of
amusement for the Military Police guards. The photographs had the potential to suggest that
Americans took a sadistic pleasure in games of homoeroticisation and sadomasochistic sexual
humiliation. Soon after the release of the photos, George W. Bush stated resolutely that “Their
treatment does not reflect the nature of the American people” (Bush in New York Times,  1
May 2004), and on another occasion assuring that “That’s not the way we do things” (Bush in
The Nation 24 May 2004). This is remarkably reminiscent of words spoken by Mrs Bush
quoted earlier, denying American promiscuity and selfishness by saying “That’s not a real
view of what the American people are like... Americans are very religious [and honest]”
(Laura  Bush,  2004).  The  Military  Police  in  the  photographs  were  depicted  as  un-American
deviants of the norm of American sexuality. This norm was the Christian heterosexual, chaste
or  at  least  monogamous  model  of  sexual  behaviour  represented  by  White,  Christian  US
citizens, particularly Mr and Mrs Bush. Completing the condemnation was the prompt use of
the justice system by the court-martialling, discharging and imprisonment of the soldiers. The
32 As can be determined, for example, from the list of abuses listed in a The Nation article “The Horror of Abu
Ghraib,” all of which focus on the “sadistic” and “sodomising” acts. (24 May 2004: 3)
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US judicial system based on the masculine Enlightenment values of law and reason prevailed
over a Hobbesian state of nature of animalistic sexuality.
The public reaction was similar. The outpour of public sympathy was explicitly for the
victims, and condemning of the American perpetrators. Interestingly, as Puar notes, the
repression of Iraqi prisoners remained the most highlighted aspect of the scandal, “in order to
efface the hypersexual excesses of the US prison guards” (Puar, 2004: 527). Indeed, the focus
remained largely on the injustice done to the prisoners, while the doings of the guards were
quickly understood as deviant exceptions without any further consideration of their sexuality,
or the role of the military institution in condoning and encouraging such behaviour. Puar goes
on to note the irony of the US emerging as  “more tolerant of homosexuality (and less tainted
by misogyny and fundamentalism) than the repressed, modest, nudity-shy ‘Middle East’”
(ibid.). As such, the US continues the projection of a self-image of supreme civilisational
standards against which the progress of other peoples is measured.
Homosexuality, in turn, is rendered repugnant worldwide. The images of men wearing
women’s underwear or piled up in a pyramid naked intentionally demean homosexuality.
Although publicly condemned, the toleration of such behaviour allowed it to occur. This
underlying toleration and sanctioning of homophobic behaviour has a legitimising effect on
its perpetuation into the larger society. Although the US emerged as tolerant of
homosexuality, this tolerance does not equate an absence of homophobia. The Abu Ghraib
scandal also endangered homosexuals in the US as possible targets of homophobic outrage.
Heterosexuality  was  confirmed  as  natural  and  normal  at  the  core  of  what  it  meant  to  be  an
American.
It is vital to bear in mind, however, that heterosexual masculinities are also
hierarchically arranged. The hierarchies of military rank reflect a class-differentiated
organisation. Lower-class, lower-ranking male soldiers are endowed with childhoods of street
fights and poor education, which contrasts to the ‘civilised’ and educated senior and upper-
ranking gentleman officers. As Cynthia Enloe describes, lower-ranking soldiers are expected
only to obey the high-ranking officers, and to protect them with their more animalistic and
uncivilised masculinity. It is therefore also the lower-ranking soldiers who are imagined to be
capable of rape, unlike gentlemanly officers, who may seduce, but do not rape. (Enloe, 2000b:
152) Certainly in the case of Abu Ghraib, it was the lower-ranking military prison guards who
were accused of sexual abuse, instead of their superiors, who were relinquished from
responsibility for the behaviour of their subordinates.
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As discussed, US patriotism is reflected most strongly in the pride in its military. It is
therefore not surprising that the heteronormativity of US patriotism should be so explicitly
produced and sustained by the US military at Abu
Ghraib  either.  It  is  a  continuation  of  the  self/Other
discourses that degrades the Other by the feminisation
assumed to occur by homosexualisation. At Abu
Ghraib the sites of discourse were the physical flesh of
the Arab bodies being photographed and videotaped.
Their bodies were the objects of imperialistic
domination and demonisation. One photograph shows a
man standing on a box with a pointed bag over his head
and long black garment over his body, with
electrocuting wires attached to his fingers, toes and
penis. For Petchesky it is “reminiscent of nothing so
much as a (Muslim, Arab) woman in a burqa” (Petchesky, 2005: 313). In addition to its
feminising humiliation, the concealment of the identity of Muslim women is metaphorically
repeated on a man in punishment for their treatment of women. While this is a likely
possibility, the pointed hood and draping clothing is also hauntingly evocative of the uniforms
of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) - the legendary fraternal white supremacy organisation of the
US. Now isolated and infamous for its extreme racism and lynchings, the photograph could
alternatively be interpreted as the demonisation of the Other, whose evil are compared with
that of the hateful KKK - both are regarded as packs of evil men, murderous and religiously
fundamentalist. Again we are confronted with the definition of the psychopathic and the
pathological that require purifying intervention.
The photograph presents the problem of masculinity gone bad - in other words, weak,
irrational and unpredictable- problematic ‘feminine’ attributes. Meanwhile, it also performs a
procedural cure for this. While the body may be positioned in such a way to display the
electrical wires that send torturous shocks through his body, it is also extremely reminiscent
of a crucifixion scene; a scene of slow death. Wearing a single peace of clothing, his feet are
together, facing forward, and his arms are stretched out to each side with his palms facing
forward, the head slightly tilted. And finally, he is placed on an elevating block like a public
display, as in a public execution for the crowds to see. He is not Jesus Christ, but rather,
dressed in black, the colour of darkness, the unrepentant sinner beside Jesus destined for hell.
The crucifixion is the punishment decided by the hegemonically masculine US male soldiers.
Image 9 The photograph of the hooded
man at Abu Ghraib
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Their masculinity is sufficiently ‘pure’ and ‘untainted’ by femininity to pass judgement on
others and be the overseers of correction. Crucifixion punishes by pain, here by electrocution,
but with the hope of disciplining the ‘criminal’ into repentance of eventual conformation to
behavioural gender norms. We could decide to read the hood as a hood to objectify the enemy
for  the  abusers,  and  the  position  simply  to  display  torture  tactics,  but  such  an  interpretation
does not explain the meaning of the contents of the photograph, why they are presented as
they are as opposed to another. Indeed, the alternative explanation offered here is that it is
form of violence that imposes the dominant masculinity’s religious, sexual, racial and national
values on the defenceless enemy, much like the Nazis forced Jews to sew the Yellow Star of
David onto their clothes, explicitly exhibiting their enemies for public consumption.
The act photographing itself can be considered a form of violence. The photographs
involve intentionality that is tied with an imperialistic gloating of US hegemonic masculine
domination. As Puar observes, they have qualities “reminiscent of vacation snapshots,
mementos of a good time, victory at last, or even the trophy won at summer camp” (Puar,
2005: 531). They do not only record the violence committed, they enable a constant and
endless perpetuation of the violence each time they are viewed. Puar describes their
distribution “like pornography on the Internet, the speed of transmission an aphrodisiac in
itself [to satisfy the keen ecstatic eye of the voyeur]” (ibid.). She goes on to compare the
photographs to photographs taken between 1880 and 1930 of lynched black men and women
hanging from a tree in the background with their killers grinning in the foreground. Puar’s
comparison is chillingly appropriate.
Until now the analysis has focused on violence between men, which is assumed to be
the natural gender norm of violence. The assumed naturalness of violence by men to men was
highlighted by the disturbed public reaction to the participation of the female soldier Private
Lynndie England. In an interview on Dateline NBC, England explained her presence as the
orders of male soldiers who “wanted... females to be there so [the prisoners] knew they were
being humiliated by having females see them naked”33 (England, 2005). As in Guantánamo,
the  femininity  of  American  women  was  elevated  above  the  masculinity  of  Arab  men.
However, the image of an American woman holding the leash of a naked prisoner, or pointing
her fingers like a gun at a prisoner’s exposed genitals was interpreted as sadomasochistic
behaviour that is associated with sexual perversion. Although male soldiers received the
33 Indeed there were other women involved in the scandal, but their appearances in photographs were less
common, which may explain why they have received less attention. The two other women that received
sentences, Sabrina Harman and Megan Ambuhl, also received lighter sentences in accordance with less
evidence.
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longest convictions34,  England received most of the media attention. Her involvement was a
horrific contradiction of norms of femininity. As Puar points out, it reflects the failures of
liberal feminism to sufficiently “theorise power and gender beyond female-male dichotomies
that  situate  women  as  less  prone  toward  violence  than  men  and  morally  superior  to  them”
(Puar, 2004: 528).
For those against women’s membership in military ranks, it was the perfect example
to argue their innate unsuitability and incompetence for the military. It also served as a
legitimisation and manipulation of the masculine-rational/feminine-irrational assumption.
After the scandal, England’s deficient and irrational mental capacity was used by her defence
lawyers  as  well  as  England  herself  as  an  excuse  for  her  behaviour.  In  her  interview  with
Dateline NBC, England explains that her involvement was not her own decision, and blames
her lack of judgement on a loss of emotional control; “I was so in love with [Specialist
Charles Garner] that I trusted his decisions and did whatever he wanted” (England, 2005). She
reproduces the discourse of the man (Garner) as reasonable, and the women (herself) as
emotional, and her reliance on the capacities of masculine rationality to make decisions for
her, because of her deficiencies. England’s mental weaknesses are even given medical
backing by her defence at trial. England’s school psychologist Thomas Denne testified that as
a child she suffered oxygen deprivation at birth, speech impairment and dyslexia. Despite her
progress in school she continued to need “special attention” (Denn in Associated Press 4 May
2005). Thomas Denne, when asked if England knew right from wrong, replied, “She had a
compliant personality and tended to listen to authority figures.” Her defence lawyer thus
argued for her inferior ability to reason: “She is clearly in a different mental capacity... than
any of the others accused,” (Hernandez, ibid.) who were predominantly male.
The emphasis on homosexuality left other abuses at Abu Ghraib in the shadows or
completely ignored. Less attention was given to the photographs of dead Iraqi bodies, beside
which stood an American soldier giving a ‘thumbs up’ sign. The lack of discussion of these
photographs sends the signal of indifference. Returning to Judith Butler’s (2004b)
terminology of ‘valuable bodies’ as bodies seen as valuable enough to mourn, the silence
surrounding these dead bodies leaves a cold mark of apathy. US soldiers were sent to Iraq to
kill, and such photographs merely send a public reassurance of “mission accomplished.” The
female soldier Sabrina Harman that occasionally feature in these photographs also a light
34 Specialist Charles Garner received the longest sentence of ten years.
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sentence, six months in prison and a bad conduct discharge, compared to England’s three
years and a dishonourable discharge. Murder was not enough to constitute shock-inducing
violence, and the way that they died did not appear to be a cause for concern. Death in war
was “business as usual” and did not require unusual alarm.
The completely invisible sufferers of Abu Ghraib are its female prisoners. The pictures
that circulated in the press provide no evidence of female prisoners. The existence of their
bodies, however, are apparent in the Taguba Report that records the findings of an
investigation into the prison’s abusive practices. It reports the photographing and videotaping
of both male and female detainees and a male Military Police raping a female detainee. (The
American Journal of International Law, 2004: 595) Photographic evidence of female
detainees being abused was released, but not distributed among Western audiences as the
tabloid news of the other abuses. They include disturbing images of a women being forced to
show her breasts at gunpoint, women being forced to perform oral sex on soldiers, and gang
rape. (Granma Internacional Digital, 2006) Yet, they have received little publicity and there
has been no demand for the men in these photographs to be court-martialled. Their rape,
brutalisation and physical and mental torture have occurred in virtual silence, again, implying
indifference  to  matters  understood  as  normal  in  wartime.  It  reflects  the  prevailing
understanding that rape is a natural and inevitable consequence of war, despite that war rape
is has been declared a war crime.35 It demonstrates a continuing lack of insight into the
connections between gender and militarism, of the coding of women as embodiments of the
nation, of their rape as domination of that nation, and of the larger domination of masculinity
over femininity, which is especially important for (male) soldiers and the survival of
militarism. Instead, the suffering of women and children in war - those for whom wars are
supposedly fought - continues extensively, and silently.
The scandal of Abu Ghraib, therefore revolved around the sexually shaming the men
by feminisation and homosexualisation. It was an act of Othering that entailed a homophobic,
misogynist, racist and imperialist domination of the Other. Discourses reproduced traditional
norms of masculinity as violent but rational, and femininity as peaceful, moral, yet irrational.
War as a masculine practice was yet again declared by the shock of Lynndie England’s
involvement. Unlike the very visible England, the female Iraqi prisoners remained hidden.
Minimal attention was given to photographs of their rape, as well as their rapists. The rape of
women and the death of men received indifferent responses, or no responses. They do not
35 Established in 1998 in the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, which entered into force as
international law in 2002.
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constitute the ‘exceptional’ sufferings of Iraqi male prisoners. In war, men rape women and
kill men, but they are not meant to get homosexual, sadomasochistic pleasure from forcing
other men into submissive homosexual positions. In doing so, the threatened to jeopardise the
US heteronormative hegemonic masculinity on which US patriotism and the US military are
entirely existentially dependent.
Soldiering in Iraq
As  the  Abu  Ghraib  scandal  demonstrated,  there  are  powerful  conceptions  of  what  it
means to be a US soldier. As Kayla Williams observed at her homecoming from Iraq in 2004,
“even if [people] didn’t support the war, they supported the troops” (Williams, 2006: 281).
Specifically, there are sexually oriented understandings of what and who men and women in
US military uniforms should represent. This section is interested in further examining how the
discourses of US soldiers in the Iraq War are gendered, and how sexuality is involved in the
depiction of military life and combat there. A dominant focus will be on women soldiers, as
the debate surrounding their appropriateness in the military provides an array of insights into
both masculinities and femininities in the US military. Lynddie England, Jessica Lynch and
Kayla Williams serve as examples of female soldiers, the latter of which shall be focused on
through her autobiographical account of her experience. Male soldier Colby Buzzell’s
autobiography contrasts as a male experience. It must be understood that these texts produce
discourse of soldiering in Iraq, and that these discourses also participate in reproducing
previously existing discourses. Autobiography provides insight into the personal thoughts and
experiences of individuals. However, these thoughts cannot be held as original truths or
anything of the sort. Their thoughts, like those of any other, have been shaped by other
discourses, and thus reproduce them in their own expressionism. Soldier autobiographies are
popular reads. Readers are interested in hearing about a war or soldier life from a person who
was ‘there’ and therefore ‘knows what it was really like.’ They are often bestsellers. As Jean
Bethke Elshtain describes, “the soldier has been to hell and back, and that fascinates”
(Elshtain, 1995: 166).36  From the reader comments available for potential Internet book
buyers on Amazon.com, it is also perceivable that US readers have profound respect for such
works, and for the military experiences described in them. Reminding of the high esteem that
the military possesses in the US as the epitome of nationalism and thus the popularity of such
36 Elshtain continues to explain that indeed one of the “endlessly rekindled vexations of anti-war activists and
peace philosophers is the fact that peace does not enthral as does war” (Elshtain, 1995: 166)
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books, it is possible to suppose a generally favourable public acceptance and adoption of the
‘truths’ and identities they express. In this case, the books profess to express truths about the
‘frontlines’ of the War on Terrorism, thus perpetuating particular gendered meanings and
identities of war in general and this particular war in the War on Terrorism.
Female Soldiers in the Gulf War
According to Cynthia Enloe “the American image that came out of the Gulf War was
of the professionalised, militarised woman patriot” (Enloe, 1993: 222). The Gulf War (1991)
was  the  first  US  military  operation  where  women  were  visible  actors  as  soldiers  and
participated as such in unforeseen numbers. Twelve percent of US military personnel in the
Gulf, 37,000 persons, were women. (Feinam, 2000: 160) The Gulf War was a significant
point in women’s endeavours for military participation. It created a new discourse that strived
to justify women’s assimilation into the forces in acceptable terms in accordance with norms
of femininity.
For  military  planners,  it  is  strategic.  After  the  end  of  conscription,  women  were
increasingly urged to join the military to make up for the deficit of willing men to join the
military.  They were useful to the military also as legitimators of the mission. From the Gulf
War, it became increasingly common to refer to ‘our boys and girls in the Gulf’ rather than
just ‘our boys,’ also reflecting the high point of women’s empowerment during the Gulf war
(Yuval-Davis, 2003: 105). Women were also valuable in “boosting the morale of male troops
with their ‘nurturant socialisation’ and their availability for sexual service,” (D’Amico, 1996:
382) thus making the war more possible by making the killing machine more efficient.
In the press, however, the stories that centred on female soldiers focused on the
parental  status  of  these  women.  News  stories  discussed  and  were  critical  of  the  impact  on
families whose mothers were going to war. There was also worry about how single fathers left
behind would manage in the absence of their partners. Apparently not as well as single
mothers always do. (Feinman, 2000: 161) The presumptions about sexuality in the US, which
depicts female soldiers as mothers, often waving to her children who rest in their fathers’
arms,  rendered  female  soldiers  first  of  all  as  heterosexual  and  as  mothers.  Thus,  the  classic
fears of women soldiers being lesbians or whores were temporarily relieved. Joanna Burke
comments  on  how  pacifists  would  argue  that  women  could  not  fight  because  they  were
mothers, so too explanations were later found to also support their fighter-status by linking it
to maternal instincts - in defence of their husbands, lovers, or children. (Bourke, 1999: 309)
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Thus,  as  Feinman  ascertains,  “In  the  Persian  Gulf  War,  US  military  women  became  the
objects of a confused iconography of soldier, good/bad mother, and sex object” (Feinman,
2000: 162).
At  the  end  of  the  war,  press  accounts  reported  on  the  “victorious”  return  of  US
soldiers to their “wives, newborn babies, and families” (Feinman, 2000: 163). Such reporting
rendered invisible those without them. It implied that lesbians, gays and bisexuals were not
members (or at least equal members) of the military. Indeed, the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy
forces such members into silence, and threatens them with discharge should they ‘come out.’
Proportionally depreciated were the African American female soldiers who constituted over
forty  percent  of  the  women in  the  Gulf.  As  Jeanne  Vickers  points  out,  while  oil  companies,
banks and arms manufacturers were the big winners of the war, the fighting itself was another
usual case of the “the poor killing the poor,” where most of the frontline soldiers were from
the poorest segments of US society.37 (Vickers, 1993: 64)
Nonetheless, the image of the female soldier that emerged was that of a dedicated
professional. As Cynthia Enloe describes;
The ideal American woman soldier of the 1990s still wears lipstick in the Pentagon
advertisements. Her eyebrows are neatly plucked, but she isn’t smiling. She doesn’t put up
with harassment. Under her... helmet, she is a serious citizen doing her job, she’s a pro.
(Enloe, 1993: 227)
The professional female soldier appears “neither morally loose nor suspiciously
manly” (Enloe, 1993: 220), in other words, neither a whore nor a lesbian. Being a “pro” is
being someone taken seriously. Their professionalism provides protection from potential
sexually implicated slander and functions thus as “a new form of guaranteed respectability”
(ibid.).
Gendered Soldiering in the Iraq War
The discourses  of  three  female  soldiers  and  one  male  soldier,  Colby  Buzzell,  in  Iraq
that are examined here crucially demonstrate how gender is militarised in the War on
Terrorism in and by combatants. These examples are Jessica Lynch who was captured and
37 On the subject of poor in the military, Feinman warns that “feminist antimilitarism cannot afford to dismiss
women’s attraction to the armed forces as simply a ‘poor draft.’” She nonetheless admits that indeed “much of
the appeal for women seeking to rise in professional status in the forces is certainly tied to economic benefits, at
least in part” (Feinman, 2000: 57).
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then rescued, Lynndie England of the Abu Ghraib scandal, and Kayla Williams, who wrote an
autobiography of her experiences. Each represents a different sort of ‘woman’ and ultimately
the discursive judgements surrounding them reflects under what norms women should
participate in the military, as well as continuing debates and contradictions concerning female
soldiers. In the War on Terrorism, the gender hierarchies of soldiers are constructed as such
that  US  female  soldiers,  as  members  of  the  US  military,  are  along  with  US  male  soldiers,
‘saviours’  of  Muslim  women  and  children.  Within  the  US,  they  are  regarded  as  the
enlightened and empowered women who have joined their men to rescue Other women, under
the protection of the state and their male colleagues. Seen as back-up, they are nonetheless
inferior  to  male  soldiers  who do  the  ‘real’ work  of  frontline  combat.  This  section  examines
the complex gendered relationships between soldiers, and between soldiers and their Others in
Iraq.
Quartermaster Corps Private Jessica Lynch was a supply clerk in Iraq, which as Deepa
Kumar points out, is a long-ago established women’s position in war, that of a camp-
follower38. (Kumar, 2004: 299). Her convoy suffered a surprise ambush on 23 March 2003.
She was eventually taken to hospital by her apparently torturous Iraqi captors, from where she
was rescued by US forces on 1 April 2003. Lynch’s story runs like a fairytale; the meek all-
American girl is captured by dark brutes, and the damsel-in-distress is subsequently liberated
from their  clutches  by  strong  and  righteous  male  rescuers.  Despite  the  controversy  over  the
actual story, Lynch is nonetheless presented as both the hero, as well as the victim.
Lynch was depicted as a “[tough] little thing” (Rather, 2003), “fighting to the death...
[and] did not want to be taken alive” (Schmidt and Loeb, 2003: A1). As a victim, she was a
meek woman, unintended for battle, but as a hero, she fought aggressively and indifferent to
the possibility of losing her own life - as a proper soldier hero should. However, as Kumar
writes,  “While  Lynch  is  a  hero,  her  heroism  is  tempered  by  sexist  notions  of  women’s
bravery. Ultimately, despite her courage she is still in need of rescue by her male
counterparts, the real heroes” (Kumar, 2004: 301). Therefore, Lynch does not represent the
empowerment of women, but rather their continuing second-class membership in the military.
They may participate, and participate commendably, but they are no equal to ‘real’ male
soldiers, as they intrinsically possess particular sexually determined assets for soldiering that
even brave women like Lynch will never possess.
38 See Enloe, 2000b for more on camp followers and their history.
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Lynch was nonetheless highly significant in reproducing particular idealised self-
conceptions of the US nation. She answered to specific racial beauty standards: White, blonde
hair, blue eyes, pretty. She came from the small community of Palestine39, West Virginia, the
perfect girl-next-door, a wholesome sweetheart. The angelic portrayal of Jessica Lynch
constructs the norm of the national self according to racialised hegemonic idealisations that
discriminate coloured, urban, and non-religious persons in the USA. This reaches across the
ocean to Iraq. Lynch represented the pure and saintly US under threat from the dark and
uncivilised  terrorist  people  of  the  Middle  East.  Her  rescue  was  a  metaphoric  reclamation  of
this US identity by rescuing it from the dark and degenerate demon-like Islamic villains. In
such a way the rescue functioned to justify the war. It demonstrated the need to protect
American women from villainous coloured people, and that success in such a task was
achievable.
Such a notion discredited Lynch as a soldier and transformed her into the classic
female victim in need of protection. As such, her sexual well being in captivity was a matter
of discussion. Among other torture she was said to have endured as a prisoner-of-war (POW),
she was reported to have been raped. She was commended for resisting well under such
treatment. Like Major Rhonda Cornum, who was sexually assaulted by her Iraqi captors in the
Gulf War, stories of Lynch also gave the impression of “protecting military information and
bolstering the morale of her male [comrades] as more important than worrying about her
sexual well-being” (Enloe, 1993: 220). On the other hand, it was a shockingly infuriating
matter if the innocent American girl was possessed by sexually brutalisation, even sodomy,
by  Other  men.  It  was  a  humiliation  of  the  national  self  that  necessitated  rescue  and
reclamation of national sexual innocence. While Lynch denied any recollection of being raped
in an interview with Diane Sawyer on ABC, she nonetheless replies, “I have no memory of
that... but you know if it did happen, people need to know that that’s what kind of people that
they are, that’s how they treat the female soldiers over there” (Lynch in Sawyer, 2003). She
says this despite correcting previous reports and saying that she was in fact treated very well
during her captivity. Instead, she invokes “Orientalist fears of the insatiable sexual drives of
colonised men of colour” (Kunmar, 2004: 303). There is no mention of the extent to which
rape exists within the military, and the implications of this on the harmful masculinism and
misogynism of militarism. As this is absent from the discussion, the challenge to militarism
presented by gender in feminist discussions remains safely untouched.
39 As Kumar remarks, “despite the rhetorical embellishments of name of the town, Palestine, continues to remind
us of the reality that is being glossed over” (2004: 311).
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Ultimately, the Jessica Lynch story is largely a warning against the inclusion of
women in the armed forces, especially in combat. Female soldiers may fight bravely, but they
cause more trouble for the real male soldiers if captured. Deemed sexually more valuable
possessions, they are deemed more vulnerable to harm and sexual abuse if captured. As
POWs,  they  are  no  longer  soldiers  as  male  POWs  are,  but  female  victims  requiring  male
protection. A common argument indeed against women in the military, particularly in combat,
is that men will naturally want to protect their female comrades, which distracts them from
the ‘real work’ of warfare. In the film Saving Private Ryan (1999), the heroism of the rescue
is dependent on the maleness of the private in need of rescue. As Feinman describes, Private
Ryan “represents the salvaging of the masculine martial citizen, though he himself raises the
humbling question of whether or not he has been worthy. His wife and children surround him
with a yes. It would prove the mistake of allowing women to become soldiers if the ‘fellow’
soldier  was  a  gal”  (Feinman,  2000:  88).  This  discomfort  is  reflected  in  the  TV  film Saving
Jessica Lynch (2003)40 released quickly, only seven months after Lynch’s rescue. Capitalising
on  the  title  of  Ryan,  it  implies  a  story  of  similar  unquestionable  heroism.  This  is  not  to  be
however, as ultimately Lynch is the ‘good,’ helpless US female in need of rescue from the
‘evil,’ dark Muslim men, whereas Ryan was found alive and fighting Germany, and refused to
abandon his post even when the ‘rescuers’ reached him. In contrast to Lynch, Ryan is a ‘real’
soldier - independent, unrelenting, and values the mission more than his life.
This was not the first time that Jessica Lynch’s rescue was mass-broadcasted. The
initial occasion was that of the actual rescue in April 2003. That the event was filmed implies
a premeditated belief that the rescue was worthy of visual recording, even that it might make
news. It was a dramatic rescue. Uniformed US soldiers stormed into the hospital firing their
weapons and promptly rushed Lynch out of the hospital on a stretcher, her body blanketed by
a US flag, her fair-featured face only visible. The picture-perfect all-American girl was
reclaimed and renationalised by US male protectors. Despite the controversy that erupted later
over the authenticity of the video, it nonetheless served to valorise US male soldiers, victimise
poor “[little] Jessi” (Rather, 2003), and demonise her Iraqi captors.
It is peculiar that warrior women have had mythological or actual historical existence
far in the past 41  but have not garnered any normalising acknowledgement. Legendary
examples exist of those who even led men into battle such as Boadicea, Joan of Arc, and
Queen Elizabeth I who captured the western collective imagination. However, as Nira Yuval-
40 An A&E documentary Saving Private Lynch (2003) was also released with the same titular wordplay on Ryan.
41 Antonia Fraser reviews this history in The Warrior Queens Boadicea's Chariot (2002)
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Davis writes, “their main function has usually been not to point out that women are capable of
warfare heroism like men, but rather to construct them as unnatural if romantic women,” and
that since women have become increasingly formally incorporated into militaries in the
twentieth century, “romantic images of women heroines have become more common”
(Yuval-Davis, 2003: 95). Lynch’s story is a part of this romanticist discourse that, although it
appears to applaud Lynch for her strength and bravery against US enemies, relies on
patronising assumptions of an innate feminine weakness that render female soldiers
unalterably inferior to their male counterparts.
In Iraq this supposition gained a graphic dimension by Lynddie England’s
involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal. England’s involvement has already been discussed in
the previous section, that she was depicted as irrational, over-emotional, mentally challenged
and sexually distorted. She appeared to be the complete opposite of the angelic and
wholesome Lynch. Kumar points out that, in fact, they had much in common. (Kumar, 2004:
310) Both were from small communities in West Virginia, came from rural working class
families and joined the military for economic opportunities and benefits. In situations where
they were intended to serve the aims of conquest, Kumar suggests that “perhaps the key
difference is that one’s image was constructed for public consumption, while the other’s was
not” (ibid.). While the Abu Ghraib photographs were indeed destructive to the image of the
US military, the question of intention is not as critical here as the power of the discourses the
stories of England and Lynch. Both were involved in the definition of appropriate and desired
US femininity, and the extent to which such femininity could be appropriated for military
postings. England represented the extreme, dark and gruesome dangers of femininity out of
control capable of jeopardising the reputation of the entire US military institution, while
Lynch portrayed  an  ideal  US femininity  in  combat  at  its  best.  Her  patriotism was  glorified,
but even this did not provide her with the strength and bloodthirstiness that would make her a
‘real’ soldier,  not ‘just’ a supply clerk.  She was still  “Jessi,” a woman, vulnerable and not a
natural killer.
Attempting to contrast both of these women is Kayla Williams, who in her
autobiography of her time in Iraq Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the
US Army (2006) writes, “Don’t count Jessica Lynch. Her story meant nothing to us [female
soldiers]. The same goes for Lynddie England. I’m not either of them, and neither are any of
the  real  women  I  know  in  the  service”  (Williams,  2006:  15).  Williams’  book  therefore
attempts to describe to her readers “what it feels like to be a woman soldier in peace and in
war” (ibid., italics original). Williams is aware of “a strange sexual allure to being a woman
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soldier” (Williams, 2006: 18). The observation that is demonstrated constantly throughout the
book is that a female soldier is considered either a “bitch” or a “slut”;
... That whole 15 percent [of the US military that is female] is trying to get past an old joke.
‘What’s the difference between a bitch and a slut? A slut will fuck anyone, a bitch will fuck
anyone but you.’ So if she’s nice or friendly, outgoing or chatty - she’s a slut. If she’s distant
or reserved or professional - she’s a bitch.
(Williams, 2006: 13)
Williams equates masculine qualities as soldier qualities, as not putting up with
harassment, a “a professional,” as remarked previously by Cynthia Enloe. This is reflected in
Williams’ remarks on her male comrades. When one cried during a viewing of the film Black
Hawk Down she commented, “I was freaked because the movie made him cry - in public... It
made him look like a big pussy” (Williams, 2006: 51). Fending off male soldiers, her insults
are directed at their masculinity, such as “Small, dicks. Unmaly men,” or “Fuck off, peanut
prick” (Williams, 2006: 167-168). While a display of sensitivity in men leads to their
feminisation or homosexualisation, Williams masculinises women whom she considers to be
‘professionals,’ for example Williams think her tough friend Lauren has “one big pair of
balls” (Williams, 2006: 61). Her small  “pathetic” Leatherman knife she refers to in front of
her collegues as her “chick Leatherman or fag Leatherman” (Williams, 2006: 127). Her use of
language of involves sexualised expressions. On another occasion she wrote that an admirable
female lieutenant would “micromanage like a motherfucker” (2006: 92). Far more crammed
with  sexual  swear  words  is  Cobly  Buzzell’s My War: Killing Time in Iraq, which is also
depicts the abundance of sexual jokes, sexual behaviour and pornography that circulate
among the soldiers as a normal and everyday part of a military life. For example, Buzzell, in
his sarcastic tone, writes that “Spank mags are required reading amongst infantrymen on field
problems (the dirtier the better). Everybody jerks off in the field. Masturbating is not looked
down upon but instead applauded and is an effective practice to stay awake on guard”
(Buzzell, 2006: 51). Williams also describes when she and other soldiers entered a Iraqi
training facility. When personnel arrive to gather evidence, Williams found herself “extremely
confused when he [one of them] picks up the few unburned files on women and tears off the
photographs, leaving the papers behind. He showed no interest in the men’s files” (Williams,
2006: 144). Williams does not elaborate further on this, but it is clear that the women of the
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Other,  again,  are  of  interest  to  the  men of  the  self  as  objects  of  desire  and  possession,  thus
asserting a dominating masculinity.
Soldiers also sexualise their weaponry. One soldier named his M420 machine gun
Maxine “after a sexual conquest” (Buzzell, 2006: 101). This is reminiscent of the chant
recited by soldiers in training; “This is my rifle [holding up the rifle], this is my gun [pointing
to penis], this one’s for killing, this one’s for fun” (Goldstein, 2001: 350). In the film Full
Metal Jacket (1987) a sergeant yells at recruits that their rifle was “the only pussy you people
will ever get... You’re married to this piece, this weapon of iron and wood, and you will be
faithful.” These female metaphors reflect first of all the heteronormativity - and homophobia -
of militarised masculinity by reference to marriage, and secondly its misogyny by masculine
domination. To control one’s weapon is paralleled to controlling a woman, or one’s wife, to
fire with it is metaphoric of the sexual domination of her during intercourse, and the pleasure
of killing likened to orgasmic pleasure. Buzzell also explains that “Every time we did a raid
we’d give the target individual a code name, usually a female name [like Bonnie]” (Buzzell,
2006: 149), thus feminising the victims as weak and unmanly. The notion that these Iraqi
victims might actually be defenceless is not an issue, however, but rather that their
masculinity is no match for US militarised masculinity.
In addition, Buzzell often references to fears of being seen as a homosexual, or, a
“fairy,” or “fruity” (Buzzell, 2006: 138, 139), in normally mundane situations; “I subscribed
to magazines that... not a lot of other soldiers read, like Thrasher, Mad, National Geographic,
Time and Details... which brought up a bunch of questions about my sexuality among fellow
squad members” (Buzzell, 2006: 134).
Buzzell  would  also  often  refer  to  a  female  soldier  as  a  “skank”  or  “bitch”  (Buzzell,
2006: 138, 139, 65, 158). Williams too is constantly called “Boobs” by a male soldier
(Williams, 2006: 167). She believes that one “woman’s incompetence makes all women in the
Army look incompetent,” (Williams, 2006: 269) and thus does not link it to the larger
misogynistic  culture  of  the  military.  Although  Williams  is  comparatively  more  aware  of
sexism in the Army, she stops short from delving further into the culture of masculinity and
misogyny in the military. Williams participates not only in promoting masculinity and
misogyny, but also produces it in two sexual jokes order to bond with her male comrades. The
first  one  goes  as  follows;  “What’s the  difference  between a  hooker  and  an  onion?...  No one
ever  cried  when  they  cut  a  hooker.”  The  second  one  asks  “What’s  the  first  thing  a  woman
does when she gets back from a battered women’s shelter?... The dishes, if she’s smart”
(Williams, 2006: 168). Williams participates in joking about violence against women, thereby
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endorsing the acceptability of directing physical brutality at women. She does not see
anything wrong with it, and enjoys how it allows her to join in men’s socialisation. A woman
herself, it is a depressing attempt to become ‘one of the boys,’ as in doing so she participates
in condoning the very sources of sexism that she claims to oppose, and fails to recognise. In
the end, the military is a masculine institution that Williams wishes to join in my
masculinisation, and resents traces feminine weakness in it. Buzzell too complains about
changing the name of ‘search and destroy’ missions to ‘movement to contact’ missions. His
judgement: “‘Pussification’ of the Army is what I call that garbage” (Buzzell, 2006: 1999).
Buzzell relishes in the aggressive machoism of the Army. When he joined the infantry,
he was looking forward “shooting guns and blowing shit up like Rambo” (Buzzell, 2006: 49).
Training did not disappoint; “[it] was just basically one huge war game,” “a whole lot of fun,”
“a pretty cool job... when you’re actually doing something, like blowing shit up, shooting at
targets, or out in the field playing ‘war’” (Buzzell, 2006: 55, 61, 64). Training prepared
Buzzell’s imaginary conception of his upcoming deployment in Iraq as a time of pleasurable
destruction, a place where he could truly live out fantasies of Rambo like he might have
imaginatively  done  as  a  child  on  the  playground.  Enemies  were  not  people,  but  targets,  and
this was reflected in soldiers’ descriptions of their Iraqi victims. Williams quotes a Marine at
training shouting “‘Kill ’em all! I can’t wait to get those bastards!’”  (Marine in Williams,
2006: 53). In Iraq, another soldier told Williams about his experience of killing; “I got a kill
last week. Man, I gotta tell you. It was the coolest” (Williams, 2006: 143). Referring to “a
kill” hides the point that he killed someone, makes it sound like a cold, unemotional, surgical
manoeuvre.
Williams is conscious of the techniques of dehumanisation. In other wars, enemies
were nips, chink, gooks, krauts or slopes. In Iraq they were hajjis (someone who has done the
hajji pilgrimage to the Mecca), sadiqis (“my friends”), or habibis (“my darlings”). Soldiers
rarely knew what the Arabic words meant. They were also called towelheads, ragheads,
camel jockeys, and the fucking locals. Williams is aware that these “words that ensured that
we  didn’t  see  our  enemy  as  people  -  as  somebody’s  father  or  son  or  brother  or  uncle”
(Williams, 2006: 200). Buzzell does not attempt to analyse such situationss, and uses the
word hajji as a regular word for an Iraqi man in his writing. He admits that be barely knows
the difference between a Shiite and a Sunni. (Buzzell, 2006: 208) On another occasion his
truck accidentally drove over Iraqi graves. “They kinda felt like subtle speed bumps as we ran
over them,” he breezily comments, passively continuing with, “Oops. Our bad” (Buzzell,
2006: 201). Elsewhere he writes, “I hate to say this, because it’s extremely racist, but every
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single fucking person there looked like a goddamn terrorist to me. Every single one of them.
And dude, they were all over the place” (Buzzell, 2006: 109). Despite the wish to be not
sound racist, he cannot help but imagine all Muslims as terrorists. It is undoubtedly a problem
for a soldier to fear the entire population of the land his army occupies. The sexist and racist
imagery of the War on Terrorism creates problems for soldiers. A soldier may end up killing
scores of civilians, if all are perceived as the elusive, invisible terrorists. They have been
trained to kill, trained to encourage the adrenaline rush towards pulling a trigger by glorifying
battle. Buzzell quotes a lieutenant saying to recruits;
‘Americans traditionally love to fight. All Real Americans love the sting of battle. My God, I
actually pity those poor terrorist bastards we’re going up against. We’re not just going to
shoot these noncompliant bastards in the face, we’re going to cut out their living guts and use
them to grease the gears of our Strykers and the bolts of our weapons... ’
(A lieutenant in Buzzell, 2006: 72)
Williams, as a higher-educated woman and Arabic translator, is better mentally
equipped to question linguistic dehumanisation. Her ability to communicate fluently with
Iraqis is also to her advantage in the ability to empathise with their sufferings better than other
soldiers. When her group is given permission to shoot anyone on a mobile telephone who
won’t end the conversation, Williams is shocked; “Can you imagine a foreign power coming
to the United States and deciding to drive around and shoot your neighbour because he’s on
his cell phone?” (Williams, 2006: 236) Interestingly, these words are used for Iraqi men, not
women. Neither Buzzell nor Williams are particularly concerned with describing encounters
with women. It is as if Iraq is chiefly populated by men, with a few ‘womenandchildren’
occasionally passing them silently in buses.
On the other hand, Williams sometimes expresses a belief in the simple-mindedness of
Iraqis. For example, when a Yezidi man asked her “‘Will you please tell Mr Bush about the
Yedizis?’” (Man in Williams, 2006: 186) she finds this ridiculous, and gets frustrated.
Towards the end, she admitted, “We all started to hate the fucking locals” (Williams, 2006:
253), and that admitted that sometimes she thought “God, why can’t we just kill everyone - or
leave them to fucking kill each other?” (Williams, 2006: 238). She tries hard to see Iraqis as
people,  but  it  is  increasingly  difficult  under  the  strenuous  demands  of  the  military  in  an
environment where she begins to feel frustrated, threatened, and exhausted.
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Such sensations are strongly resulting from the bodily pressures of powerlessness,
which have potentially harmful repercussions outside the body, to other bodies. Williams, for
example, is aware of the ability of her and her co-soldiers to harm others, and how suddenly
harming others became desirable after intense feelings of powerlessness;
All  of  us,  guys  and girls,  were  in  a  situation  in  Iraq  where  we were  powerless  much of  the
time. Powerless to change what we did. Powerless to go home. Powerless to make any real
decisions about how we were living our lives while deployed. And then we found ourselves
in this situation where we had all this power over another person. And suddenly we could do
whatever the fuck we wanted to them.
(Williams, 2006: 206)
The institution of the military holds a promise of power to its members. That promise
comes with the condition of complete personal submission to the behavioural codes and
norms of the institution. So, in fact, most of the time soldiers are in fact deprived of power,
powerless  to  make  simple  decisions  over  their  lives.  This  extends  even  to  simple  decisions,
for example the shame Buzzell endured for ordering the ‘wrong’ kinds of magazines.
With regards to torture of Iraqi men, however, Williams records an experience where
she  was  ordered  to  humiliate  the  enemy  by  sexual  ridicule,  and  finds  herself  unable  to
participate, citing pity, discomfort and horror as reasons for her refrain. When the torture
session was over, she confronted the interrogator with the Geneva Conventions, to which he
replied “‘Yes... But you have to know that these people are criminals. This is the only way to
deal with them... Besides, the terrorists don’t follow the Geneva Conventions - so why should
we?’” (Interrogator in Williams, 2006: 249). The idea that there is no other choice but to use
torture results from the belief in the unstoppable evil of the Other. International legal
frameworks are regarded as insufficient controls for such perverted bodies. Legal justice is a
creation of White, civilised male bodies and beyond the mental capacity of the dark and
uncivilised ‘terrorist’ barbarians. As the interrogator continues “These people only respect
strength, power... They’ll never listen to us unless we play rough” (ibid.), reflecting the
conviction that only male muscle can discipline out-of-control, primitive, caveman-like
Muslim bodies, who only understand violence. Thus, international humanitarian legal codes
are depicted as naive. More to the point, they are unnecessary, as humanitarianism is hardly a
matter of concern to those who do not regard their victims as human.42
42 In a similar way, the mass victims of the bombings of entire cities in the Second World War, such as Dresden,
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, were krauts and nips, not sentient human beings.
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As warriors, it is not favourable for soldiers to display emotion, which is coded as
feminine, and thus weak. As cases of torture demonstrate, soldiers have been under pressure
to do as ordered, and not undermine the team or their own standing in it by questioning
situations, often even by moral standards. This pressure ensures first of all the behavioural
discipline of their bodies, and later hopefully mental discipline as well. Simultaneously, it
disciplines  their  treatment  of  the  bodies  of  Others.  Words  spoken,  like  those  of  the
interrogator, are given impressions of ‘truth.’ And thus, they do violence to those they
demean.
Williams, as a translator - and notably female - is excluded from the front lines.
Buzzell, however, is frequently present in combat scenes, and relays them with colourful
description. They convey how verbal violence commonly accompanies physical violence.
Narrating an attack of a mosque, he recounts another soldier “hysterically throwing up the
heavy-metal devil-horn hand signal like it was an Ozzy Osborne concert, yelling, ‘Who hoo!
Fuck you, mosque! Fuck you!’ And everybody started engaging the mosque with everything
they had” (Buzzell, 2006: 160). Buzzell momentarily wonders, “Like isn’t this against some
kind of Geneva Convention thing?” (ibid.), but keeps shooting nonetheless yelling “‘Get
some!’ every time I fired a burst (like they do in the movies)” (2006: 161). The soldiers’
gesticulations and exclamations shift their battle into a hyper reality, where they are cheering
on heavy metal or in a hyper-masculinist action movie. Their actions are momentarily not
real, and they can therefore behave uncontrollably, and imitate the hegemonic masculinity of
action movies like Rambo,  where the hero is usually the strongest man capable of killing or
harming the most people. Their Iraqi enemies are not human, and viewed as demons, enabling
the delight they take in the destruction. Indeed, for Buzzell, the “[huge mess] was fucking
beautiful” (ibid.). Despite Buzzell’s realisation that they are attacking a religious building, this
does not summon enough empathy to cease fighting. After all, it is a building of a faith whose
fundamentalist members are their terrorist enemies. The subconscious anti-Islamic outlook
permeates combat as another contributing factor to the demonisation and barbarisation of
Muslim men. The destruction of the buildings that house their religious institutions is not only
a material annihilation, but also a metaphorical act of ideological imperialism of US
militarism over the Islamic faith and its followers.
According to Elshtain, “Because women are exterior to war, men interior, men have
long been the great war-story tellers, legitimated in that role because they have ‘been there’ or
because they have greater entrée into what it ‘must be like’” (Elshtain, 1995: 212). Women’s
stories of war and resistance indeed have not been conferred with the great status of men’s
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war novels. The competition with popular men’s stories of Iraq like Buzzell’s may explain the
different covers of Williams’ books in the US and UK editions. Whose stories are read in part
determines the experiences and perspectives of combat in the War on Terrorism that are
adopted as truths. Although Williams’ femininity enabled her to see sex in the Army and the
power  it  gives  men,  this  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  experience  of  all  women,  of  course.
Feminist standpoint, however, is highly useful here, for, examining women’s experiences of
the War on Terror militarism highlights how it is gendered and brings to light experiences and
thus, power relations, that would otherwise remain hidden if one were to rely solely on male
stories.
Assuming as Elshtain writes that women’s stories are less publicly interesting than
men’s,  especially  in  a  culture  like  in  the  US  where  masculine  militarism  reigns  supreme,  it
can be supposed that literary promoters would seek methods to sell the woman’s book as
effectively as possible. Recalling that the US ideal female soldier presents herself as a serious
and  dedicated  professional,  who  is  neither  a  whore  nor  a  lesbian  and  does  not  put  up  with
harassment, Williams too reaches for legitimacy with such a projection.
On the cover of the US edition of Love My Rifle More Than You, Williams stands in
desert fatigues in front of a large Army truck, legs spread apart firmly on the ground, like a
serious soldier ready for action. Her hair is open, sunglasses covering her eyes, and a cheerful
smile on her face. These convey her femaleness, but yet not too feminine that she is militarily
Image 11 UK CoverImage 10 US Cover
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incompetent - her hair is short, sunglasses plain, and her smile is not sexually suggestive, but
rather seeks to suggest that she is enjoying her job in the Army. In her arms, at the centre of
the photograph, is an enormous rifle. The word ‘rifle’ in the title beside the photograph of the
rifle emphasises its presence, and even might suggest that Williams’ happy expression is her
love for her rifle, which she is almost embracing with affection. The image implies that the
text is about women’s serious professionalism in the Army - professionalism meaning their
repression of undesirable feminine characteristics, their willingness to obey orders, fight and
kill, and dedication to their cause, country and co-soldiers.
The UK cover, however, contrasts starkly to the US edition. As shown, the UK cover
simply displays three pairs of shoes, supposedly Williams’, two of which are distinctly
feminine high heels, and the third a pair of worn Army boots. They can be interpreted as
representing the different feminine identities of Williams. For example, the heeled sandals
represent  her  on  her  time off,  on  vacation,  enjoying  herself.  The  second more  study  pair  of
high heels are a more serious, smart, yet ‘feminine’ Williams. Finally the large boots
represent the serious ‘soldier’ Williams. Imagining a woman in these different shoes sets off
the spectator’s imagination of the gender jumps and sexual transformations that one woman
might  be  capable  of.  For  example,  how  might  a  woman  dance  like  a  princess  at  a  ball  one
night, and then put on her boots in the morning to fight terrorists? The UK cover is more
interested in the transitions in gender and different performances of Williams’ sexual identity,
whereas  the  US cover  promotes  itself  with  a  promise  of  a  serious  glimpse  into  professional
and patriotic female militarism. And, indeed, if marketing strategists assume that the US
public  is  more  likely  to  buy  a  book with  a  woman embracing  her  rifle  and  military  culture,
then this also has connotations on the militarisation of US culture. The provision of and desire
to consume celebratory images of the US military and militarist culture creates and recreates
admiration and support for the institution in everyday society. The happy yet professional
female soldier is portrayed as someone worth reading about, as someone who also has a
brilliant story about the US in Iraq, but from a different gender perspective.
However, Elshtain’s prophecy concerning the lower status of the novels of female
soldiers appears to prevail here too. Although enjoying a degree of success, Williams’ book is
given 3 stars out of 5 by Amazon.com readers, and is number 104,552 on the Amazon.com
Sales Rank, Buzzell’s book is awarded an average of 4.5 stars by readers and is 6,947 on the
Ranking.43 Being a popular Internet shopping website, and judging by the enormous gap in
43 Amazon.com figures as observed on 14 July 2006.
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sales, Buzzell’s is clearly the most read of the two. While these figures merely give a vague
idea of sales, they are not of prime interest here. Both Williams and Buzzell are participatory
of the production and reproduction of particular discourses. These discourses have power that
hierarchalises gender and sexuality in conjunction with militarism and particularly the War on
Terrorism. Gender and sexuality shape, motivate, manipulate, upgrade, and degrade
individuals in war - which in turn moulds and remoulds understandings of gender and
sexuality.  The  military  machine  and  the  men and  women that  constitute  it  are  also  a  part  of
this process, and the discourses that they produce for the ‘folks back home’ help construct
particular truths about men and women in war, the nation for which they fight, and the nature
of the enemies they wish to kill.
Military Mothers: Cindy Sheehan
An  important  group  of  those  ‘folks  back  home’  are  the  mothers  of  soldiers.  As
discussed, militarised mothers are mythical figures in war. As Jeanne Vickers writes, the
family is one of the main contributing sources to militarism, especially mothers, by the early
education of children;
Militarism as a way of thinking and responding to problems at home begins at an early age,
socialised into the behaviour of small children through their relationships in the home and
violent messages in the media. Boys learn to resolve conflict through force, domination and
control. Girls, taught that they belong to the weaker sex, learn the arts of compromise,
accommodation and submission; later as mothers, they continue to exhort their sons to ‘be
men,’ thus perpetuating a societal pattern of violence.
(Vickers, 1993: 43)
As men, mothers continue to be significant figures encouraging their sons them to
become soldiers and fight and provide them with emotional support when they go to war. For
example, Kayla Williams recounts the story of a mother collecting a great sum of money to
ship her son’s unit in Iraq “something like a hundred air conditioners she’d bought at Wal-
Mart” (Williams, 2006: 125). In the War on Terrorism they also become particularly visible
as the mourners of soldiers killed in Iraq. When President George W. Bush meets with
grieving families, it is invariably mothers (and also often husbands) who are under the
spotlight. A Newsweek article (22 August 2005) describes such tearful encounters with Bush,
where several mothers as questions him like one “How could you let this happen? Why is my
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son gone?” (Bailey and Thomas, 2005: 37). After this, however, both the mother and
president begin to cry and continue crying together in a long embrace. The meetings often end
with the president, the patriarchal national leader paternally reassuring these women that their
sons did not die in vain,44 and therefore their motherhood has honourably contributed to the
national security. According to the article, most mothers encourage the president to continue
the war in Iraq, and remain as faithful as possible to the idea-type femininity of militarised
motherhood (see Enloe, 2000b). Cindy Sheehan, however, is an example of a militarised
mother who adopted a staunch anti-war stance, and was consequently perceived by many as a
traitor.
In the summer of 2005, Cindy Sheehan became an anti-war celebrity. She camped
outside President Bush’s Crawford ranch in protest, waiting for him to come and speak to her.
She soon acquired hundreds of followers, many of which shared her experience or empathised
with  her  sufferings.  It  was  the  death  of  her  son  Casey  in  Iraq  that  motivated  her  to  protest
against the war. Reported in Time in August 2005, she said that she had always been uneasy
about  the  war,  but  after  the  death  of  her  son  she  became  convinced  that  the  Bush
Administration lied about the reasons to go to war, and felt betrayed. (Ripley, 2005: 25)
Cindy Sheehan is the only mother to have attracted such widespread publicity. Her
protests  and  statements  have  in  turn  given  voices  to  mothers  speaking  both  for  and  against
Sheehan. Sheehan’s case divides the discourse on military mothers into two different
narratives. One is the Sheehan-like anti-war mother suffering from feelings of governmental
betrayal, and the other is the statist mother defending the war unconditionally. US media
shades the relationship between them as conflictive, and as a difficult question of recognising
the ‘good,’ loyal patriots from the ‘bad’ and dishonourable ones. Either way, both discourses
of military mothers engage in the veneration and mythologisation of the mothers of soldiers as
the  valuable  producers  of  the  male  bodies  that  are  sacrificed  for  the  security  of  the
collectivity.
Cindy Sheehan is described as a “peace activist,” “the symbol of the anti-war
movement,” and “the spiritual leader of the anti-war camp.” Journalist Karen Houppert in The
Nation applauds her for having “swung [public opinion] against the war” as the “grand dame
of the peace movement who declines to niggle over the details and simply urges all the
various factions to get along” (Houppert, 2006:11). She is represents the ideal peacefulness of
44 The president, in such occasions, displays a sensitive, ‘feminine’ side to his strong patriarchal image. This
display of emotion is not considered to be contradictory with his masculinity. Rather, he is awarded with respect
for having the courage and decorum to respect the loss of hegemonic masculinity so profoundly.
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women, and their supposedly superior skills for cooperation and conciliation. Neither is she a
privileged film star like Jane Fonda who demonstrated against the Vietnam War. Houppert
emphasises with praise that she is “a middle-aged, middle-class Everymom,” precisely what
constitutes an average respectable American mother.
Such writing elevates Sheehan to not only a leader, but to a status of divine
motherhood. As a “grand dame” who oversees the movement, she stands above as a matriarch
embodying the principles of the movement community - the Gold Star Families for Peace -
and as their guardian angel, defending it, nurturing it and bestowing it with a celestial aura of
righteousness. Soldiers opposing her protest stopped to speak to her. Their conversations
often ended in mutual tears and hugs (a description which cannot help remind one of the
‘hugging saint’ Mata Amritanandamayi, also known as Amma). As a mother and promoter of
peace, she is thus able to disarm and bring even her opponents to tears with calm conversation
and loving motherly physical contact.
Critics of Sheehan mainly attack her for being unpatriotic and manipulative. In Time
magazine, Casey Sheehan’s aunt said that she was “promoting her own personal agenda at the
expense of her son’s good name” (Ripley, 2005: 24). Others express their disgust with her
more  explicitly.  Jennifer  Harting,  whose  husband  was  killed  at  an  Iraqi  checkpoint,  “thinks
that  instead  of  protesting,  Sheehan  should  take  solace  in  knowing  that  a  soldier’s  job  is  to
follow the President no matter what. ‘Her son’s life could never have been in vain... it’s sad
that she can’t see that’” (Harting in ibid.). A similar view is taking by a Ronald R. Griffin,
mourning father, who believes that Sheehan is “dishonouring all soldiers” (Griffin, 2005:
A10). She has a right to protest, but Griffin would instead “be protesting the very thing that
[his deceased daughter] believed in and died for.” Mourning mother Jeanette Urbina, who
empathises with Sheehan’s grief, but wants to believe that her son eventually died protecting
his country, takes a slightly different view. She does not believe that the ending the war will
alleviate Sheehan’s sorrow, but still believes the war should continue; “The mothers have paid
so  much for  this  war...  I  just  want  it  to  be  a  success  now,  so  all  this  pain  will  be  worth  it”
(Urbina in Ripley, 2005: 25). That so many women criticise Sheehan is demonstrative of the
powerful part that women play in sustaining particular war-supporting performances of both a
particular masculinity as well as a particular femininity.
In these discourses anti-war is equated with anti-Americanism. None of the critics
question the reasons why the war is fought, and believe that questioning the president or
military deployment is unpatriotic. Patriotism for them is an unconditional obedience of the
President and government, and an unconditional trust in their ability to make judgements for
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citizens. A lack of patriotism involves ingratitude for this protection provided by the state, and
such individuals like Sheehan are hounded and shunned for their lack of faith in a chauvinistic
state. The protest of mothers contradicts “the nationalistic interests of their leaders and the
historically deep-rooted patriarchal model of the proud mother and the soldier son” (Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 1996: 359). Thus it is no surprise that Sheehan and her followers are described as
traitors. Indeed there have been even more severe voices of opposition. Charles Krauthammer
of The Washington Post wrote that Sheehan as a “political  radical” who was “exploiting the
media’s hunger for political news... by wrapping herself in the courage of her son Casey”
(Krauthammer, 2005). He interprets the divisions over the war in the Bush-like ‘with us or
against us’ approach, that if one is not for the US, one is for the enemy. Sheehan, according to
Krauthammer, is exactly like that “hard left in the Vietnam War” who thinks that “the good
guys  are  the  ‘freedom  fighters’  -  the  very  ones  who  besides  killing  thousands  of  Iraqi
innocents, killed her son, too.” He then points out the involvement of the Workers World
Party (WWP) in the anti-war movement and by doing so says that Sheehan cannot imagine to
successfully advance her cause in the US with former murderous dictatorial and imperialist
Soviet allies45. Indeed she is not merely allied with them, but she is one of them. She is hence
not one of  ‘us’ but ‘them,’ who are distinctly understood as un-American.46
Some critics voice Cindy Sheehan as ‘evil,’ but for many it is also a matter of
foolishness and gullibility. Time commented on her “naive politics and ideology” (Klein,
2005: 23) in one article, and in another, Amanda Ripley describes her voice as “high, almost
childlike, [S]he says like as often as any teenager” (Ripley, 2005: 23; italics original). Her
naivety and irrationality are consistent with polar gender dichotomies that endow
masculinities with the values of reason and wisdom. Sheehan, instead, is irrational, even
child-like in her self-expression and capacity for logical analysis and judgement. She is,
however, given masculine qualities by supporters. Her friends call her “Attila the Honey” as a
pun on warrior king Attila the Hun. The masculine-coded qualities of a brave warrior,
aggressive, determined and skilful are given to Sheehan to ironically metaphorise her own
battle for peace. They are understood as positive qualities that bring success, credibility and
legitimacy to Sheehan and her entourage. The division between public and private spaces that
depoliticises the private space in which women and children are regularly located, and
45 Krauthammer lists quite a repertoire: “ Thus a rally ostensibly against war is run by a group that supported the
Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the massacre in Tiananmen Square, and a litany
of the very worst mass murderers of our time, including Slobodan Milosevic, Hussein and Kim Jong Il. You
don’t seize moral high ground in America with fellow travellers such as these” (Krauthammer, 2005).
46 See Campbell’s Writing Security for an excellent discussion about the continuity of the us/them, American/un-
American discourse.
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politicises public space, which is taken thus as masculine. Indeed, political public action from
the Boston Tea Party to the Civil Rights movement has been historically depicted as
masculine struggles. Struggles for women’s rights, however, such as the suffragette or pro-
choice abortion movements have consistently faced controversy if not overwhelming
opposition from both contemporary men and women. Movements of men and women such as
the Vietnam anti-war movement, continue to be delegitimised by feminisation - as
Krauthammer’s article shows. It is not surprising therefore, that Sheehan’s movement
promotes itself in masculinised terms, as this affords itself a higher degree of legitimacy and
credibility. At the end of 2005, Cindy Sheehan was on Time’s list of “People That Mattered -
2005” (26 September 2005) beside other masculine figures such as George W. Bush, Dick
Cheney, Pope Benedict XVI, John McCain, the Google inventors, Tony Blair, and Darth
Vader.47 Some severe critics, in turn, according to The Nation, scold her deviation from the
classical feminine housewife, “for protesting the war instead of staying home to cook her
family dinner” (Houppert, 2006: 11).
At closer examination, it becomes apparent that the masculinity Sheehan’s movement
relies on a militarised shell and structure. The name of Sheehan’s anti-war group is the Gold
Star  Families  for  Peace.  The  title  names  the  men and  women of  these  families  as  heroes  by
the reference to their personification as ‘gold stars.’ The heroism implied is of a firmly
nationalistic sort. Stars are present in US national insignia, in the flag, in institutional
emblems and so on. Stars are also traditional in Western military decorations, to which the
reference here is most likely because of the military background of these families. Such
medals, such as the Congressional Medal of Honour in the US (the highest military decoration
possible), are bestowed for exceptional demonstrations of valour and bravery during battle.
They legitimise the militaristic hegemonic masculine ideal-type that celebrates the
thoughtless, unemotional, and mercilessly aggressive warrior who loyally serves the state
unquestioningly with these qualities. By honouring a type of bravery that is defined by the
ability  to  dehumanise  others  and  kill  them,  the  Gold  Star  Families  for  Peace  cannot  be
considered to be anti-war, but anti-war in Iraq. It does not condemn the military, merely
authority figures like President Bush with the power to employ it for wars that cannot be won.
Wars are acceptable, so long as they are winnable and their reasons uncontroversial.
47 There were three other women included: Geena Davis for her role as the first female president in the television
programme Commander and Chief, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, and golf player Michelle Wie -- all
women showing masculine-coded qualities to be considered a success in their roles that have traditionally been
performed by men.
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As mentioned, Cindy Sheehan herself has been militarised by others by, for example,
calling her “Attila the Honey.” Another example of the militarisation of the movement is the
naming of the camp-out protest outside Bush’s ranch as Camp Casey, after her dead son. First
of all it militarises the group by depicting its space as a military garrison, which in turn
depicts the people in that space as soldiers. The protest is a siege of Bush’s ranch, where the
families adopt the identities of their dead soldier sons as if they are continuing their battle for
them. Mothers like Sheehan are the most visible actors there. Although men are equally active
members, their presence is not made felt by the media like the women's’. Sheehan’s husband,
for example, with Cindy herself, is one of three male founding members, which make half of
that board. Despite the militarisation of the movement and the masculinities that it summons,
the women are nonetheless the bodies that are given presence. Again, this emphasises the
esteemed position of military mothers. Motherhood is a station so respected nationalistically
because of the understanding of mothers as vessels of national continuation, the perpetuators
of its blood, and therefore its physical existence and meaningful substance. The reproductive
contribution of fathers, in turn, is to provide their semen, but otherwise to ensure that their
sons  are  brought  up  as  patriots,  as  precisely  the  ‘brave’ warriors  capable  of  killing  for  their
country. Fathers in the movement are not depicted like the caring mother figures, but rather as
feminised men and therefore neither is their presence in a peace movement appropriate, not is
the coverage of an ‘inferior’ masculinity interesting.
And finally, it is significant to mention a further aspect of the spatial militarised
gendering of Camp Casey, that  also has religious implications.  Photographs of Camp Casey
often feature the white crosses planted into the ground, imitating a cemetery. On each cross is
the name of a soldier killed in Iraq. These images are remarkably reminiscent of for example
Image 10 Crosses at Camp Casey Image 11 Crosses at Normandy American Cemetery
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the military graveyard of Normandy where soldiers killed on D-Day are buried, The
Normandy American Cemetery St Laurent (Omaha Beach Cemetery). A large area of space is
used to erect this monument that is explicitly to mourn and honour  the  dead.  It  is  a  simple
construction,  white  crosses  in  rows,  yet  effective  precisely  for  this  reason.  The  cross  in  the
Christian tradition is a symbol of faith, as well as suffering and death. Jesus Christ died on the
cross and suffered for well-being of mankind. While millions have been buried under crosses,
implying the spiritual peace of the deceased, the combination of crosses with the military
merges  religion  with  war.  Soldiers  are  transformed  into  crusaders.  God  is  claimed  to  be  on
their side, by the belief that they will go to heaven if killed in battle because of the nobility of
their cause. The state and its current condition, and thus its masculinist formations, are given
the ultimate divine legitimation. Indeed, as David Campbell describes, the supposed
Westphalian division of church/religion and state was never complete. The masculinist state
implies a masculinist religion, which are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, as the photograph of
Camp Casey shows, dozens of US flags are planted alongside the crosses. The dead male
bodies they symbolise are metaphorical subjects of possession by masculinist religious
conversion and nationalisation.
The crosses also imply a spiritual purity. White being the colour of purity and
virginity, their death represents an extinction of ‘goodness.’ The irony of the display is that
contrary to what is suggests, as soldier’s job is killing, in the Christian faith murderers cannot
reach eternal paradise. The crosses represent an eternalisation of a hegemonic masculinity for
the deceased men after death. The post-mortem idealisation therefore calls for the mourning
of the loss of this imagined exemplary masculinity, but simultaneously encourages its
continuation in other men by setting an example of the desired ideal-type.
In  the  case  of  the  Iraq  war,  as  other  wars,  the  participation  of  women  in  the  role  of
mothers  is  a  source  of  great  pride,  but  ironically  also  their  most  tragic  suffering.  Cindy
Sheehan’s motherly grief motivated her to call for the end of the Iraq war. However, although
the temptation to celebrate her as a pacifist hero, it is imperative to understand that her anti-
war stance is not anti-military. She has very much in common with the mothers that criticise
her by ultimately being a supporter of the soldiers of the US military, which is precisely the
role of the ideal militarised mother. In accordance with the defining criteria of Cynthia Enloe
(2000b: 253-254), Sheehan for example takes motherly pride in her son’s military career,
trusts the military, believes he is worthy of public attention and believes by being a good
mother she is enhancing national security and confirming her own citizenship rights through
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her  son.  She  accepts  that  it  is  the  job  of  sons  to  fight  and  “feels  that  it  is  their  duty  to  their
country to support an operation, which will decimate the population and destroy the very
bases of civilised society” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 363). For Sheehan, however, the
reasons to cause social and environmental destruction in Iraq were not sufficiently justified
for the national security, and therefore regarded the military deployment of men, including her
son, as a waste of idealised masculine bodies. Her opposition is to the US government that
launched the war, particularly the executive branch, the Bush Administration. However, as
demonstrated by the nationalistic display of flags and crosses, the Sheehan is staunchly
supportive of a patriarchal statist, Christian and pro-military social status quo. She does not
make the connection between masculinism and soldiering, and she is a continuation of a
motherhood femininity that supports the hegemonic ideal-type masculinity that militarisation
glorifies.
Sheehan is not the ideal-type mother especially because of her lack of complete
submissiveness and refusal to remain uncritical about the war. However, as Enloe writes, “the
military does not usually require the ideal” (Enloe, 2000b: 253), and the ideal is a rarity.
Nonetheless,  “it  is  a rare mother of a son who can resist  absorbing several  parts of the ideal
into her own maternal values” (Enloe, 2000b: 254), and Sheehan is no exception. Her anti-war
stance may catalyse public opposition to the Iraq war, but this opposition is exclusive and
does not extend to other past, present and future wars.  The military survives in tact through
Sheehan’s movement as the correct place for men to enhance their manhood, for women to
mourn the loss of it, and for the state to celebrate it.
VI.   FINAL REMARKS
The  case  of  Cindy  Sheehan  exemplifies  a  popular  faction  of  the  US  anti-war
movement that retains patriarchal assumptions about masculinity and femininity, instead of
challenging warfare from its rigid gendered structures. As Cynthia Enloe warns, as long as
such assumptions “shape people’s beliefs and identities and their relationships with one
another, militarisation, however, temporarily stanched, lies dormant, capable of rising again,
and yet again” (Enloe, 1993: 70) The recognition and acknowledgement that wars rely on
particular disciplinary gender hierarchies and sexually discriminative acts and attitudes, is the
first  vital  step  to  bring  about  change.  As  we  have  seen  from  the  discourses  of  the  War  on
Terrorism, gender hierarchies prioritise the needs of particular individuals. The events of 11
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September bestowed visibility and instant celebration to strong, ‘heroic,’ white American
men, like fire fighters, who toppled the previous rationalist-bourgeois hegemonic masculinity
of the WTC victims. The escalation towards militarisation also reflected the continuing eager
desire for the remasculinisation of US identity begun in the Gulf War to make up for its
humiliation in the Vietnam War.
This new hegemonic US masculinity was confirmed in discourses on the militarisation
of the War on Terrorism, first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq. Throughout, its prioritisation has
been dependent on the Othering of the enemy. The masculinity of most Muslim men is
demeaned by their representation as evil, homosexual and/or sexually perverted, uncivilised
monsters. These misogynistic, homophobic, racist, and anti-Islamic US discourses of Muslim
men are targeted at terrorists, Afghani men, Saddam Hussein, or at times at any Muslim
person, usually male. Sometimes discourses of the same people change, from representing
them as monsters to victims instead, as is the case in Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. The
sexual abuse endured by the prisoners reflects a homophobic and sadistic US colonialism, as
demonstrated also in the autobiographies of Kayla Williams and Colby Buzzell. Nonetheless,
their captivity and powerlessness continues to feminise the prisoners. Their pitiable conditions
revealed by the US mass media produce discourses of mercy for the unfortunate, uncivilised
men captive in US military detention centres. If they cannot be killed, the must be saved,
exorcised of their sexual perversion and wickedness and Islamic paganism that encourages it,
in order to redeem them as valuable bodies. Until then, they remain sinful, worthless brown
male bodies to be killed by nationally celebrated and technologically equipped White men.
Demonising  discourses  are  accompanied  by  and  articulated  at  the  expense  of  the
victimisation of remaining Others. These remaining Others are in most cases the women or
‘womenandchildren’ in the Other country in question. The tragic treatment of women under
the Taliban regime became a fervently publicised additional justification to the invasion of
Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s regime was a danger to both women and
its children, as well as many men whose powerless victimhood demasculinised them in US
eyes. In both cases, the discourse of Bush’s militant hegemonic masculinity depicted the
invasions as crusades to ‘liberate’ these unfortunate and oppressed Muslim women from the
uncivilised and sexist clutches of their monstrous men. In Afghanistan in particular, the US
women’s rights discourse emphasised the connection between women’s rights and
democratisation.  This  connection  contained  Orientalist  desires  to  unveil  the  Islamic  woman
and discipline the Islamic faith and hence its followers. The Bush Administration and US
media,  while  uncritical  of  women’s rights  issues  in  the  US,  was  quick  to  proclaim personal
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success in the Afghan women’s rights issue, as demonstrated by the discourses on Malalai
Joya.  Discourses  reflected  little  understanding  of  forms  of  Islamic  feminism  or  concern  for
the experiences of women in post-invasion Afghanistan. Western liberal feminist demands of
a selection of written rights (and not necessarily enforced) and franchise sufficed for the US
government to declare they had ‘liberated’ Afghani women.
The  presentation  of  women  as  victims  in  US  discourses  also  confirmed  a  prevailing
preconception, that women do not, or rather should not participate in warfare. Women were
not present among the doers of 11 September. Rather, male terrorists and male US politicians,
military strategists and rescue workers were made visible in the events of the day. Should the
terrorists had been women, it could have been used as a warning of the dangers of ‘irrational’
feminine  behaviour  in  power.  Indeed,  the  discourse  on  female  terrorists  reflects  the  fear  of
female violence. The acts of violence carried out by female terrorists are in contradiction with
classic dichotomies of male-violent-lifetaker/ female-peaceful-lifegiver. Their bodies are
represented as mentally pathological and sexually hyper-sexualised, amounting to a particular
dangers body. Terrorist women, as the bearers and carers of children, are a danger to
Western/Christian family values, as represented by Cindy Sheehan for example, thus social
organisation, also because of their seduction by and relationships with Muslim men. Once
again, therefore, Muslim men are presented as the criminals, who beguile, seduce and
brainwash unsuspecting women. As discourse on Muriel Degauque demonstrated, the danger
presented by Muslim men is not only to Muslim women, but also to Western women, thus
victimising women on both ‘sides’ as a valuable and vulnerable species to be protected by US
men.
The soldiers involved in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were, of course, not
only  men,  but  women  were  also  members  of  the  forces  stationed  there.  The  writings  of
Williams and Buzzell nonetheless contribute to the discourse that continues to regard the
military as a boy’s club. Buzzell’s popular text confirms the military male as a macho, White,
and heterosexual experience. Williams partakes in misogynistic remarks and behaviour,
therefore it is difficult to suppose that women’s participation in the military would transform
the institution into a woman and/or gay friendly establishment. As Williams’ writings
demonstrate, women in the military must conform to a particular femininity that does not
threaten the masculinity of the male soldiers, but rather, support it by actively accepting
misogynism, and never challenging their masculinity, for example by issuing complaints
about sexual harassment.
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Indeed the other source of support for soldiers was strongly at the homefront.
Immediately after 11 September, the fervent display of US flags from windows and flag pins
on chests expressed an eagerness, albeit sometimes unknown to its wearer, for US militarism.
Despite the reservations of some and the anti-war stance of many, the support for US troops
nonetheless prevails in anti-war discourses. Politicians may be wrong, but the ‘good guys’ are
always ‘our boys’ as demonstrated in Cindy Sheehan’s movement.
Indeed, this accounts for the deep shock and shame of US citizens regarding the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal. It was inconceivable that the heroes - the most idealised and celebrated
national representations of the US self - were secretly involved in gruesome torture that had
implications on the homosexual and sadomasochistic desires of the US Military Police
guards. Although the reaction could be interpreted as a realisation of problems of the military
institution, instead it was construed as an exceptional deviancy within the self. The sexual acts
of Abu Ghraib were characterised as something foreign, from and performed in an uncivilised
space and culture, and was to be left there while the guilty soldiers carried out their purifying
and disciplinary sentences. It was discussed as a pathological sexuality to be extricated and
punished, thereby preserving the sexually chaste, and undesiring Christian heterosexual US
“true” self-image, as described by Laura Bush, for example.
Instead of trivialising and ignoring gender in International Relations, this thesis has
made it the centre of its analysis, and contributed to understanding how constructions of
femininities and masculinities function and fluctuate to uphold military values and agendas,
and hence here, support and justify the militarisation of the War on Terror. These dominant
discourses are present in continuities. Some are momentary, some continue throughout, and
some disappear and re-emerge at a different time and place. All are intertwined and necessary
to  develop  one’s  ability  to  analyse  and  criticise  gender  in  War  on  Terrorism  discourses.  Of
course, the discourses discussed here are not the only significant ones. Others could have been
explored and gendered, for example discourses between Afghan and Western feminists,
Afghan and Iraqi refugees, or the post-US invasion descriptions of Iraqi civilians, of their
‘liberation,’ or their sufferings in wartime. Even the further individual exploration of any of
the discourses discussed here is easily possible in another research project. Here, nonetheless,
the aim was to provide a discussion in the attempt to understand gendered continuities and
power structures in War on Terrorism discourses.
It  is  necessary  not  only  to  criticise  and  analyse,  but  also  to  ponder  the  potential  for
change. Recalling Foucault, it must be kept in mind that where there is power there is also
resistance, which is never exterior in relation to power (Foucault, 1978: 95). Resistance is
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possible  at  a  variety  of  points  in  power  relations,  and  in  many  forms.  Current  dominant
discourses can be replaced with counter discourses that offer alternative interpretations of
politics, events, people, and places. New ones can also be introduced. For example, instead of
lamenting the US abuse of heterosexual, brown Muslims, in the future it might be possible to
discuss their experiences as humans, and even make visible the bodies of and give voices to
women, homosexual Muslim men and women, transvestites, and transgenders, who continue
to be invisible. The absence of women in discourses, geographical location and sexuality
aside, is a particularly troubling. Empowering discourses of gender equality are crucial points
of resistance to dissolve the misogyny that militarism feeds on, as well as to amplify the
voices, needs and experiences of women who currently exist in a silent vacuum. In addition it
is necessary for feminists to vilify patriarchy and the patriarchal structure of privilege and
control.
The understanding of gender as malleable is vital to gendered resistance. For, it is the
very ability to mould gender that enables the displacement of harmful hegemonic gender
identities and the breaking of gender hierarchies themselves that endow gender privileges.
The masculinity that encourages and sustains a desire to fight in war would no longer be able
to award its possessor a privileged social status. Likewise, no longer would the state, citizens,
wives, mothers, or other men be pressured to manipulate men into mobilisation by such
notions of masculinity. Resistance and transformation are indeed possible, and capable of
challenging the existence of war itself, which is dependent on these so-called ‘rational’
gendered perceptions of human worthiness, and unworthiness.
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